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Abstract
Information in the cloud is under constant attack from cyber criminals as
profitability increases; user privacy is also at risk with data being mined for
monetary value – the new gold. A single leak could have devastating conse-
quences for a person or organisation, yet users have limited control over their
privacy. It is becoming clear that the current model for public cloud computing
is flawed, where cloud vendors and their employees can no longer be trusted
to protect user data. Privacy-preserving computation in the cloud keeps data
private at all times but still remains functional, thus returning control of data
back to users. The cloud could then perform operations using data that it
cannot comprehend. The end-user would then be able to retrieve the results
from the cloud and unlock the real answers.
Homomorphic encryption is a solution for privacy-preserving processing, al-
lowing computation over cipher text. At the time of writing, a fully homo-
morphic system allows arbitrary operations but requires minutes to compute
an operation, whereas partially homomorphic encryption can only support a
single operation, meaning it cannot be a generic solution to privacy-preserving
computing. Another solution is multi-party computation, which uses a dis-
tributed approach built upon homomorphic encryption but currently suffers
other limitations like reusability and lacks the ability to be truly dynamic.
The primary objective of this research is to design a solution for the cloud
that offers privacy-preserving data computation but provides performance and
flexibility. A novel approach for multi-party computation is developed, where
the combination of encoding and distribution helps provide the balance be-
tween security, performance and utility. Privacy is maintained by each dis-
tributed entity only receiving a small portion of the actual data through en-
coding, where attempting to brute-force the data results in a vast number of
iii
possibilities, similar to encryption. Functions are defined with universal or cus-
tom logic and are computed quickly, as the performance overhead is no longer
computational but network latency. A cloud voting application was used for
analysis between existing solutions and the novel approach taken by this re-
search, which is able to add thousands of votes per minute, giving practical
privacy-preserving processing in the cloud.
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Introduction
Placing responsibility for keeping data private entirely within the hands of
a cloud vendor is not a sustainable solution to the general problem of data
privacy [1][2]. This is supported by 88% of the 3, 000 people surveyed being
worried about who has access to their data, and 84% worrying about where this
data is stored [3]. Furthermore, 91% would like a system which enables them
to have control over their data [3]. Combined with the increasing profitability
of data breaches for malicious entities, there is a need to protect data for its
entire duration in the cloud. However, systems that protect data privacy today
either have limited functionality [4][5][6] or are impractical [7][8][9][10][11].1
The research presented in this thesis addresses this issue, by studying the
problem from an implementation and practicality point-of-view.
1.1 Background
Encryption is a common approach to protecting data in the cloud. How-
ever, most cryptosystems preclude any computation over the data unless it is
decrypted. In contrast, homomorphic encryption allows operations to be com-
puted over cipher text [4]. Therefore, data can be protected while maintaining
some functionality.
The term homomorphic originates from ancient Greek, where homos means
same and morphe means shape. There are two types of homomorphic en-
1This thesis addresses privacy at the same level as encryption, where data should not be vis-
ible to the computing platforms; a layer below areas such as differential privacy [12][13].
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cryption: partial and full. Partially homomorphic encryption can only sup-
port a single operation over cipher text, for example addition [6] or multi-
plication [4][5], where fully homomorphic encryption, also known as the “holy
grail” of encryption, can support multipliable operations [9], allowing more ad-
vanced computation to be performed over encrypted data. However, currently
no fully homomorphic encryption scheme is efficient enough to be used in the
real world [14], and partially homomorphic encryption can be too limited for
many applications.
The other state-of-the-art concept for privately processing data in the cloud
is secure multi-party computation [15][16][17]. Instead of the data being pro-
tected on a single entity, the data is distributed across multiple parties, al-
lowing them to jointly compute a function while keeping their inputs private
from the other parties. Where fully homomorphic encryption is a computably
intensive operation, multi-party computation suffers from large network trans-
fers and implementation issues including reusability of garbled circuits, which
is also discussed in Chapter 3. Many secure multi-party computation schemes
make use of homomorphic encryption [18][19][20]; thus, in cases, the perfor-
mance is also limited by that of the homomorphic scheme it is built upon.
Protecting data in the cloud faces other risks aside from practicality. Some
governments today are looking at the possible ban on encryption or forcing
the inclusion of backdoors. This is because encryption schemes are designed to
protect the data they obfuscate, no matter who encrypted it. These political
challenges could significantly weaken the security levels we have today. A
different approach to encryption for protecting data should be considered to
address this possible issue.
The research reported in this thesis removes the need for data to be en-
crypted (using a traditional scheme) for processing while still remaining pro-
tected. A custom secure processor [4][21] would also achieve this but is not
widely deployable in the cloud, and again it still reveals the plain text inside
the processor. One technique to keep the data private is with lossy encod-
ing, where even when half the data is broken, the other half still needs to be
cracked [22]. Another is by one entity not possessing the necessary data to
view the plain-text [23].
2
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1.2 Hypothesis
The operation limitations of partially homomorphic encryption, and computa-
tional intensity of fully homomorphic encryption, currently prevent homomor-
phic encryption from being usable for most cloud applications. The issues arise
from the complexity of the encryption schemes and underlying mathematics,
which we discuss in Chapter 2, leading to the primary research question for
this thesis:
“Can fully homomorphic encryption be practical in the cloud?”
There were three steps taken to answer this question, and are given as the
following questions, leading to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 The underlying large number operations for homomorphic en-
cryption can be optimised for better performance.
Did not lead to major breakthroughs within the time of the PhD– see Ap-
pendix A.
Hypothesis 2 A simpler fully homomorphic scheme can provide practical per-
formance while remaining secure.
This was unsuccessful due to security weaknesses of using simultaneous equa-
tions – see Appendix B.
Hypothesis 3 Data need not be encrypted for practical privacy-preserving com-
putation; instead, keyless obfuscation and distribution can protect privacy by
a single entity not possessing enough information to decode the data, while
supporting arbitrary computation.
This hypothesis was formulated after 1 and 2 had been investigated and de-
veloped into the main hypothesis of this thesis.
3
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.3 Scope
1.3.1 Use Cases
Four use cases were considered in this thesis:
1. An entity would like to have a secure ballot, where votes must be pri-
vate and only the final tally should be revealed in plain text. Therefore,
information about how someone voted should not be obtainable.
2. A personal user would like to store their health/home data (heartbeat,
sleep patterns, or room temperatures) collected from activity trackers
and other Internet of Things (IoT) devices in the cloud. This data should
remain private, but it needs to be processed to find alerts or information
such as irregular heartbeats.
3. An organisation or company wants to store and process their confidential
data in the cloud, where it needs to be kept private at all times, even
from the cloud hosting company and its employees.
4. Multiple organisations would like to share data between them in the cloud
but control the operations computed over them and be able to control
access to their shared data (for example deleting data).
The primary use case was cloud voting because it allowed for comparison
between state-of-the-art works. Use cases 2 and 3 are essentially the same as
use case 1 in that operations need to be computed over private data. The
difference is that use case 1 has many clients and requires high performance.
The last use case targets controlling data in the cloud: who has access and
what operations they can perform.
1.3.2 Privacy-Preserving Encoding
The schemes presented in this thesis do not claim to be encryption techniques;
instead, they provide privacy through encoding. The term Privacy-Preserving
Encoding is used to differentiate encoding from encryption, while still protect-
ing data. The difference between encoding and encryption is minuscule [24].
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Both transform data, but encryption keeps some parts of the process a secret.
Without this secret value (the key), it should be computationally intensive to
break. Therefore, if only the intended parties have the secret, then the data
should remain hidden from everyone else. Note that hashing is usually for
integrity, it takes an arbitrary input and returns a fixed-length “unique” out-
put [24]; whereas obfuscation is very similar to encoding and for the purpose
of this thesis, we will say they are the same.
Traditional cryptography follows the principle given below, by the Dutch
cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs [25].
Principle A cryptosystem must not depend on keeping the algorithm safe, only
the secret key [25].
However, encoding a value b into 3 values using Exclusive-OR (XOR) logic
gates does not have a secret key. For example, with b = 0, an encoding could
be 1⊕ 0⊕ 1. If two of the values are known, b is still hidden. But this is not
achieved with a secret key like traditional encryption.
One of the oldest encryption techniques known is the Caesar cipher, named
after Julius Caesar who used it to protect messages of high importance, such as
military instructions. This is a type of substitution cipher, which maps plain-
text values to their cipher-text counterparts at a shifted index in the same
alphabet. Decoding requires the shift number, which is the secret key. Mary,
Queen of Scots, used a simple substitution cipher to try and plan the assassi-
nation of Queen Elizabeth I. This cipher mapped the alphabet and common
words to another alphabet. For this scheme, the mapping table is classified as
the secret. By today’s standards, both these old techniques are weak, making
it hard to classify them as encryption schemes. The nature of the algorithms
are a shift index or a simple mapping, where most encryption schemes in-
volve some hard mathematical problem, but they can still be categorised as
encoding.
In legalisation and regulations, encryption is also often defined as something
that uses a key. For example, in a letter from the New Zealand Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade in February 1997 states “The export of code in
any form is regulated in New Zealand in terms of the guidelines below: They
contain encryption limited to (i) 40-bit key lengths for symmetric algorithms;
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(ii) 512 bits for asymmetric algorithms; (iii) 56-bit DES for dedicated financial
algorithms” [26][27]. Therefore, for this thesis, the term Privacy-Preserving
Encoding will be used to define a mapping-based cryptosystem, where the
map is secret or defines a scheme that does not technically have a secret key
but still provides data privacy.
1.3.3 Data Security and Privacy
Achieving perfect security for data storage and processing in the cloud does
not guarantee the protection of data. It remains at risk because at some point
the user will need to access the plain-text data. Even if the service requires
authentication, a malicious user or a piece of malware can wait until access is
granted. Mobile malware is a growing threat [28] and gives attackers the ability
to steal data from the device. However data can also be stolen from services the
device has access, for example a cloud service. This is a current open problem
for applications like cloud voting with mobile agents [29], because currently
security cannot be guaranteed on the mobile device. Similarly, the cloud is
under threat from new attacks and vulnerabilities found each day (zero-day
attacks) [30][31].
This thesis attempts to mitigate the risk of zero-days by spreading data
across different cloud services. Meaning any scheme presented should be easy
to implement on current cloud infrastructure, for example Amazon Web Ser-
vices (AWS) [32] or Microsoft Azure [33], and not require any special hardware
or equipment. Thus allowing it to be distributed across varying operating
systems, applications and companies (to prevent a malicious employee from
accessing data).
Data is considered to be private in the cloud when no single hosting entity
can see the corresponding plain text. For example, if some data is hosted on
cloud A, then if cloud A is compromised, the data is still obfuscated. However,
if all hosts of some distributed data are compromised, the data could be lost.
This is still considered private data for the purpose of this thesis. Note that this
thesis investigates protecting data in the cloud, not necessary the operations
being computed over it.
Similarly, this thesis assumes all parties perform the operations currently.
No tampering, corrupting of the data or program being computed. We aim to
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protect privacy from entities able to observe and copy data (eyes only). Some
work was done to address this issue, but it is not the primary focus of this
thesis. Our focus was instead on performance while keeping the data private.
Finally, for the purpose of this thesis data privacy is for computing nodes,
where data outside of the computing node still requires the same protection
mechanisms seen today. Even though Hypothesis 3 states that data will not be
encrypted, this only targets the processing of the data. Data transfers across
the network still need to be encrypted using current cryptography schemes, and
data storage should still use encryption to provide an extra layer of security.
1.4 Contributions
The first contribution is purely as an implementation to see how existing works
can create a practical privacy-preserving cloud application. This thesis has two
main contributions, the schemes Bin Encoding [22] and Fragmenting Individual
Bits (FRIBs) [23]. These use encoding techniques instead of encryption to
provide data privacy in the cloud. They both protect data by “hiding in the
masses” where there exist a large number of combinations and it is difficult to
know when a correct solution is found.
1.4.1 Secure Survey Platform
In order to answer the research question, a definition and understanding of
practicality for privacy-preserving cloud computation was required. This was
accomplished by designing and implementing a secure survey platform using
partially homomorphic encryption, presented in Section 3.3. Initially this was
published as a voting scheme [29], before being converted to a survey sys-
tem. In addressing some of the challenges faced, a fully secure cloud survey
application is possible today, however with missing functionality and security
concerns. The main contribution of this application was it shows the practi-
cality of using privacy-preserving schemes in the real-world, from limitations
with JavaScript and mobile devices on the client-side, to reduced functionality
in the cloud which results in more processing by the survey creator.
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1.4.2 A Private Encoding Search Scheme
Bin Encoding was initially designed as an attempt to help answer Hypothe-
sis 3, where encoded data can provide some form of private functionality [22].
The private search functionality achieved is near that of plain text, as is per-
formance, including client-side. Related work focuses on encryption and cryp-
tographic trapdoor functions [34][35], where this thesis will show how a simple
lossy encoding scheme can protect privacy for approximate string searching.
However, Bin Encoding highlighted a few challenges with encoding data using
a static mapping, one of which is the lack of randomness. Even so, Hypothesis 3
showed merit as even with knowledge of the mapping, it can still be difficult
to recreate the plain-text values. A distributed model for Bin Encoding was
also presented, where greater privacy was achieved by distributing the search
across multiple cloud providers or services. The model for Bin Encoding was
published [22], where Chapter 4 also gives some additional results.
1.4.3 FRIBs: An Arbitrary Privacy-Preserving Scheme
Bin Encoding showed the potential for using encoding for privacy-preserving
processing. But a new scheme was needed to provide arbitrary computation
in order to fully meet the requirements of the research question. Fragment-
ing Individual Bits (FRIBs) is presented in this thesis as a potential solu-
tion for a practical privacy-preserving processing scheme. It was designed to
meet the hypotheses, but more importantly to try and answer the research
question. The first model given in Chapter 5 was published (the reduction
server model) [23], where the main models–the performance and enhanced pri-
vacy models–are the main contribution of this thesis. The design resembles
multi-party computation but handles data sharing and garbled circuits using
encoding. One advantage over other multi-party computation designs is that
Fragmenting Individual Bits (FRIBs) can reuse its Lookup Table (LUT)s.
1.5 Organisation
The presentation of this thesis will start with current works. A review and
discussion are given in Chapter 2, highlighting the problem of practicality. This
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chapter identities that the idea of secure computation was proposed since early
encryption schemes like the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman cryptosystem. The state-
of-the-art work from Chapter 2 is implemented and compared in Chapter 3 for
the use case of cloud voting. This helped create a definition for “practical” ;
a requirement when researching towards a practical solution. To summarise,
practicality is a balance between performance, and flexibility or utility.
In researching Hypothesis 2, a discovery was made for appropriate privacy-
preserving string searching using “bins”. Chapter 4 describes this research
and gives analysis on the privacy achieved. The scheme uses a lossy random-
mapping between an alphabet and a smaller alphabet. There are a large
number of combinations for decoding, where knowing the correct answer is
difficult. Even when successfully decoding half of the data, there are still
a large number of combinations for the remaining half. Chapter 4 not only
introduces Privacy-Preserving Encoding (PPE), but also the use of distribution
to improve privacy as each server has less information.
The three Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the main contribution of this thesis–
the Fragmenting Individual Bits (FRIBs) scheme–addressing all four use cases
and Hypothesis 3. The two core FRIBs models are described in Chapter 5:
the performance model and enhanced privacy model. Both build off earlier
work published on FRIBs [23], distributing single bits across multiple servers,
while also managing to distribute the computation table (similar to a garbled
circuit), such that no information is leaked during execution. Functions are de-
fined like garbled circuits for multi-party computation, except that they can be
reused as Chapter 6 demonstrates. The data can only be decoded by retrieving
all the distributed bits, thus privacy and security is obtained by the multiple
servers spread over different entities. Chapter 7 gives two proof-of-concept
implementations: cloud voting and exact string searching; before evaluating
their practicality. Privacy is then analysed in Chapter 7, proving that no in-
formation is leaked during processing when using the enhanced privacy model.
The hypotheses and use cases are revisited in Chapter 8, concluding that PPE,
in particular FRIBs, can provide an alternative to computationally intensive
encryption schemes. Chapter 8 also mentions future work, providing a few re-
search directions for FRIBs; however, ultimately the target for FRIBs is being
deployed in real-world implementations.
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Literature Review
In this chapter, literature is reviewed related to privacy-preserving processing:
in particular, works focused on cloud implementations. Chapter 1 briefly in-
troduced homomorphic encryption and secure multiparty computation, which
will be expanded further in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. Another popular
method of privacy-preserving processing is with custom hardware processors,
discussed in Section 2.3. However, it is worth noting that their effectiveness
for cloud deployments is yet to be discovered [36].
2.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is the current state-of-the-art solution to privacy-
preserving processing in the cloud. As previously mentioned in Chapter 1
there are two types: partially and fully homomorphic encryption. Partially
homomorphic encryption has faster computation but only supports a single
operation, while fully homomorphic encryption is currently impractical but
supports arbitrary computation [37]. Note that there is a third variate called
somewhat homomorphic encryption, where only a limited number of operations
can be applied before the scheme produces invalid results [38][39]. Many fully
homomorphic encryption schemes actually have this limitation, but are able
to re-encrypt (known as bootstrapping [39]) the cipher values, resetting the
number of operations applied [8][9][39]. Given the use cases in Section 1.3.1,
especially voting which requires millions of operations, somewhat homomor-
phic encryption will not be detailed in this thesis.
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Table 2.1: Historic overview of homomorphic encryption
2013 • Homomorphic Encryption from Learning with Errors:
Conceptually-Simpler, Asymptotically-Faster, Attribute-Based [9]
2010 • Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Integers [8]
2009 • A Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme [39]
• Fully Homomorphic Encryption using Ideal Lattices [7]
2008 • A New Approach for Algebraically Homomorphic Encryption [40]
2002 • A Provably Secure Additive and Multiplicative Privacy
Homomorphism [41]
1999 • Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree
Residuosity Classes [6]
1996 • A New Privacy Homomorphism and Applications [42]
1988 • On Privacy Homomorphisms [43]
1987 • Processing Encrypted Data [44]
1985 • A Database Encryption Scheme Which Allows the Computation
of Statistics using Encrypted Data [45]
• A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on
Discrete Logarithms [5]
1982 • Signature Protocols for RSA and Other Public-Key
Cryptosystems [46]
• Probabilistic Encryption & How To Play Mental Poker Keeping
Secret All Partial Information [47]
1978 • On Data Banks and Privacy Homomorphisms [4]
• A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key
cryptosystems [34]
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2.1.1 Historic Overview
The notation of homomorphic encryption has existed for decades, as Table 2.1
shows. Rivest et al. first proposed special encryption functions called “privacy
homomorphisms” in 1978 [4]. They initially discussed the use of hardware to
process data securely, where the data is only decrypted on a physically secure
processor (discussed further in Section 2.3). Next, they describe a solution
where data is encrypted while still allowing standard hardware to compute
operations over it – the first notion of concept of homomorphic encryption.
Proof-of-concept examples were given by Rivest et al. , showing that the
concept of processing encrypted data could be possible, concluding with two
open questions [4]:
Question 1 Does this approach have enough utility to make it worthwhile in
practice?
Question 2 For what algebraic systems does a useful privacy homomorphism
exist?
Later in 1978, the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman cryptosystem (RSA) was made
public. The original paper had no mention of homomorphic encryption; how-
ever, it was later proved to support multiplication over encrypted data [46].
This is due to the mathematical properties of RSA, where raising a message
to e in modulo n allows the two encrypted messages to be multiplied correctly
since me0 ×me1 mod n ≡ (m0 ×m1)e mod n. Therefore, partially homomor-
phic encryption has been conceptually supported since the idea of homomor-
phic encryption was conceived, though it was only realised years later [46].
Similar to work by Davida et al. [48] in 1981, Blakley et al. proposed
a database encryption scheme, which supported computing statistical opera-
tions over the encrypted data [45]. Even though the paper did not specifically
mention homomorphism, this was another step in proving that processing en-
crypted data could be made worthwhile in practice. The terminology used
by Blakley et al. for protecting data was hiding needles in a haystack [45],
where a large number of possible options exist, but only one is correct. The
example provided required finding the Greatest Common Divisor (GCD) of
approximately 2162 pairs [45]. It would be infeasible to try each pair, even
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when performing millions of checks per second. This concept of hiding in the
masses is one of the security properties that the work in this thesis builds
upon.
In 1987, Ahituv et al. provides some example algorithms that can support
homomorphic operations [44]; however these have very weak security. The
following year, Brickell et al. evaluated the first known proposal of homo-
morphic algorithms by Rivest et al. [4], proposing an additive homomorphic
algorithm where there was a maximum number of additions that could occur
before it would break [43]. However, it was not until 1996 that the first homo-
morphic encryption scheme to support both addition and multiplication was
proposed [42]. Ferrer provided a needed breakthrough in the field, and later
showed in 2002 that the proposed scheme was secure against known clear-
text attacks; however, the scheme was broken a year later by Wagner [49].
Armknecht et al. proposed a solution that supported an arbitrary number of
addition operations, but only a fixed number of multiplications, while remain-
ing secure under a known decoding problem [40].
Until this point, challenges that proposed schemes encountered were either:
(1) not secure, (2) not able to maintain homomorphic properties, (3) not able
to support repeated operations, or (4) incredibly inefficient. The breakthrough
occurred in 2009 when Gentry proposed a scheme that could support an ar-
bitrary number of additions and multiplications, and the security was based
on the hardness of lattice problems [39]. Since then, Gentry et al. have been
involved in proposing many schemes [7][8][9] for fully homomorphic encryp-
tion, gradually improving the schemes; however, a practical solution is yet to
be discovered.
2.1.2 Overview of Partially Homomorphic Encryption Cryptosystems
This section will describe a few common partially homomorphic encryption
cryptosystems: RSA, El Gamal, Paillier and Goldwasser–Micali. The encryp-
tion and decryption algorithms are given to prove their homomorphic prop-
erties. A similarity between the schemes is that each multiply cipher values
within a large modulo to compute their homomorphic function. Hence this
operation was the first to be analysed in this thesis for making homomorphic
encryption practical, leading to Hypothesis 1 (discussed in Appendix A).
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Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptosystem
The encryption and decryption algorithms for Rivest-Shamir-Adleman cryp-
tosystem (RSA) are now given: E(m) = me mod n and D(c) = cd mod n.
Both raise a message (plain or cipher) to an exponent inside a modulo n. The
proof of RSA supporting a homomorphic multiplication operation is given be-
low. The two messages are multiplied together because their exponents are
the same; therefore, two cipher values can compute a multiplication operation.
E(m0)× E(m1) = me0 ×me1 mod n
= (m0 ×m1)e mod n
∴ m0 ×m1 mod n
El Gamal
The security strength of El Gamal is based on the NP-hardness of solving
discrete logarithms, which was first proposed in 1985 by Taher Elgamal [5].
There is no publicly known algorithm to solve (break) it quickly (assuming a
large key size, for example 2048 bits). The encryption algorithm E(m) = [αk
mod p, βk × m mod p], where k is random and the remaining are public
knowledge, is unique in that the cipher is made up of two parts. The decryption
algorithm joins these parts together with the secret d, D(c) = (βk × m) ×
(αk)−d mod p. The important aspect for this thesis is that El Gamal supports
homomorphic multiplication operations on encrypted data, proven below. The
two β values can be seen as the encryption of a single value because the ks are
random, so they can just be combined into another random value.
E(m0)× E(m1) = [αk0 × αk1 mod p, βk0 ×m0 × βk1 ×m1 mod p]
= [αk0+k1 mod p, βk0+k1 ×m0 ×m1 mod p]
= [αk mod p, βk ×m0 ×m1 mod p]
∴ m0 ×m1 mod p
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Paillier
Proposed in 1999 by Pascal Paillier [6], the Paillier cryptosystem is based on
the fact that computing nth residue classes is hard. The encryption algorithm
is E(m) = gm × rn mod n2, where r is random, and decryption is achieved
through D(c) = L(cλ mod n2)×u mod n. The homomorphic operation sup-
ported by the Paillier cryptosystem is addition. This is achieved by multiplying
two cipher values together and is proven below. Addition is achieved because
the message m is now the exponent, unlike RSA. The random values (r0 and
r1) can just be combined as a single random value r.
E(m0)× E(m1) = (gm0 × r0n)(gm1 × r1n) mod n2
= gm0+m1 × rn0 × rn1 mod n2
= gm0+m1 × rn mod n2
∴ m0 +m1 mod n
Goldwasser–Micali
The previous partially homomorphic encryption cryptosystems have encrypted
integers, whereas the cryptosystem presented by Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio
Micali in 1982 only encrypts individual bits [47]. This is because it is based on
the quadratic residuosity problem, where a cipher value is either a quadratic
residue or not for some modulo (only two possible results). The encryption
algorithm, E(m) = y2 × xm mod n where m ∈ {0, 1} and y is random, such
that gcd(y, n) = 1 or y is in the group of units modulo n. The decryption
algorithm just performs the test to see if the cipher value is a quadratic residue
in modulo n, resulting in two possible values {0, 1}. This cryptosystem is
unique in that it supports a homomorphic XOR operation, as proven below.
Technically, it is still an addition operation; however, the result can only be
{0, 1}. Therefore, two bits of value 1 will make x2, which is equivalent to x0.
E(m0)× E(m1) = y20 × y21 × xm0 × xm1 mod n
= y20 × y21 × xm0+m1 mod n
∴ m0 +m1 mod 2
∴ m0 ⊕m1
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(0,0)
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Figure 2.1: Finding the nearest lattice point for a point P in 2-dimensions
2.1.3 Lattice Based Cryptography
Fully homomorphic encryption schemes are primarily based on the hardness of
lattice-based problems. Two lattice problems which cryptography can be built
upon are the Closest Vector Problem (CVP) and Shortest Vector Problem
(SVP) [50].
Definition Given a point P and the lattice M , the Closest Vector Problem asks
us to find the nearest lattice point L in M .
In Figure 2.1, it is easy to see the closest lattice point in pictorial form, but
because a computer is only given a matrix, and the dimensions are much larger,
it makes finding the closest lattice point more computationally intensive.
Definition Given the lattice M , the Shortest Vector Problem asks us to find
the smallest non-zero vector V in M .
Non-zero is important because every lattice technically has a zero vector. In
Figure 2.1, this is simply v0, because the example lattice is only showing the
basis vectors. However, if larger vectors are given, there may exist a smaller
vector which can make up the fundamental region. Note that CVP is actually a
generalization of SVP, because if you are given an oracle (function) for CVP, it
is possible to find the shortest vector by querying the oracle [51][52]. Therefore,
because CVP is a NP-Hard problem, so is SVP [53][54].
2.1.4 Learning With Errors
The Learning With Errors (LWE) problem was introduced by Regev [55] and
is widely used for a range of cryptographic functions, such as public key en-
cryption [56]. This is because it claims to be as hard as worst-case lattice
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problems [55], implying that any functions built upon LWE are secure. It is
also currently assumed that worst-case lattice problems are even secure against
the likes of quantum computers [57].
Definition The Learning With Errors problem asks us to recover a secret x ∈
Znq given a sequence of “approximate” random linear equations on x [55].
Relating this back to lattices, the definition requires that distinguishing
vectors are created from a set of noisy (contains some error) linear equations
between uniformly random vectors. Looking at an example from Regev [55],
we are given the set of linear equations shown below where in this case each
equation has an error of approximately ±1, and all we have to do is solve
for x. However, by introducing the error it makes solving x more difficult.
If we were to try and solve the set of equations using Gaussian elimination
(row reduction) for example, the errors would accumulate, making the result
invalid.
14x1 + 15x2 + 5x3 + 2x4 ≈ 8(mod17)
13x1 + 14x2 + 14x3 + 6x4 ≈ 16(mod17)
6x1 + 10x2 + 13x3 + 1x4 ≈ 3(mod17)
10x1 + 4x2 + 12x3 + 16x4 ≈ 12(mod17)
9x1 + 5x2 + 9x3 + 6x4 ≈ 9(mod17)
3x1 + 6x2 + 4x3 + 5x4 ≈ 16(mod17)
...
6x1 + 7x2 + 16x3 + 2x4 ≈ 3(mod17)
Given 2O(n logn) equations, we can deduce the secret x in 2O(n logn) time but
this approach is based more around luck than sense. A simpler technique is
the Maximum Likelihood algorithm, which only requires O(n) equations and
computes the only value for x that can satisfy the equations. This is achieved
with brute force by computing all possible values, resulting in a runtime of
2O(n logn) [55]. Currently, the best-known algorithm for solving LWE is by
Blum et al. and requires 2O(n) equations and time [58], which relates to the fact
that the best algorithms for solving lattice problems need 2O(n) time [59][60].
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Figure 2.2: Combinations of errors or noise can lead to invalid results
Therefore, homomorphic schemes built on the LWE problem need to keep
the errors relatively small, otherwise results can become invalid. For example,
Figure 2.2 shows a lattice point L, and the point P which has some error
added, so that by solving CVP, L will be the result. If P is doubled, 2L is still
the closest lattice point; however, by adding P again giving 3P , the closest
lattice point is not 3L, but instead 3L+ v0, therefore the result is now invalid.
Managing this error is one of the key challenges to homomorphic encryption in
general and is a contributing factor to the performance limitations of current
fully homomorphic encryption schemes, such as the Approximate Eigenvector
algorithm.
2.1.5 Approximate Eigenvector Algorithm
The Approximate Eigenvector scheme for fully homomorphic encryption was
proposed by Gentry et al. [9] in 2013, which uses the learning with errors
problem described in the previous section (Section 2.1.4). This scheme allows
for addition and multiplication homomorphic operations to be computed the
same as matrix addition and multiplication operations, for most cases. Gen-
try et al. claim this makes the scheme asymptotically faster and easier to
understand [9]. The formal definition of an eigenvector is given below, where
T is a square matrix, and λ is a scale. Essentially for −→v to be classified as an
eigenvector for the matrix T , the result must be equivalent to multiplying −→v
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by some scale factor. In this scheme −→v is an approximate eigenvector, not a
perfect one.
Definition A vector −→v is an eigenvector (also known as a characteristic vector,
proper vector, or latent vector) if T (−→v ) = λ−→v for some scale λ [61].
To make this a levelled scheme (i.e. it will work up to a certain depth),
the error must be controlled. As seen in Figure 2.2, controlling the size of
the error is extremely important, so that the decrypted value will be correct.
This is achieved by flattening the cipher matrix so that it contains values in
{0, 1}. Flattening uses bit decomposition operations, which does not affect dot
product operations on the matrices. This allows homomorphic operations to
still be computed correctly while keeping the errors small.
2.1.6 Practicality of Fully Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
Recent work is concluding that fully homomorphic encryption is still not effi-
cient or practical [14]. For example, Gentry et al. showed in 2012 the perfor-
mance for an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128-bit circuit, which took
40 minutes per AES block [62]. Wang et al. [10] showed performance results
of a revised fully homomorphic encryption scheme by Gentry and Halevi [63] in
2015 for the recrypt function. Central processing unit and graphics processing
unit implementations took 17.8 seconds and 1.32 seconds respectively, using a
small dimension size of 2048 [10]. A medium dimension size of 8192 took 96.3
seconds and 8.4 seconds for the same function [10]. With operations taking
seconds, cloud implementations can become unusable. For example, adding
millions of votes for a ballot requires weeks instead of hours. This is the chal-
lenge for current fully homomorphic encryption schemes, where recrypting the
data to manage the error is computationally intensive.
Designed for Negative-AND (NAND) gates, while providing XOR gates for
“almost free” – similar to functionality proposed in Part II – Ducas et al.
present the Fastest Homomorphic Encryption in the West (FHEW) scheme
which can bootstrap much faster than any other fully homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes [11]. This was based on work by Alperin-Sheriff et al. [64][65],
while the performance was achieved with the fast Fourier transform and the
highly optimised library: Fastest Fourier Transform in the West. Results given
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showed the homomorphic NAND and bootstrap operation took 0.69 seconds,
using 2.2 gigabytes of memory. Ducas et al. note that the scheme needs
to be further optimised and generalised to reach its full potential. The cur-
rent limitation of the scheme is the large cipher-text sizes for single bits and
constructing an operation (addition, for example) from the NAND logic will
require many bootstrap operations. FHEW is discussed further in Chapter 3,
where it is practicality is compared to other schemes.
2.2 Secure Multiparty Computation
2.2.1 History
First proposed by Yao in 1982 as secure two-party computation, it aimed to
answer the following question [15]:
Question Two millionaires wish to know who is richer; however, they do not
want to find out inadvertently any additional information about each other’s
wealth. How can they carry out such a conversation?
The idea is such that two parties have an input they want to keep private from
the other while computing some function. Yao demonstrated in 1986 how to
generate a random integer using two-party computation, such that it remained
secret from both parties [16], particularly useful for distributed key generation.
It was later generalised in 1987 to m-Party cases, such as voting between m
committee members where their vote is their private input [17]. This lead the
way for work on fault tolerance and verifiability with majority parties being
honest [66][67][68]. A brief overall history can be found in Table 2.2, with
improvements for performance, and the addition of homomorphic encryption
appearing, before focus on cloud implementations started to be published.
With the data being computed across different parties with frequent com-
munication, there is a latency overhead penalty similar to the computational
overhead of fully homomorphic encryption. This is why multi-party computa-
tion, even though has been around since 1982, still has not realised practical
performance for the general use case. Improvements are occurring rapidly,
where the performance of a circuit with thousands of logic gates went from
minutes to seconds within a few years [69][70] using two-party computation.
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However, at least three parties are desirable to handle malicious parties and
improved sharing security. Given circuits often contain logic that is indepen-
dent of one another during stages of computation, parallelisation is one tech-
nique for improving performance [71]. A technique called “cut-and-choose”
(a two-party protocol) was used to provide greater security against malicious
parties, by creating multiple garbled circuits [72][73], and is faster than using
zero-knowledge proofs for verification. Given most schemes offer a free XOR
function – no network transfer – practicality can be improved by reducing the
number of non-XOR gates in a circuit [74]. This is a technique that can be
used with the work presented in this thesis.
The reason circuits, or simply the LUTs cannot be reused is they allow pat-
terns to be monitored, where the occurrences for the matching row can start
to reveal what the input and output are. Work around reusing circuits in the
cloud was presented by Wang et al. [75], using an all-or-nothing privacy ap-
proach. The client stores partial data in the cloud (single server), and submits
some garbled inputs for processing, where if one garbled input is leaked, the
other inputs are also leaked. The inputs could be encrypted, where the func-
tion first needs to decrypt the inputs before the actual function is computed.
They state that if the cloud does not learn the result of the function, then it is
the same as traditional semantic security. The limitations are that only some
of the client data is stored in the cloud and that a single server evaluates the
garbled circuit used for processing.
2.2.2 Garbled Circuits
In order to hide a party’s input, obfuscation is used in the form of garbled
circuits: defining logical circuits by creating LUTs with each input and output
combination. An example is given in Table 2.3 for a NAND function. A party
first generates the table and gives the inputs and outputs random labels (X),
thus obfuscating them. Then the inputs are encrypted before the rows are
shuﬄed, making the table seem garbled. Because of the shuﬄing, knowing the
resulting row or output value does not reveal the input. The necessary labels
and garbled circuit are then sent to the other party. This party uses its input
to try and decrypt each row, where only one will decrypt giving the result,
22
2.2 Secure Multiparty Computation
Table 2.2: Historic overview of multi-party computation
2016 • Garbled Computation In Cloud [75]
2013 • Minilego: Efficient Secure Two-Party Computation from General
Assumptions [73]
2012 • A New Approach to Practical Active-Secure Two-Party
Computation [70]
• On-the-Fly Multiparty Computation on the Cloud via Multikey
Fully Homomorphic Encryption [20]
2009 • Secure Two-Party Computation Is Practical [69]
2001 • Multiparty Computation from Threshold Homomorphic
Encryption [76]
1998 • Efficient Multiparty Computations with Dishonest Minority [77]
1992 • Communication Complexity of Secure Computation [78]
1989 • Verifiable Secret Sharing and Multiparty Protocols with Honest
Majority [68]
1988 • Cryptographic Computation: Secure Fault-Tolerant Protocols and
the Public-Key Model [66]
• Multiparty Unconditionally Secure Protocols [67]
1987 • How to Play any Mental Game [17]
1986 • How to Generate and Exchange Secrets [16]
1982 • Protocols for Secure Computations [15]
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Table 2.3: Garbled circuit truth table for a NAND gate
a b c
0 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
→
a b c
Xa0 X
b
0 X
c
1
Xa0 X
b
1 X
c
1
Xa1 X
b
0 X
c
1
Xa1 X
b
1 X
c
0
→
c
EncXa0Xb0
(Xc1)
EncXa0Xb1
(Xc1)
EncXa1Xb0
(Xc1)
EncXa1Xb1
(Xc0)
→
c
EncXa1Xb0
(Xc1)
EncXa0Xb1
(Xc1)
EncXa1Xb1
(Xc0)
EncXa0Xb0
(Xc1)
which is then shared. A few challenges faced by multi-party computation are
highlighted in this example, which this thesis aims to solve:
• Because the output is typically known to all parties, this could be seen as
problematic when the result must remain private from the cloud providers
(the output should only be visible to the client or end-user).
• Clients are transferring garbled circuits, which is a large amount of data
for a simple logic gate.
• The circuit cannot be reused, as this will reveal patterns. Recent work
has started to address this [79][80][81].
• Each row must be tried to find the result, slowing down the lookup times.
• The circuit is generally evaluated on one server.
2.2.3 Secret Sharing
Widely used in multi-party computation schemes, secret sharing is the act of
distributing a piece of information across many parties, where k ≤ n pieces
are then required to recover the original value. Therefore, < k pieces cannot
reveal the value, keeping it secret [82]. If k < n, then the scheme is known
as a threshold scheme; these were first proposed in 1979 by Blakley [83] and
Shamir [84]. Threshold cryptography is an example of secret sharing where
several parties or servers are needed to decrypt the value. The security strength
of this approach comes from the fact that k servers need to be compromised.
The same approach is used in this thesis, where multiple servers protect data
privacy.
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Secret sharing exists in two forms: secure and insecure. The difference
is that for a sharing technique to be secure, as more pieces are obtained,
the number of possibilities or complexity of solving the original value should
not change. For example, when splitting the phrase “secret” into “se”, “cr”
and “et”, if two pieces are obtained, the number of possibilities for the re-
sult word decreases. However, if the secret is converted into 0x736563726574
and split into 0xC0E300001752 + 0xE2F77285900D + 0xCF8AF0ECBE13
mod 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF, then the number of possibilities does not change
with two pieces.
Shamir Secret Sharing
The basic concept of Shamir secret sharing is that there is a minimum number
of points k to define any polynomial [84]. In particular, there are k points
needed to define a polynomial of k− 1 degree. For example, there are 2 points
required to define a line, 3 points to define a parabola, and 4 points to define
a cubic curve. Therefore, on secret generation, n points are created on the
polynomial, but only k are required to define the polynomial and find the
secret.
Blakley Secret Sharing
Blakley’s secret sharing scheme is based on the principle that anyN nonparallel
(N−1)th dimensional hyperplanes intersect at a specific point [83]. The shares
are hyperplanes, where the secret is the intersection.
2.2.4 Combining Multi-Party Computation and Homomorphic Encryption
With multi-party computation, the computation of a function over some data
is secure – much the same as homomorphic encryption, but if secret shar-
ing is not used, all parties have visible private inputs. With the parties and
their data hosted in the cloud, the “private” inputs are no longer protected.
Protecting the private inputs can be achieved with homomorphic encryption,
using either a shared key or multiple keys for each party. Shared keys are
self-explanatory, where each input is encrypted with the same key. The more
interesting situation is where inputs are encrypted with different keys.
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López-Alt et al. implemented on-the-fly multi-party computation in the
cloud, while using homomorphic encryption to encrypt inputs using multiple,
unrelated keys [20]. Using a multi-key lattice fully homomorphic encryption
scheme [18][19], each user can encrypt their data with their key and send it to
the cloud, where functions can be applied over many users’ encrypted data (for
example, computing the average value). The result of any secure computation
is decrypted by all the keys that were used as inputs. The benefit over more
traditional multi-party computation is that the private inputs are protected,
thus ideal for a cloud environment. The downside of such a scheme is that by
using fully homomorphic encryption, the overall computational performance
is still poor.
2.2.5 Current Libraries and Implementations
VIFF
The Virtual Ideal Functionality Framework (VIFF) was developed in Python
for secure multi-party computation, with the goal to facilitate rapid prototyp-
ing, leading to practical multi-party computation applications [85][86].
SEPIA
SEcurity through Private Information Aggregation (SEPIA) [87][88] is a Java
library proposed for generic secure multi-party computation. The original use
case was for collaborative network monitoring to detect events and calculate
statistics. This allows different domains, networks, and organisations to work
together to detect intrusion alerts while keeping their traffic and alerts hidden
from the other peers.
FairplayMP
Initially proposed in 2004 as Fairplay [89] for two-party computation, Fair-
playMP [90][91] is a system that supports secure multi-party computation. It
constructs boolean gate tables, from a high-level function definition, automat-
ing the circuit creation.
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SPDZ and SCALE-MAMBA
SCALE-MAMBA [92] was born from an early version of SPDZ [93][94], with
the goal of creating a production ready system. Both have good support
for compiling Python programs, but the oﬄine generation stage is the main
bottleneck, for example, generating the triples for multiplication (a principle
proposed by Beaver [95]).
TinyGarble
A logic synthesiser and circuit optimiser, TinyGarble was proposed in 2015 to
minimise the number of non-XOR gates for custom hardware [74]. Songhori et al.
state that this makes garbled circuits more practical, but the issues of data
transfer still exist, and deployment in the cloud is difficult.
Sharemind
Sharemind is a framework for independent organisations to collaborate and
process information in a privacy-preserving manner [96][97]. The importance
of Sharemind is not new technologies, because it is built upon existing secure
multi-party computation protocols, but the business model of using indepen-
dent organisations. This model provides trust by each processing server being
managed by a different organisation, where five are currently available. The
most efficient setting for Sharemind is with three servers, where one can be
semi-honest [96]. However, the trust model breaks when multiple organisa-
tions act maliciously and communicate with each other to attempt to reveal
some data. An interesting use case for Sharemind is estimating satellite col-
lision probabilities in low orbit [98], supported by the US Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency. Limitations for certain applications are that the
closed-source design inhibits comprehension and auditing [99].
Lightweight Web Application
Recent work implemented a multi-party computation scheme and web appli-
cation for the Boston Women’s Workforce Council with regards to a study
on wage disparities [99][100][101]. Lapets et al. also introduce the concept
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of multi-party computation-as-a-service [99]. The operation required was an
aggregate statistic (sum) over the data with regards to gender and job cate-
gory. Given the single operation, this application is not comparable to fully
homomorphic encryption, as arbitrary computation is not supported. How-
ever, it does show how certain applications or use-cases can benefit different
privacy-preserving schemes.
2.3 Secure Hardware Processors
Another method and the earliest form of practical privacy-preserving computa-
tion is developing custom hardware processors, also mentioned by Rivest et al.
[4] in 1978. An example is the state-of-the-art secure processor AEGIS [21];
designed to only reveal the data inside the processor, any data entering or
leaving the processor is encrypted, for example to external memory. This
protects against a range of software and physical attacks. However, AEGIS
still has security vulnerabilities in the form of side-channel-attacks [102][103].
This attack vector analyses information “leaked” from the physical execution
of a program, for example power consumption [104] or electromagnetic ra-
diation [105]. Other limitations of secure processors are the practicality of
deployment in the cloud, because they are a physical entity.
By creating services reliant on custom hardware, we lose the core essence
of what the cloud should be, which is abstract and dynamic [36]. However,
users can now deploy Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) designs in the
cloud for custom hardware accelerators [106]. A FPGA bridges the gap be-
tween hardware and software, by providing performance closer to that of an
application-specific integrated circuit, while having the reconfigurability of a
microprocessor. They contain a finite amount of programmable logic, also
known as reconfigurable logic, that can be used to implement digital circuits
by applying a bitstream file to the device. This bitstream file is analogous
to a compiled program in software, but where programs contain machine in-
structions, a bitstream file contains a sequence of bits which configure circuits
and logical functions. Processing data in parallel can give better performance;
however, it is usually achieved by computing the same function over chunks
of data at the same time. FPGAs offer a slightly different form of parallel
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Figure 2.3: SFaaS data flow for secure processing
processing by pipelining a design. This allows different stages of a function to
be processed in parallel such that the data flows through the function, giving
the performance that is currently lacking with secure processing. The design
can either be application specific or based on an instruction set processor [107].
Using a FPGA in the cloud could allow a data flow process similar to Fig-
ure 2.3 [36], where the virtual machine acts as the controller. The bitstream
file is encrypted with the FPGAs public key and includes the decryption key
for the data. This allows symmetrical keys to be used for data processing, giv-
ing greater performance and using less logic over a public key cryptosystem.
Providing the decryption key for the data stops malicious users of the FPGA
being able to decrypt the data by writing a bitstream file to decrypt other
users’ data.
2.3.1 Physical Unclonable Function
A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) allows for secrets to be derived from
complex physical characteristics of the silicon (a physical one-way function)
rather than storing the secrets in memory [108][109][110]. Guajardo et al.
proposed the feasibility of using PUFs for intellectual property protection by
encrypting the bitstream file using elliptic curve cryptography [111]. PUFs are
naturally noisy, which combined with varying temperatures and ageing could
affect the reliability [112]. However, the key only needs to be generated or
regenerated once per power cycle. Therefore, after the FPGA is powered on
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and the private key has passed a test against the known public key, any PUF
issues will not be encountered until it is reset. Even though the feasibility of
PUFs is still to be discovered, the idea of having a decryption key only visible
to the FPGA could be realised soon.
The alternative to using a PUF is where a FPGA is hardcoded with a private
key which is generated automatically during manufacturing, and the public
key is printed on the chip or included in the box. The keys should never
be saved, and only visible for a brief moment during manufacturing. The
manufacturer could also sign all public keys, allowing customers to verify the
key was generated by the manufacturer, not by a malicious entity. However,
the private key is visible at some point in time, so is not the ideal solution.
2.3.2 Programmed Decryption Key
With a protected bitstream file, the decryption key for data processing can
remain protected, as it will only be exposed within the FPGA. Three cryptog-
raphy schemes will be analysed for usage in an FPGA in terms of logic size and
performance. Note that logic size depends on the FPGA used, and is given as
an approximation.
Advanced Encryption Standard
Rijndael, or as it is commonly known, AES, is a method of data encryption
with symmetric keys [113]. The advantage over other cryptography schemes
for layered encryption is the cipher-text is the same size as the plain text.
For example, with a 2048-bit RSA encryption key, a 32-bit plain-text value
increases by a factor of 64. Adding another layer of encryption grows the size
again, as a 2048-bit value needs to be split into smaller chunks to be encrypted
with another 2048-bit key. Therefore, for layered encryption, the property of
fixed sized cipher text is important. With inputs larger than the key size, they
are split into blocks and chained together. The core operations of AES are
XOR and bit rotating, giving it good performance as well as small cipher text
sizes. The two components required for encryption and decryption are the key
(256-bit for example), and initialisation vector.
The AES is widely used in secure FPGA designs and offers very fast per-
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formance (> 20Gbps) [114][115][116]. Designs can also be tailored to use less
logic, from thousands of slices down to a few hundred while still achieving
megabits per second [115][116]. The advantage of AES over other cryptog-
raphy schemes in terms of implementation on an FPGA is the simplicity of
the algorithm: the flexible performance versus logic required. The only main
limitation of AES is that it uses a symmetric key. Even with the key pro-
tected in the bitstream file, data sharing and multiple data sources remain an
issue. However, AES could be used for data storage and processing, while all
uploaded or outgoing data could be encrypted with a public key cryptosystem.
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptosystem
Recall that Rivest-Shamir-Adleman cryptosystem (RSA) is a public key en-
cryption scheme designed on the factoring problem, computing the plain-text
or cipher base value to an exponent within a modulo [34], and can use Mont-
gomery modular multiplication [117][118]. RSA is more expensive in terms of
area and performance compared to AES for FPGAs. For example, a slower
implementation still requires thousands of slices, where faster implementations
can require tens of thousands [119]. Performance can vary between megabits
per second down to kilobits per second [118].
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
A public key cryptosystem, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), was pro-
posed independently by Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller in 1985, and its crypto-
graphic strength comes from the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem being
hard [120]. The advantages of ECC are smaller key sizes, smaller cipher text
sizes (less data transferred) and faster computation times [121][122] when com-
pared with non-ECC schemes such as RSA. For example, the secp256r1/nistp256
curve (256-bit) is comparable to the cryptographic strength of an RSA 3072-
bit key [123]. An early FPGA implementation by Leung et al. showed a ×30
speedup over software implementations, using only a few thousand slices [124].
A recent survey in 2007 showed the varying difference between state-of-the-art
implementations [125], and in 2008, a 33.05µs solution on a 163 bit binary field
was proposed [126].
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2.3.3 Attack Vectors
Apart from black box attacks, all other attack vectors require physical access,
including readback attacks, side-channel attacks and reverse engineering an
FPGA bitstream file [127]. This is an improvement over current software
solutions for data processing, which can be accessed and broken remotely.
Black Box Attacks
These are a common attack for systems where all possible input combinations
are tried, with the output revealing the inner design [127]. This attack is not
feasible given that the input and output data must be encrypted, where the
public key may not even be known. The design should handle incorrect input,
for example a value not encrypted with the correct public key.
Readback Attacks
For debugging, FPGAs often have a readback feature to allow values to be read
from the FPGA, for example the decryption keys through a special interface.
Methods of disabling this functionality exist [127]; however, for a production
FPGA deployed in a cloud service, this functionality should not exist or be
physically disabled in the chip once the chip has passed production tests.
Side-Channel Attacks
These attack vectors are viable and involve analysing physical properties of
the FPGA while in operation, for example power consumption [104] or elec-
tromagnetic radiation [105]. These are difficult and can require a laboratory
environment to be successful.
Reverse Engineering the Bitstream File
With enough time and effort, the design of a bitstream file (once decrypted)
can be reverse engineered [127]. However, an attacker only need focus on
finding the decryption key for the input data, which could be easier depending
on the level of obfuscation.
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2.4 Secure String Searching
A subset of secure data processing, string or query searching over encrypted
data is a widely-researched domain, with many feasible solutions existing.
Even though data is not technically processed such that it changes form, string
searching is an important aspect of data storage in the cloud and was the first
test case for Privacy-Preserving Encoding presented in this thesis.
Trapdoor functions, which are simple to compute in one direction but hard
to reverse, have been used in cryptography for decades [34][35], and constitute
the primary means of encrypted keyword searching [128][129][130][131][132]
[133][134]. Boneh et al. [128] describe one of the first applications for en-
crypted searching, a technique for associating a set of keywords with encrypted
emails. This is achieved by the user creating a trapdoor for a word such as
“urgent” using their private key, which the server uses to search the encrypted
emails and inform the receiver when an email is urgent.
A major limitation of keyword indexes is that searches are only successful if
their words are correctly spelt. Google’s well-known example of 600 recorded
versions of the query “Britney Spears” [135] is a dramatic illustration of wide
variations in spelling. Today’s users are accustomed to systems that are ro-
bust to spelling errors, and much research is aimed at supporting approximate
searching in encrypted data [131][134][136][137]. Recently, schemes have been
proposed to enable multi-keyword searching [138][139]. Li et al. show how to
search over encrypted data while providing ranked results, a major improve-
ment over previous schemes, but this requires the index to be built oﬄine,
with a trapdoor function for each word. A recent scheme for a searchable
symmetric encryption protocol tried to find the balance between privacy and
performance with regards to what can be leaked during a search [140]. This
work highlights the need to look at alternate solutions which may not protect
full privacy (access patterns are leaked) but can give practical usage.
For large enterprises, it is sufficient to build and maintain indexes within
the corporate environment and transmit them to the cloud for use. However,
ordinary people who use the cloud to store personal documents would probably
prefer to delegate the task of building indexes and handling the searching to the
service provider. Current systems either require the index to be downloaded,
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updated, and re-uploaded or require heavy preprocessing on the document
before being uploaded. Moreover, they do not support phrase or proximity
searching, and at best are robust only to simple (single-character) typograph-
ical and spelling errors. Little research has been devoted to addressing these
shortcomings.
2.5 Privacy
This thesis focuses on keeping data private from cloud providers (for example,
the compute nodes), where information learnt from running operations over the
data and seeing the result is out-of-scope. We have published in areas of privacy
such as the location of requests [141], and user account information [142].
However, some other privacy techniques for data processing will be briefly
mentioned here to further explore the privacy field.
In 2003, Dinur et al. showed that allowing any query, no matter how simple,
over a private database could allow the leakage of an individual’s privacy [143].
A solution to this problem is differential privacy, which aims to add noise to a
statistical query result [12][13]. The objective is that the result from the query
should be similar if some users data exists or not in the database [12][13].
By adding noise to the result means there is a tradeoff between privacy and
accuracy, similar to the work presented in Chapter 4. The primary contribution
of this thesis in Chapter 5 required accurate results but would allow techniques
such as differential privacy to be applied as an additional layer.
Protecting user privacy within published data sets, k-anonymity states that
a user cannot be distinguished from at least k−1 users in the same set [144][145].
Suggested as an improvement over k-anonymity, `-diversity hardens against
some of the known attack vectors on k-anonymity [146]. These techniques
can be applied to data sets released by trustworthy vendors, such as health-
care releasing data sets for researchers. If the data set is published with these
anonymity techniques already applied, then the work presented in this thesis
would function as if the data set contained the real values. Thus, allowing
the data to be fully private from the cloud providers, while the results when
revealed would have a form of protection.
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2.6 Summary
The approach that gives the greatest performance for privacy-preserving pro-
cessing is custom hardware implementations, but as this chapter has high-
lighted, these do not fit the philosophy of the cloud. They also do not protect
data for its entire life in the cloud and have other management issues [36], w
whereas the solution that can continuously protect data – fully homomorphic
encryption – is currently impractical to use in the cloud for generic appli-
cations, even with hardware implementations [147]. Partially homomorphic
encryption has many variants and given the simplicity of the encryption al-
gorithms can offer usability performance. However, Chapter 3 will present an
application where usability performance is not guaranteed, including client-
side performance. The limitation of a single operation also means partially
homomorphic encryption cannot be the generic solution for privacy-preserving
processing in the cloud.
With multi-party computation, the execution of a function over some data is
secure – much the same as homomorphic encryption, but traditional definitions
of multi-party computation state that all parties have private inputs. However,
when the parties and their data are hosted in the cloud, the “private” inputs are
no longer protected if they are plain-text values. Also, for any new party, they
must also join the system, decreasing performance. Multi-party computation
can be combined with fully homomorphic encryption to address this issue;
however, then it has the limitations and concerns related to fully homomorphic
encryption. Improvements to multi-party computation with garbled circuits
still have a single server evaluating the circuit, and reusability of these circuits
is still an open issue for data fully stored in the cloud. Work presented in this
thesis aims at addressing these issues without the need for input data to be
encrypted, answering Hypothesis 3.
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Practicality of Privacy-Preserving
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3
Defining Practicality
3.1 Introduction
Even when realising practical privacy-preserving processing, it will not be as
efficient as processing plain-text values with current technology. Therefore, a
benchmark is required to define what is practical in order to answer Hypoth-
esis 3, and to be a target for the scheme presented in Part II. This chapter
will concisely compare the performance of partially homomorphic encryption,
fully homomorphic encryption, and multi-party computation for the use case
of secure cloud voting.
Developing an electronic voting scheme which is 100% secure against all
attack vectors is incredibly difficult, but it does need to be as secure as current
paper voting techniques. To protect voter privacy, votes must be kept private
so that no entity has knowledge of how someone voted. This is a perfect use
case for privacy-preserving processing schemes because the result of a ballot is
the sum of all votes for the available choices or candidates. Therefore, only a
simple operation is required, meaning partially homomorphic encryption, fully
homomorphic encryption, and multi-party computation can all be compared.
There are many requirements an electronic voting scheme must meet [29];
however, for this example only the need to verify a vote as either a yes or no
is required.
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3.2 Comparing Schemes
Each scheme of the following schemes–plain text, partially homomorphic en-
cryption, fully homomorphic encryption and multi-party computation–will be
implemented in the simplest manner to meet this chapter’s requirements for
secure electronic voting. In this section yes or no with be represented as 1 or 0
respectively. Note that unless otherwise stated, all performance results in this
chapter were computed on a MacBook Pro (Retina, 13-inch, Early 2013), and
all results should be considered estimates or guidelines.1
3.2.1 Plain Text
Even though the performance of plain text processing is unfeasible for any
privacy-preserving computation scheme to compete with, the performance of
decrypting, processing, and encrypting the data can be compared. By encrypt-
ing the tally after each vote, it increases the chances the tally value is only
visible within the central processing unit.
A simple example was created in Python using RSA, as shown in Listing 3.1.2
Lines 2-5 are just for sample purposes, where lines 6-10 were profiled. Line 7
uses modulo 2 to guarantee the vote ∈ {0, 1} while also providing randomness
to the cipher votes. Line 10 attempts to clear the variables of their plain-text
values. For 2048-bit keys, lines 6-10 took approximately 5ms, where 4096-bit
keys took just under 30ms to compute. This is because of the decryption steps
in lines 6 and 7. Even though the encryption and decryption algorithms for
RSA are essentially identical, with encryption, a 32-bit number is raised to a
large power but with decryption, a large number is raised to a large power.
Therefore, even plain text processing still has computational overheads if the
data is encrypted after each vote is added.
Listing 3.1: Simple Python voting example
1 from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
2 tally_key = RSA.generate (2048)
3 vote_key = RSA.generate (2048)
1The laptop was in the same state for each experiment, and only the base operating system
processes were running.
2Note that the value 11L is a random value such that modulo 2 reveals the vote (another
form of randomness), while the tally is currently 123.
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4 vote_cipher = vote_key.publickey ().encrypt (11L,None)
5 tally_cipher = tally_key.publickey ().encrypt (123L,None)
6 tally = tally_key.decrypt(tally_cipher)
7 vote = vote_key.decrypt(vote_cipher) % 2
8 tally += vote
9 tally_cipher = tally_key.publickey ().encrypt(tally ,None)
10 tally = vote = 0
3.2.2 Partially Homomorphic Encryption
With the need to tally votes an additional homomorphic scheme is required. A
C++ homomorphic library, libhcs, developed at the University of Waikato by
Marc Tiehuis, was used for this example [29][148]. This library implements the
threshold variant of the Paillier cryptosystem, and the library was primarily
designed for a voting system [29]. The important property of this scheme is
the ability to generate zero-knowledge proofs, in particular, proof of 1-out-of-2
n’th powers, for a given cipher value. These proofs allow the cloud service
to verify a cipher vote contains either a 0 or 1, but it does not know which.
Without this check, a malicious voter could encrypt large values to give their
vote a higher weighting.
The implementation with libhcs is more complicated than other schemes
presented in this chapter, with some small customisations to the library itself.
The library was designed to distribute the voting, but only one server was
required for this example. A generator value of 97 was used for the proofs,
where a yes vote is the encrypted value of 97, and the no vote is 1. In List-
ing 3.2, line 8 sets the current tally value to 984. Not shown in this example
is a counter to record the number of votes added, but for this tally, there have
been 24 votes. Therefore, 984−24 = 960 which when divided by the generator
minus 1, gives 10 yes votes. Lines 10-12 encrypt a no vote, where the random
number ran is needed later to generate the proof. Lines 13 and 14 generate a
proof for the cipher vote, where the proof function also requires knowledge of
the vote value. Lines 15 and 16 would occur in the cloud, where if the proof is
valid, the cipher vote is added to the tally. The decryption would occur after
the ballot has been completed and where the cloud should not have access to
the decryption key.
Performance results for each core function are given in Table 3.1 using a
2048-bit key. The key generation is not critical for the running time as this is
a one-off cost before the ballot begins. The total time for a client to generate
41
Chapter 3 Defining Practicality
Table 3.1: Libhcs function execution times
Function Time (ms)
KeyGen 140.3
Encrypt 14.5
ProofGen 32.6
ProofVerify 33.3
Decrypt 4.5
HomAdd < 1
their cipher vote and proof would be ≈ 47.1ms. In the cloud, verifying each
vote takes ≈ 33.4ms, and near no time to homomorphically add the vote to the
tally. With these results, and without taking advantage of parallelisation, the
cloud could process millions of votes in a single day. With cloud grade hardware
(faster than a laptop) and parallel tallies, support for national elections is
achievable (224 − 1 votes were assume in Section 7.2.1).
To compare with Section 3.2.1, multiplying two large numbers within a
modulo was tested in Python as well. Listing 3.3 shows the example code,
where Line 6 performs the homomorphic addition. This line takes < 1ms to
compute, which is actually faster than the time in Section 3.2.1. Therefore,
this example shows the overhead of decrypting and encrypting values each
time a vote is added to the tally; where if a proof was not required, partially
homomorphic encryption would actually be faster than computing on plain
text for a simple addition.
Listing 3.2: Simple partially homomorphic encryption voting example
1 mpz_t tmp , cipher_vote , cipher_tally , ran;
2 mpz_init(tmp); mpz_init(cipher_vote);
3 mpz_init(cipher_tally); mpz_init(ran);
4 hcs_rand *hr = hcs_init_rand ();
5 pcs_public_key *pk = pcs_init_public_key ();
6 pcs_private_key *vk = pcs_init_private_key ();
7 pcs_generate_key_pair(pk , vk , hr , KEY_SIZE);
8 mpz_set_ui(tmp , 984);
9 pcs_encrypt(pk, hr, cipher_tally , tmp);
10 mpz_set_ui(tmp , 1);
11 mpz_random_in_mult_group(ran , hr ->rstate , pk->n);
12 pcs_encrypt_r(pk, cipher_vote , tmp , ran);
13 pcs_t_proof *pf = pcs_t_init_proof ();
14 pcs_compute_1of2_ns_protocol(pk, hr, pf, cipher_vote , ran ,
0, 0);
15 if(pcs_verify_1of2_ns_protocol(pk , pf , cipher_vote , 0))
16 pcs_ee_add(pk, cipher_tally , cipher_tally ,
cipher_vote);
17 pcs_decrypt(vk, tmp , cipher_tally);
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Figure 3.1: NAND gate full adder
Listing 3.3: Python multiplying large numbers example
1 import random
2 from Crypto.Util import number
3 n_sq = number.getPrime (2048) **2
4 r = lambda: random.getrandbits (4096)
5 c1 , c2 = r(), r()
6 c3 = (c1 * c2) % n_sq
3.2.3 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
The performance of partially homomorphic encryption is manageable for cloud
voting, although it does not have the ability to compute other operations: for
example, being able to track which users have voted while keeping records
private until after the ballot. More advanced ballots could be implemented,
such as the mixed-member proportional voting method used in New Zealand.
Therefore, ideally a fully homomorphic encryption scheme would be used to
implement the voting system.
The library FHEW was used to implement a voting protocol, as discussed in
Section 2.1.6, which provides the homomorphic NAND operation [149]. The
addition of two 32-bit integers can be achieved with 31 full-adders and a single
half-adder. A full-adder comprised of NAND gates can be seen in Figure 6.1.
However, with a voting system, only a single bit will be received and added
with the tally value. This also allows the scheme to guarantee a vote ∈ {0, 1}.
In Figure 3.2, a half-adder is given, where from i = 1 the carry is the B input
wire. Therefore, B0 is the vote and Ai is the tally value. The number of total
possible votes in the ballot, will vary the number of half-adders required.
Instead of implementing the entire voting protocol, only the performance of
the required functions was evaluated. A sample program is shown in Listing 3.4
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Figure 3.2: NAND gate half adder
Table 3.2: FHEW function execution times
Function Time (seconds)
Setup 0.537
KeyGen(1) < 0.001
KeyGen(2) 12.644
Encrypt < 0.001
Decrypt < 0.001
HomNAND 0.106
which gives the oﬄine functions, encryption/decryption, and the homomorphic
function.
Listing 3.4: Sample FHEW program for evaluation
1 int main() {
2 LWE:: CipherText e1 , e2 , e12;
3 FHEW:: Setup();
4 LWE:: SecretKey LWEsk;
5 LWE:: KeyGen(LWEsk);
6 FHEW:: EvalKey EK;
7 FHEW:: KeyGen (&EK , LWEsk);
8 LWE:: Encrypt (&e1 , LWEsk , 0);
9 LWE:: Encrypt (&e2 , LWEsk , 0);
10 FHEW:: HomNAND (&e12 , EK , e1 , e2);
11 LWE:: Decrypt(LWEsk , e12)
12 return 0;
13 }
The performance of each function was measured using the built-in clock
function (processor clock ticks), and is shown in Table 3.2. Like the partially
homomorphic encryption example, the key generation times are not critical, as
they are performed oﬄine. Given the scheme only encrypts or decrypts single
bits, the performance for both functions is very fast. However, where this
scheme and other fully homomorphic encryption schemes are inadequate when
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computing a homomorphic function. In this case, computing a single NAND
operation takes ≈ 100ms. Therefore, even with parallelisation, a half adder
will take over 300ms to compute. If a 32-bit tally is required, 10s would be
required to add a single vote to the tally. This can be improved by using a pool
of tallies, each with a smaller number of bits, where 8-bits would still require
a few seconds. To reach the same performance of the partially homomorphic
encryption example voting scheme, nearly 100 parallel tallies would need to be
computing at the same time. Note that this before any parallelisation on the
partially homomorphic encryption voting scheme.
3.2.4 Multi-Party Computation
A use case for multi-party computation could be voting with a small number
of fixed participants. However, with large-scale voting, an unknown number
of completed votes will be added to the tally. The challenge with multi-party
computation protocols is adding dynamic behaviour, as the protocols are con-
structed oﬄine and agreed upon beforehand, where garbled circuits should not
be reused. To compare multi-party computation, a simple tool was used to
define a basic voting protocol.
TASTY is a Python tool developed for automating efficient secure two-party
computation protocols using combinations of garbled circuits and homomor-
phic encryption techniques [150][151]. Because both partially homomorphic
encryption and fully homomorphic encryption are already being evaluated, we
will just use the garbled circuit methods for two-party computation. TASTY
can also perform analysis and benchmarking for protocol designs, which are
used below. The configuration used for each protocol in TASTY had a long
security level, which gives: symmetric/statistical as 128-bits, asymmetric as
3, 248-bits, and curved as secp256r1. Both servers were on the localhost, with
network traffic going through a pipe with a delay of 25ms in each direction.3
The first protocol design is given in Listing 3.5 where two servers (server and
client in TASTY) add their values together. In terms of voting, the vote is
split across the two servers such that clientval+serverval = v where v ∈ {0, 1};
3This latency value was chosen by measuring the latency between nine AWS locations,
where 22.5ms was the average latency to each locations nearest neighbour (rounded up
to 25ms).
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in this case 3 + (−2) = 1.
Listing 3.5: Simple TASTY voting design
def protocol(client , server , params):
LEN = 32
client.val = Signed(bitlen=LEN , val=3)
server.val = Signed(bitlen=LEN , val=-2)
client.gval = Garbled(bitlen=LEN , val=client.val)
server.gval = Garbled(bitlen=LEN , val=server.val)
client.ogval <<= server.gval
client.gresult = client.ogval + client.gval
client.result = Signed(bitlen=LEN+1, val=client.gresult)
client.output(client.result)
The values are then garbled, and the server sends the garbled value to the
client, which adds them and produces the result. To make this scheme compa-
rable to the homomorphic encryption designs, there are a few elements missing.
The first is that the result is not secured; to achieve this a random value r
would need to be generated between the two servers where r is not known to
either. Each server could sum the votes then perform an addition between
them, but this is not really comparable. Also, the key feature missing is that
the vote is not verified to be yes or no, which would require more computa-
tion than adding values. Listing 3.6 shows how multiple values were tallied
together in this example protocol, where only two values are added together
at one time.
Listing 3.6: Simple TASTY voting design for multiple votes
def protocol(client , server , params):
LEN = 32
client.val1 = Signed(bitlen=LEN , val=3)
...
server.gval4 = Garbled(bitlen=LEN , val=server.val4)
client.ogval1 <<= server.gval1
client.ogval2 <<= server.gval2
client.ogval3 <<= server.gval3
client.ogval4 <<= server.gval4
client.gresult1 = client.ogval1 + client.gval1
client.gresult2 = client.ogval2 + client.gval2
client.gresult3 = client.ogval3 + client.gval3
client.gresult4 = client.ogval4 + client.gval4
client.gresult12 = client.gresult1 + client.gresult2
client.gresult34 = client.gresult3 + client.gresult4
client.gresult = client.gresult12 + client.gresult34
client.result = Signed(bitlen=LEN+6, val=client.gresult)
client.output(client.result)
Protocols were generated for tallying N votes, where each vote is split across
the two servers. The metrics given in Table 3.3 are overall times for the setup
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Table 3.3: Multi-party computation results for a simple voting protocol
N Setup(ms)
Online
(ms)
Setup
C->S (KB)
Setup
S->C (KB)
Online
C->S (KB)
Online
S->C (KB)
1 457.09 55.08 3.38 4.89 0.12 1.56
2 856.34 157.78 6.67 10.93 0.24 3.11
3 1256.77 211.48 9.94 17.03 0.37 4.69
4 1374.16 318.10 8.06 27.56 0.49 6.25
5 1540.59 374.13 8.13 32.51 0.61 7.82
6 1798.90 484.97 8.22 37.29 0.73 9.39
and online phases, as well as the amount of data transferred during each phase.
For some protocols, we could ignore the setup phase; however, if a verification
protocol was designed to check that (clientval + serverval) ∈ {0, 1}, the setup
phase would need to occur each time with this static protocol. The results show
that not only is there a lot of data being transferred between the two servers
but that the timing values are quite high to perform an addition operation,
which is less complex than performing a verification.
3.2.5 Summary
For the voting use case, partially homomorphic encryption is the best option,
because it gives the greatest overall performance, especially in the cloud. Even
when compared to plain text processing, partially homomorphic encryption can
tally votes faster than decrypting and encrypting values. The zero-knowledge
proofs are the only limiting factor in terms of performance but are necessary
for the verifiability required. However, performance in the cloud is not the
only factor, as client-side performance can be important. Because the fully
homomorphic encryption scheme only encrypts a single bit, it would have good
client-side performance, but the cost of the cloud computation is currently
too high. The use of multi-party computation protocols show promise for
other applications; however, their lack of flexibility and reusability make the
homomorphic encryption schemes better suited for this type of application.
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3.3 Extending to Survey System
A survey, for the most part, is a collection of ballots, one for each question.
Therefore, the practicality of partially homomorphic encryption was tested for
a survey system, raising some additional challenges over a simple ballot in
terms of functionality. The codename for this application was Mau Surveys,
where Mau can be translated to secure in Ma¯ori. Note that larger versions of
screenshots given in this section can be found in Appendix C, and the source
code can be obtained from Appendix D.
3.3.1 Creating a Survey
Disregarding the interface to customise the survey, the main challenge for the
user-centricity of a system is the public and private keys. Many users of a
survey system would have little knowledge of the concepts and importance of
these keys. Therefore, asking a user to provide a public key for the survey
could be too advanced for many users. Instead, the keys can be generated
within the web application on the client side, such that the private key is not
outside the clients’ environment. Note that the management of the private
key file is currently the user’s responsibility, but could be stored in the cloud,
using the user’s password to encrypt it. This could even be achieved without
the user’s knowledge of the keys, hiding the idea of encryption altogether.
Figure 3.3 gives an example where the user has generated a private and pub-
lic key. The private key is written to a file to be downloaded but is generated
client side. This is implemented using a JavaScript library [152], meaning per-
formance is slow due to how large numbers are handled. For example, creating
a 2048-bit key pair can take over 4.5 seconds. The user could begin creating
the questions and answers during this period, as can be seen in Figure 3.4.
Similarly, the key pair could be generated as the page loads, meaning by the
time the user has filled in the other details, a key pair is ready.
3.3.2 Completing a Survey
Given the slow performance of JavaScript for large number computation, it
is currently not feasible to encrypt answers and generate proofs. Therefore,
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Figure 3.3: Generating the public and private key for a new survey
Figure 3.4: Interface for creating a survey
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the portable native client was used for testing in Google Chrome, which allows
native code to be executed and accessed by JavaScript (the Web Cryptography
API does not support the operations required [153]). Note that a dedicated
mobile application would not have this problem, but as Figure 3.9 shows,
performance is still an issue. JavaScript can then be used to pass values to
be encrypted and get the cipher and proof value back. This allowed a single
answer to be encrypted in just over 500ms including passing to the portable
native client and back to JavaScript. The performance of just the native code
was a few magnitudes slower than in Section 3.2.2.
With the average reading time of under 300 words per minute [154], a ques-
tion made up of 20 words will take over 4 seconds to read. Therefore, around 8
answers from the previous question can be encrypted while the user is reading
the next question. For example, Figure 3.5 shows the computation occurring
after the user moved to the next question. Note that the timing values are
using the console timestamp, showing the timing difference between when the
answer value was posted to the portable native client and parsed back by
JavaScript. This hides the latency and computation from the user; only once
the user completes the last question will they notice the encryption occurring.
Another factor to consider is the waiting time for a user to experience while
their cipher answers are being verified and tallied. This will also affect the
tallying server, which should not be vulnerable to many users submitting their
answers at once. The solution implemented was for the server to store the
answers into a queue, to be verified and tallied when possible. The user would
later receive a notification that their answers had been added to the tally.
This stops the user needing to wait for the tallying to occur. If the user is not
behaving maliciously, their survey answers will have a valid proof. Therefore,
it would be rare for a valid survey response to fail.
The server can then have workers running which read from the queue and
process each survey response. First, a worker verifies all answers by checking
the proofs. Then it proceeds to update the tallies, where atomic transactions
occur when updating each answer’s tally. However, note that multiple work-
ers processing responses to the same survey may not give a performance gain.
The conclusion here is that there are many factors impacting the overall per-
formance and usability of a privacy-preserving cloud application, aside from
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Figure 3.5: Example of a user taking a survey, with the encryption occurring in the
background
just verifying and tallying values.
3.3.3 Reviewing a Survey
To review a survey, the user gets presented with a similar view as taking the
survey. Only the owner of the survey can view this page. If the owner enters
the decryption key, the results of the survey are shown, as seen for example
in Figure 3.6. Decryption occurs client-side, with the cipher values already
downloaded, as shown in Figure 3.7. Note there is an insecure vote option, for
when a user chose not to encrypt their answers (Figure 3.5 shows the option
to disable encryption). This was implemented to provide a balance between
performance and security, giving the user a choice. The portable native client
was used to decrypt the answers, where Figure 3.8 shows that it took 70ms to
decrypt each answer. Therefore, 14 answers can be decrypted every second,
which is acceptable.
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Figure 3.6: Example of a user reviewing the results of their survey
Figure 3.7: Example of how the cipher and plain-text results for a survey are
presented to the user
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Figure 3.8: Example of the performance for decrypting each answer of a survey
3.3.4 One Answer Only
Multiple choice answers are exactly like having a voting ballot for each answer,
where the answer is given a vote of yes or no. However, for questions where
only one answer is allowed, this is more complicated, as there needs to be a
proof of only one answer. This could be used in an election, where multiple
candidates for are given.
For each answer, a cipher vote and proof are generated. Therefore, if the
cipher votes are homomorphically added together, a new cipher vote is given,
which should also ∈ {0, 1}, as shown in the equation below.
csum =
n−1∏
x=0
E(Ax)
This can be sent to the cloud along with the answer cipher values, where it
can verify the summed cipher value. However, this does not guarantee that
csum ∈ {0, 1} because all the answers could be 1. To generate a proof for the
cipher value, we need the random number used for encrypting the value. When
encrypting each answer to the question, we can combine each random value
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and use it to generate the proof for csum, as shown below.
gm0 × gm1 × rn0 × rn1 mod n2 = gm0+m1 × (r0 × r1)n mod n2
For example, below we show 4 cipher votes and the random values used, along
with a small n value.
n = 3331843951
r0 = 3255715651
r1 = 2642234083
r2 = 3723126367
r3 = 4266383843
c0 = 620686413408095270
c1 = 624310657855553550
c2 = 9987196793370673622
c3 = 2908154565487608414
The r values can be multiplied together, to give the r used for the sum of the
votes, as shown below.
rsum = r0 × r1 × r2 × r3 mod n2
= 4135892289674754894
csum = c0 × c1 × c2 × c3 mod n2
= 10286136893535093293
≡ (n+ 1)1 × rnsum mod n2
The limitation with this approach is that it can only guarantee that zero or
one answer was selected for that question. If multiple answers are required,
for example 2, then this solution will not currently work. Instead, the answers
in the backend could be possible combinations of answers. For example, a
question with 10 answers where 2 can be selected gives 90 answers. This is
computationally intensive for both the client and cloud. If the number of
possible pairings is too large, two sets of answers could be encrypted, such
54
3.3 Extending to Survey System
that each set can either have zero or one answer selected. This does then allow
the same answer to be selected twice. Interface design can prevent this for the
average user, but it cannot be guaranteed for a malicious user.
3.3.5 Linking Questions
Surveys can be used to provide statistics and analysis on topics, therefore
the option to link answers together is critical. For example, does a person’s
favourite car brand relate to their favourite colour? Linking answers is also im-
portant for providing more advanced voting systems. There are two approaches
for trying to support this feature: client intensive or server and decryption in-
tensive.
Using an example of 2 questions, each with 4 answers, gives 16 possible com-
binations. This can then be treated in the backend as one question. Linking
another question would give 64 options for the client to encrypt and generate
a proof for each one. The performance on the client is the limitation for this
approach, as well as the amount of data being sent from the client’s device.
Performance is reduced because only after all the questions being linked have
been answered can the encryption occur, whereas encrypting a single question
can occur while the user is answering another. When the survey loads, the
client application or browser can start automatically generating all the cipher
values and proofs, treating them all as zero. Therefore, only the linked answers
need to be regenerated when the user has answered all linked questions.
Moving the computation and overheads to the cloud is another approach.
The client encrypts each question as normal, along with the proof, and sends
them to the cloud, where the cloud can perform the normal tallying. In addi-
tion, it can then link questions together. The concept is padding the answers
together using bit shifting, as shown below.
= (gm × rn)2 mod n2
= g2m × r2n mod n2
≡ m << 1
For example, combining two questions, the answers from question 1 and from
question 2 ∈ {0, 1, 2} (bit length of 2) can be summed. Therefore, with a
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64-bit integer, 32 results can be padded into a cipher value, meaning a new
cipher value is needed for every 32 participants. With a million participants,
using a 2048-bit key, a few megabytes are needed for each combination. The
challenge is that for the proof, the actual value encrypted in Section 3.2.2
∈ {1, 97}, meaning the sum ∈ {2, 98, 194} for linking two questions. These are
2 = 0000 00102, 98 = 0110 00102, 194 = 1100 00102 where the lower 4-bits
are the same. Therefore, when bit shifting, instead of shifting by 8, we can
shift by 4. Apart from the first 8 bits, the most significant bits are 2 ≡ 00102,
98 ≡ 10002, 194 ≡ 11102. Therefore, a 64-bit integer can store 15 participants.
To get the linking results, the survey creator decrypts all packed values and
can tally the linked results. This is another disadvantage of using the padding
approach. Time and cloud storage can be saved by not recording linked values
for the last answer to the question, because these can be solved using the other
values and final tallies of each answer. The two approaches are contrasting,
because practicality is either achieved for the client or the cloud and survey
creator.
3.3.6 Other Trust and Privacy Issues
In creating the survey cloud application, there were a number of issues that
still arose even with the data encrypted through to the survey creator. The
cloud provider and survey company cannot see any data, but still can learn in-
formation, where the survey title, questions, and answers can leak information
about the user taking the survey. One solution to protect the entire survey
from the cloud provider is to have a password or some form of key obfuscating
the survey. Users could also be given unique codes to unlock the survey, such
that they do not need to create an account.
The major trust issue discovered is guaranteeing the public key used to
encrypt the survey on the client device is the same generated by the survey
creator. The balance between making the application user-centric and secure
came into question. The solution implemented was to give the user an option
to view a hash or the entire public key when taking the survey. This would
prevent the public key being changed in the database. The survey creator
would then need to make the key and hash publicly available, for example
on social media, but this challenge highlighted how difficult it is to hide the
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Figure 3.9: Mobile voting performance on an iPhone 5
encryption from the user.
3.3.7 Real versus Virtual World Practicality
Presented results for partially homomorphic encryption thus far suggest good
performance. However, when tested on an average mobile device, the compu-
tational intensity of computing large numbers is highlighted. Figure 3.9 shows
that generating a proof can nearly 20s for a 2048-bit key. In terms of com-
puter science, seconds to minutes for obfuscating a vote on the mobile device
is seemly very slow. However, with the use case of voting, the algorithm and
system performance are not the only components to consider for practical-
ity. The following is an example of the typical procedure a voter would have
to undertake: commuting to the voting station, queuing at a voting station,
authenticating themselves, and filling in voting papers. Therefore, if the en-
cryption and proof generation takes a few minutes on a client’s mobile device,
it is still time saved overall. A user could be entertained with a game or could
be notified once the computation is complete. The convenience and time saved
validate the minutes of computation time as being practical.
In contrast, with a survey, practicality is defined differently because com-
pleting a digital survey needs to be as fast as possible, otherwise participants
are less likely to finish it. For example, with non-secure survey systems, the
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user experiences near-zero latency when completing the survey. As discussed
in Section 3.3.2, a lot of the computation can be hidden as the user completes
other questions. However, with partially homomorphic encryption, depending
on the device and key size, the user could experience a few seconds or minutes
before being able to submit the survey. Again, the survey could be submitted
automatically once encryption is complete. However, the same technique is
not as practical for a survey system, as it is for a simple ballot, where the
cloud performance is practical, but the client side is still problematic.
3.4 Summary
This chapter has shown that the most practical privacy-preserving solution
is currently partially homomorphic encryption, with multi-party computation
practical for some types of applications. The use case of secure voting and the
extension into a secure survey system has shown some aspects for what it means
to be practical and some limitations of existing solutions. Different schemes
will be better suited for some applications than others. Therefore, practicality
depends on the application; however, focusing on cloud performance, partially
homomorphic encryption takes under one millisecond to compute a homomor-
phic operation with a key size of 2048-bits. Combined with the proof, this gives
around 35ms for a vote to be added to the tally. This should be the target of
any scheme claiming to be practical in the cloud. However, Section 3.3.7 raised
the issue of client performance, and fast encryption times are also required,
otherwise even with practical cloud performance the application is still not
usable.
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Privacy-Preserving Encoding
In researching Hypotheses 1 and 2, there was no direct outcome to answering
the research question for this thesis. However, the simple fully homomorphic
encryption algorithm explored in Appendix B did offer search capabilities,
spawning the idea of using encoding for privacy-preserving processing. In-
stead of encrypting characters into cipher values, encoding them into groups
or “bins” could allow search capabilities while protecting privacy. This chapter
explores that idea, resulting in a tentative conclusion for Hypothesis 3.
4.1 Bin Encoding
An approximate string searching scheme “Bin Encoding” is presented as an
initial comparison between encoding and encryption [22]. This is a lossy en-
coding scheme—a simple trapdoor—that maps characters individually to bins
(an extension of the simple substitution cipher used by Mary, Queen of Scots).
There are several bins, and multiple characters map to the same one. Hence,
the original string cannot be easily obtained from its encoding. For example,
below is a mapping with three bins A, B and C:
{a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i} ⇒ A
{j, k, l,m, n, o, p, q, r} ⇒ B
{s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z} ⇒ C
(This example is for illustration; in practice, we envisage many more bins
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Figure 4.1: Personal user system model for Bin Encoding
to reduce the number of false positives when searching.) Relative to this
mapping, the encoded values for hello and world are AABBB and CBBBA
respectively, which can be obtained using Algorithm 1. Apart from world,
another possibility for CBBBA is snore (amongst others). However, these
possibilities can only be generated by someone who knows the bin mapping.
Given the encoded value but not the mapping, there are countless possibilities
for CBBBA, such as hello (even though the above bins map it to AABBB).
The user’s data is protected by hiding it in many possible bin combinations (>
1020).
Algorithm 1 Bin Encoding
1: function binencode(string, binmap)
2: estring ← ' '
3: for i← 0 to len(string) do
4: c← lowercase(stringi)
5: if c in binmap then
6: estring ← estring + binmapc
7: return estring
4.1.1 System Model
The scheme is aimed at the personal cloud end user, with Figure 4.1 showing
a typical use case. Bob is saving a file in the cloud and would like it to be
encrypted, while retaining the ability to search its contents at a later date.
Before transmitting the file, his device encodes it; the computational expense
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is trivial. Bob separately encrypts the file using a secret key, and sends both
encrypted and encoded versions to the cloud service. Filenames are encrypted,
while smaller documents can be padded.
The service stores Bob’s encrypted document and adds the encoded version
to its index, which is encrypted when not in use. It manages the encryption
key for the index, but only Bob knows the key for his actual documents. When
searching, he sends encoded queries to the cloud service, which uses the index
to determine which documents satisfy the query. Bob’s data is protected,
because the cloud service cannot decipher either the encoded documents or
the encoded search terms.
4.1.2 Removing Special Characters
To harden Bin Encoding against language attacks, special characters, such as
spaces must be removed, because they reveal too much information. For exam-
ple, if spaces are visible, encoded words of length 1 will correspond with high
probability to either i or a (in the English language). If the space character
is encoded, its bin will occur unusually often. For example, a high-frequency
letter like T occurs in English around 9% of the time [155], whereas space has a
far greater frequency of 16− 30%, assuming an average word length of 5. This
may make it easy to detect which bin contains the space character, leading
again to the problem of single-letter words. The index is therefore based on
bin positions in the document and not words like a traditional index.
4.1.3 Approximate String Searching
By encoding characters individually, approximate string searching can be sup-
ported. Using the above mapping, hello encodes to AABBB. But hallo also
encodes to AABBB, so they would still match. Furthermore, if h and e were
swapped, the encoded result would remain the same. Of course, this is an
unrealistically simplistic example, and with more bins approximate searching
will need to take into account how many bins are different, or transposed.
Modern operating systems support built-in spell checking, which perhaps
reduces the importance of approximate string searching. However, this adds
an overhead to the client, it has a limited dictionary, and users are taxed by
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having to confirm corrections. Thus, it is advantageous for searching schemes
to support approximate string matching.
4.1.4 False Positives
Searching for a string over unencrypted data rarely returns false positives.
However, when both query and data are encrypted, a cloud service cannot
determine how accurate its results are. Lossy techniques such as Bin Encoding
make it even harder to prevent false positives, for not only does the service
have no knowledge of the data and query, but it cannot be sure that two
identical encoded values are actually the same. Furthermore, an approximate
search increases the potential for false positives if an exact match is not found.
However, by looking for patterns, Bin Encoding still produces accurate results,
as will be shown in Section 4.3.
4.1.5 Building the Index
The scheme allows the index to be built by the cloud service, rather than the
client. The client only needs to encode the documents, which adds negligible
overhead, and encrypt them. This allows multiple devices to update docu-
ments at the same time. In contrast with trapdoor searching, delegating index
operations to the cloud service allows it to implement more advanced search
facilities and obtain more accurate document rankings, because the locations
of query term hits are known.
Just how the index is built is left open, and the details are beyond scope
here. However, given the cloud has no knowledge of spaces, we recommend an
n-gram approach, where n would be the number of bins. For testing, we built
the index using grams of the same size as the query, although in practice it is
likely that fixed sized grams such as bigrams or trigrams will be used. Note
that overall performance will depend on how the index is constructed and the
number of documents in the index.
4.1.6 Generating the Bin Mapping
There are many ways of generating the mapping of characters to bins. A simple
solution is to generate it randomly and save it for future use. However, if a user
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accesses the cloud from a different device, it will also need the map—however,
it is undesirable from a user and security point of view to transfer the map
from device to device. Instead, we recommend creating the mapping from a
password.
Algorithm 2 Bin generation example
1: function bingen(password, salt, bins)
2: binmap← {}
3: hex← Hash(password+ salt)
4: i← len(hex)− 1
5: for c← A to Z do
6: while c not in binmap do
7: p← int(hexi to i−1) mod bins
8: i← i− 2
9: if len(binmapp) <= d26/binse then
10: binmapp ← binmapp + c
11: return binmap
This can be done in many ways; as a concrete example we describe a simple
method, shown in Algorithm 2, that uses a hash function. The password, along
with some user-specific salt, is hashed into a large number. This is expressed
in hexadecimal and treated as a string, parts of which are converted to an
integer in modulo N , where N is the number of bins. This is used to assign
the letter to a bin. If equal bin sizes are required and the bin is full, the process
is repeated. If the entire hashed value is consumed, we could return to the
beginning and re-hash with an offset (not shown in Algorithm 2).
4.2 Privacy with Bin Encoding
Given Bin Encoding is a simple lossy encoding technique, it cannot be classed
as encryption. However, encoding can also protect privacy and secure data.
The protection is analysed in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 for frequency and brute
force attacks respectively.
4.2.1 Frequency Attack
The simple substitution cipher used by Mary, Queen of Scots, was broken
via frequency analysis, which led to her execution in 1587 [156]; this is why
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Table 4.1: English letter frequencies
A B C D E F G H I J K L M
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Figure 4.2: Difference in calculated and actual bin frequencies
frequency analysis is covered in this section. Analysing the frequency of a
bin occurring gives an estimation of the letters mapped to it. For example,
given the letter frequencies in Table 4.1 [155], if a bin occurs at a relatively
small frequency, it is more likely to contain letters that also have a smaller
frequency. This also gives a reduction in bin combinations for a malicious
user to try, because certain combinations do not fall within the estimated
frequencies calculated.
Figure 4.2 shows the difference between the estimated frequency obtained
from counting bins in the index and the actual frequency of the letters in each
bin. These results show that with enough encoded documents indexed, it is
possible to predict within ±2.5% of the actual letter frequency. They also
show that a smaller number of bins for the index is harder to estimate.
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of 100 million unique random bins for a
3 bin configuration, giving a total of 300 million bins, each containing 8 −
9 letters. The average summed frequency for a bin is around 33.3%, even
though the English letter frequencies vary. Therefore, when generating the
bin mapping, we can check if the bin frequencies are within the majority of all
possible bins combinations. For example, using 3 bins, the scheme might only
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accept bins with frequencies between 20% and 46%. This means that even if
a malicious user knows the frequency of each bin to ±2.5%, it still gives over
20% of all possible bin combinations. Note this experiment only contained
bins of even size (8-9 letters), where an implementation having a variation in
the number of letters per bin would have more possible bin combinations.
4.2.2 Brute Force
There exists a finite number of states for a mapping; therefore, a malicious
entity need only find which. With an even number of characters per bin,
the expression below determines the number of possible states where N is the
number of characters, b is the number of bins, and N mod b = 0. For example,
with the set {A−Z, 0− 9}, gives N = 36. When b = 3, it results in ≈ 3.38e15,
and if b = 12 then there are ≈ 1.71e32 possible states. An uneven number of
characters per bin grows these values further.
b∏
i=1
(
N − (N/b)(i− 1)
N/b
)
With the correct state or mapping, because Bin Encoding is lossy, there
are still many combinations that the original plain-text value could be. With
b = 3 and N = 36, then there are 12 possibilities for each bin. With a query of
length 5, there would be 125 possibilities, before considering if it is a valid word
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or phrase. An encoded document with only 100 characters would therefore
have ≈ 8.28e107 possibilities. Note that with 100 characters, and given spaces
have been removed, word lengths are not known. If the mapping is not known,
trying to solve an encoded document is hard (≈ 8.28e107× 3.38e15 = 2.80e123).
The challenge is knowing the solution is correct. For example, using the prime
number theorem to estimate the number of prime numbers that are 1024-bits
gives many more possibilities 21024log(21024) − 2
1023
log(21023) ≈ 1.27e305. However, the
difference for encrypted text is it is usually obvious when the decryption key is
found, where with Bin Encoding there are many possible solutions even with
knowledge of the mapping.
An example can be seen in Table 4.2, where all 5 letter words (6919) from
a dictionary [157] were tested against each other for collisions using the same
mapping. This shows that with only a few bins, there is the potential for some
false positives in results. However, it also means that for trying to recover
the plain text, that there are a number of options even if the mapping and
word length are known. Results from another experiment in Tables 4.3 and 4.4
show the large number of potential matches if the mapping is not known. Each
word was encoded into x bins using ASCII values modulo x, and tested for a
match against the query word, giving the same mapping column. The other
mapping column was computed by encoding the query and testing if each 5
or 10 letter word could be a potential encoding. The criteria for a potential
match was that no character gets encoded to different bins. For example, hello
is not a potential match for the encoded query ABBAC because l is split across
two bins. Table 4.4 also includes two 5 letter words which still have potential
matches with 10 letter words.
4.3 Bin Encoding Results
The previous section detailed how difficult it is to reserve the mapping process
for Bin Encoding. The functionality of a search is still present though, as will
be shown in this section. String searching over a document is given in 4.3.1
before language analysis in the form of collisions is given. The lower the
collision rates for a language, the better results Bin Encoding will return.
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Table 4.2: Collisions between five letter words
Number of Bins Average Collisions Percentage
1 6919 100%
2 238.586 3.448%
3 28.473 0.412%
4 9.759 0.141%
5 3.810 0.055%
6 2.824 0.041%
7 2.092 0.030%
8 1.684 0.024%
9 1.332 0.019%
10 1.501 0.022%
11 1.195 0.017%
12 1.189 0.017%
13 1.128 0.016%
14 1.256 0.018%
15 1.143 0.017%
16 1.137 0.016%
17 1.084 0.016%
18 1.055 0.015%
19 1.029 0.015%
20 1.085 0.016%
21 1.021 0.015%
22 1.009 0.015%
23 1.007 0.015%
24 1.009 0.015%
25 1.000 0.014%
26 1.000 0.014%
Table 4.3: Five letter word queries
Word Bins Same Mapping Other Mappings % in Dictionary
hello 3 16 5374 77.94%
hello 13 1 5058 73.15%
world 3 80 5407 79.34%
world 13 1 4598 66.50%
paper 3 20 4963 72.05%
paper 13 3 4871 70.47%
zoned 3 106 5348 78.86%
zoned 13 1 4598 66.50%
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Table 4.4: Ten letter word queries
Word Bins Same Mapping Other Mappings % in Dictionary
blacksmith 3 1 1994 16.79%
blacksmith 13 1 635 5.35%
underwater 3 2 2861 24.10%
underwater 13 1 1272 10.71%
helloworld 3 0 2629 22.13%
helloworld 13 0 1212 10.20%
purringcat 3 0 2156 18.15%
purringcat 13 0 893 7.52%
Table 4.5: Exact matching in a document
Search Query First Result Second Result Third Result
internet internet (100%) interest (42%) intercon (33%)
ethics ethics (100%) ewhich (45%) ethica (45%)
privacy privacy (100%) videdby (28%) nyactiv (28%)
hackers rkthere (28%) isthehe (28%) hersche (28%)
underwater waterreser (33%) underscore (26%) -
sldnfs - - -
Table 4.6: Approximate matching in a document
Search Query First Result Second Result Third Result
internat internet (53%) informat (53%) interest (42%)
intranet internet (42%) infrastr (33%) intended (33%)
intrenet internet (66%) interest (53%) inginter (53%)
ethiks ethics (45%) fthiss (45%) ethica (33%)
ehtics ethics (33%) effect (33%) -
priatcy privacy (38%) leinthe (38%) beingof (28%)
private privacy (38%) provide (38%) privile (38%)
4.3.1 Searching over a Document
The document used to obtain these results was “Ethics and the Internet
RFC1087” [158]. For a single index, 13 bins were used, with all bin mappings
randomly generated at runtime. The primary ranking used was the ngram
search function from the Python ngram library [159]. Results are the size of
the query, so some results are segments of words, or even two parts of a word,
because spaces are not known.
Table 4.5 contains six queries; the first three queries exist in the document
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Figure 4.4: Average word collisions rates for English using modulo bin allocation
and this is shown by the results giving 100% matches. The remaining results
(second and third) can vary depending on the bin mappings; however, if the
query is not misspelled and the search term is in the document, a 100% match
always occurred in our testing. The bottom three queries are terms which are
not in the document and hence do not get strong matches.
The results for approximate searching are given in Table 4.6 where a selec-
tion of incorrect queries is given. These results show that the cloud is still able
to match a word/phrase that the user could be meaning. Note that because
approximate matching is more challenging for Bin Encoding, even a single
wrong character in the query can lead to varying results. However, the impor-
tant aspect is that the correct result is returned to the user even if it is not
the first match, where a quick filter on the client side could be used to move
it up the rankings.
4.3.2 English Collision Rates
In order to test false positives, we computed all collisions (possible false pos-
itives) between words of length 4, 5, 6 and 7. Figure 4.4 shows the average
collision percentage of English words from the dictionary [160].1 Looking at
the percentages, using 3 bins will clash with less than 0.017% of all words.
Then, as the bin sizes increase, the rate of collisions drops to average just over
1Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 do not start at 0 because they either had too high collisions in
Table 4.2, or for the case of 0 and 1, are not usable.
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Figure 4.5: Word collisions rates for Pinyin using modulo bin allocation
a single word. This means that using a larger number of bins for the index
gives few false positives.
4.3.3 Mandarin Collision Rates
Given the complexity of Mandarin and other Chinese dialects, even basic key-
word searching can be challenging [161]. A single character represents a whole
word or phrase, and can vary depending on the characters surrounding it, un-
like English. Therefore, we used Hanyu Pinyin to romanise Chinese characters,
by spelling out their sounds. This is a lossy approach, as some characters can
produce the same Pinyin output; however, Bin Encoding itself is already lossy.
Once the characters are converted, encoding and searching can proceed like
other languages.
Pinyin produces relatively small words (sounds) from a single character,
which effects the collision rates, as can be seen in Figure 4.5 (tested on a small
dictionary [162]). However, because words are a combination of sounds, the
collision rate will drop as they are combined, like the last entry in Figure 4.5.
This aligns the collisions rates to other languages. Therefore, exact searching
can be supported by Bin Encoding, but approximate searching will be more
difficult. If the user input is Pinyin, then approximate searching will be able
to support errors. However, if the user input is a Mandarin character, which is
then automatically converted to Pinyin, approximate searching will not work.
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Figure 4.6: Word collisions rates for Ma¯ori using modulo bin allocation
This is because an error with the input could cause large variations to the
Pinyin output.
4.3.4 Ma¯ori Collision Rates
Spoken by the indigenous people of New Zealand, Ma¯ori is a variation of
historic eastern Polynesian languages. It has an interesting property, were
each syllable ends in one of 5 vowels (10 if we include long vowels which are
indicated by a horizontal bar). Therefore, given an encoded Ma¯ori query, the
last bin must contain either a short or long vowel.2 This opens up a new attack
vector that would not be possible with the English language. However, given
the large number of vowels and that the cloud does not require knowledge of
which language is used, it is not a major issue.
Figure 4.6 shows collision rates between words of equal length where the bin
mapping was performed using a modulo allocation. Each word length shows
a spike when using 4 bins. This is because of the poor distribution of vowels
across bins, as 4 out of the 5 short vowels give the same modulo result. Using
a random bin allocation as in Figure 4.7 gives more desirable results and shows
the importance of the bin mapping generation.
2The dictionary was obtained from Dr. Te Taka Keegan (tetaka@waikato.ac.nz).
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Figure 4.7: Word collisions rates for Ma¯ori using random bin allocation
4.4 Distributed Bin Encoding
As previously discussed in this chapter, a larger number of bins will return
more accurate results from encoded queries, because more patterns are ob-
served. However, having many bins (>13) opens both index and queries to
a wider range of attacks. In the extreme case, 26 bins are simple to attack,
because there is a one-to-one mapping between characters and bins (assuming
the alphabet is {A−Z}), enabling standard frequency and language attacks—
although removing spaces makes these somewhat more difficult. In practice,
the index will be built using a smaller number of bins (<6) to harden it against
such attacks.
4.4.1 System Model
The proposed distributed system model stores data in different “environments”
that are isolated from one another in such a way that if one environment is
compromised by a malicious user, they will not be able to use the information
or privileges gained to compromise another environment (possibly hosted by
different cloud service providers as well). Figure 4.8 shows a distributed index
model containing four separate environments that isolate data. Three of these
environments, I, II, and III, contain indexes to the same documents built using
different bin mappings. By combining search results from each index, more
accurate results can be returned. For example, if one index gives a match on
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Bob
Environment IV:
- No Index
- Map for I,II&III
- Encrypted Files
Environment I:
- Index I
- No Map Info
- No Files
Environment II:
- Index II
- No Map Info
- No Files
Environment III:
- Index III
- No Map Info
- No Files
Figure 4.8: Distributed index system model for bin encoding
part of the document but another does not return the same match, this is
likely to be a false positive.
Environment IV in Figure 4.8 is responsible for distributing the query to
the indexes and for combining the results to return to the user. When the
user sends a query or edits a document, the number of bins for encoding can
be large (for example 13). When Environment IV receives encoded values, it
uses a randomly generated mapping, different for each user, to further encode
the already encoded values for each environment into a smaller number of
bins. Although the user’s mapping is never sent to the cloud, each index has
a different mapping. Environment IV also stores the encrypted files received
from the user (although they could be placed elsewhere). The distributed
index provides better security than a single index, because a compromise on
a server with an index only has a small number of bins making it harder to
recover the plain-text values.
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4.4.2 Results
Instead of using 13 bins for the index, the client encoded documents into 13
bins for sending to the distribution server, before being converted into the
three indexes, where each used 3 bins with different mappings. Results are not
shown here because they essentially replicate the ones achieved in Section 4.3.1.
This proved that the distributed model is the superior model, as it provides
more privacy and accuracy than a single index.
4.5 Limitations of Bin Encoding
There are limitations for using the lossy mapping function, some of which are
mentioned in this section.
4.5.1 Results Known
Allowing the cloud to know if a result was found is an advantage and disad-
vantage. For large indexes, knowing if a document matches means less data
is transferred back to the user. However, better privacy would be achieved by
the cloud not knowing if a result is found. Given the file content and name are
encrypted, along with the queries not known, the cloud knowing the number
of matches is acceptable for this scheme given the focus is on practicality.
4.5.2 Randomness
A property of strong cryptosystems is their ability to provide randomness,
such that the same plain-text value produces different cipher values. If the
cloud does not know if a match is found, this is more important. Currently,
Bin Encoding does not support randomness for queries; however, two identical
encoded phrases can be different plain-text values, especially with a small
number of bins such as with the distributed model. Randomness for Bin
Encoding would involve randomly corrupting bits of the queries where multiple
queries would be needed to filter results. However, this was not tested or
explored.
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4.5.3 Light Obfuscation
To make dictionary and frequency attacks more difficult, we propose the idea
of lightly obfuscating each word before it is encoded. This must be done at
a character level, to preserve approximate searching. Obfuscating a couple
of characters per word results in characters being encoded into different bins.
This heavily reduces the accuracy of frequency attacks. Dictionary attacks are
also hindered as each possible light obfuscation method must be considered
when testing each word in the dictionary.
Algorithm 3 shows an example where every second character is XORed with
the first letter. The obfuscation frequency (every second character) and func-
tion (XOR) should vary for different users, like the bin mapping. The key
can be an arbitrary value, but for this example we use the first character.
This is because in the majority of Google’s recorded misspellings of “Britney
Spears” [135], the first character is correct.
Algorithm 3 Obfuscate word before encoding
1: function obfuscateWord(word, freq, func)
2: key ← word0
3: eword← ' '
4: for c in word do
5: if index(c) mod freq == 0 then
6: c = func(key, c)
7: eword← eword+ c
8: return eword
9:
10: binEncode(obfuscateWord(word, 2, XOR), binmap)
4.5.4 Padding
Small documents which are accessed often could reduce the attack space for a
dictionary attack: for example, as in a shopping list as shown below:
ShoppingList.txt
milk
eggs
bread
red bull
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A solution to hide these smaller documents is randomly padding the encoded
output on both sides. It is important that the length is random, otherwise all
the small documents will have the same padded length, making them easy to
identify. When generating the padding bins, it is possible to create patterns
which will be returned when searching. Preventing false positives for the file
is simple, as we can check that the random bins do not have the same patterns
as the original encoded string. For example, for the shopping list we checked
three bin patterns, and the padded result can be seen below, where the original
string is in blue.
GKMGHDHCCNGADANJACEHGIFGLFDBGCNCDJDIHEAIBNAALBF
MCIFDBKNHMDMLGGBJMJIAIEBAJLHNKCJECBMLMDFEFLDLJG
AHLHGJMIHIEEEDGFJAMBFKAHAHBNGCAHMEDCMAFFBDAADMK
ADBHAFHMILLJFDLBILDMDIKDCCBHBLJFBJCAJJJKIBEFIAK
FILHEEMCDCJKEGALLBCCBBGHFCACELGKJLKNKDHNKEHFJNB
INJNNKDMFLECEGGKEILDMKMAFHBCDBFNJHDLHDAIMMMIBKK
FIFJFMLJNFMJCFAACGLKIMKCHEEJDECGDEMMHNIFGIKIJCJ
NDEJICJIKCDKIICHAKEBBADKAKBHGCCHNFNFIDLLFDJJKEN
FCCLAHKKFKKLDLAAMFLMHNMIAIEJKMGILMGMABJCNFCIJFA
IAGKCMGJENCFEFENCEGGKGAHDDNIEKCNICJJAKICILBFJCH
BCLLJDNMAHNKINFEEMDJCNH
Padding the shopping list to around 500 characters 1, 000 times (using dif-
ferent randomly mappings), 4 and 5 letter dictionary words were encoded and
compared for exact matches. On average, 53× 4 letter words and 95× 5 letter
words were falsely added. This is only 0.0153% and 0.0131% of the possible
words respectively. These results are within the same percentages of collision
rates, making padding a feasible solution for small documents.
4.5.5 Preview Results
Providing the user with preview results on what was matched – like the Google
search engine – is very difficult for encrypted data. If a document is encrypted
using a technique where the entire document must be decrypted at once to
get the plain-text, then there is a lot of overhead (downloading the file and
decrypting it) to get a snippet of the document. To improve this overhead, the
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document could be encrypted in smaller chunks so that only a quick decryption
is required. However, this then adds overhead to the encryption phase.
Stream ciphers [163][164][165][166] offer greater performance than tradi-
tional schemes but can sacrifice the level of security. However, they offer a
useful property for encrypted search. If no block chaining is used, such as
where each character is XORed with the output of a pseudo-random number
generator, then it is possible to only download and decrypt the part of the doc-
ument where a match was found. This technique decreases both the encryption
and decryption steps, while not requiring the entire file to be downloaded.
The current limitation is that Bin Encoding returns an index into the file
where the match was found without special characters, meaning the index does
not factor in spaces. Therefore, a third file must be uploaded, where special
characters are removed, and it is encrypted using a stream cipher. This allows
for correct indexing but restricts the preview results (there are no spaces).
4.6 Summary
Bin Encoding has shown the feasibility of using encoding for providing privacy-
preserving processing in the cloud. Privacy is achieved through the number of
possible mappings and by using lossy encoding. The possibility of frequency
attacks and the lack of randomness means Bin Encoding is not as strong as
encryption-based searching schemes such as [140]. However, with the addi-
tional functionality and low overheads–similar to plain text–it gives Bin En-
coding a good balance between security, performance and utility. Even greater
privacy can be achieved using a distributed system, and it has been shown
that distributed encoding could be a feasible method for protecting privacy in
the cloud while providing practical performance. Naturally the performance
of Bin Encoding will depend on the index, allowed leakages [140], and the
number of documents in the system, but the simplicity of the scheme gives it
potential. This chapter started to answer Hypothesis 3, where the following
chapters will further explore the concept of distributed encoding.
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FRIBs: Fragmenting Individual Bits
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Scheme Model
In Chapter 4, the idea of using encoding to protect data was explored; however,
Bin Encoding only supports string searching and cannot guarantee perfect ac-
curacy. Therefore, another solution was required for researching Hypothesis 3.
That scheme is a distributed encoding scheme, designed to support arbitrary
computation with the goal of being both privacy-preserving and practical. The
designed encoding scheme also provides a technique to address an issue with
multi-party computation, where garbled circuits should not be reused. The
scheme–codenamed Fragmenting Individual Bits (FRIBs)–is discussed for the
remaining of this thesis, with the system model presented in this chapter.
5.1 Mathematical Definitions
For a greater understanding of the FRIBs scheme, two mathematical models
were used: Petri Nets and Pi-Calculus. The standard model for Petri Nets is
used with transitions, places, and tokens, as shown in Figure 5.1. A transition
cannot occur unless inputting places have a token. When a transition occurs,
Place with Token
Transition
P lace without Token
Figure 5.1: Petri Net definition
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Table 5.1: Pi-Calculus definitions
Expression Meaning
c < x > Send variable x through channel c.
c(x) Receive and bind to variable x from channel c.
A.B Run A, then run B.
A|B Run A and B in parallel.
A.B|C.D Run A, then run B and C in parallel, then run D.
A(c) = c(x) Define A with channel c as c(x).
(k, l) map−−→ (x) Use key k in lookup table l, binding the output to x.
(x) ran(r)−−−→ (y) Perform a randomising operation using r.
(x) rstates−−−−→ (..., x, ...) Hide x in an array of random possible values for x.
(x) operations−−−−−−→ (y) Some operations are applied to x, resulting in y.
all input places lose a token, and all output places receive one token. This
model was used to show the data transfers between servers and the concurrency,
where each server needs to be running at the same time.
Pi-Calculus is the other mathematical representation used in this thesis.
Petri Nets provide an abstract view of data flow between servers, whereas Pi-
Calculus shows a more advanced process model and an idea of the operations
occurring. Some customised expressions were used to help give the abstract
data flow of FRIBs, given in Table 5.1, where the last four rows are used to
provide more context into the workings of FRIBs.
5.2 Overview
The FRIBs scheme has been designed to distribute each individual bit across
many service providers, while still allowing arbitrary operations to be com-
puted. We likened our proposed idea to the New Zealand terminology of fribs,
which are small pieces of unwanted wool removed after shearing [23]. If we say
a “bit” is the woollen fleece, then it cannot be recreated without all the fribs
and wool. Distributing the bit fragments can be seen as exporting the fribs
and wool to different locations, known as fragment servers. Once exported,
the bit fragments can be processed privately by building functions from logic
gates.
Another example is given in Figure 5.2, where we say a bit is a puzzle and
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Figure 5.2: A bit can be seen as a puzzle, where all the pieces are needed to
reconstruct the bit. In this example some information about the puzzle (bit) can
be obtained from some of the pieces (fragments)
Figure 5.3: In this example the lights are turned out, so the pieces are not visible,
meaning no information can be obtained from them
the fragments are the pieces [167]. Once fragmented, the puzzle can only be
recreated by putting the pieces together in the correct order. However, in
this example, one can learn something about the puzzle/bit by looking at a
piece, whereas in Figure 5.3 the lights are turned off, meaning no information
can be learnt about what the puzzle represents without putting the pieces
together, which turns on the light. The concept of fragmentation is further
explained in Section 5.3.1; however, if the fragmentation is all XOR operations
(bit = FA⊕FB⊕FC), then the last fragment still affects the result (lights out),
where with all AND operations, the result could be revealed by a 0.
Privacy from a single entity is achieved by the distributed fragments being
stored and processed on different servers hosted by different entities.1 These
distributed fragments are not a subset of the data in a way used by traditional
1For example, using Google, Microsoft and Amazon, such that no single entity has access
to the others.
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Bob
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Lookup
Table
Fragment
Servers
Reduction
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Figure 5.4: System model with three fragment servers and a reduction server
distributed systems, as each fragment holds a segment of a single bit which
by itself represents nothing–FRIBs is not a divide and conquer approach. One
example is a database table split over multiple servers [168]; each holds a
different piece of information or subset, but a fragment holds part of a bit,
meaning each server holds part of all the information. Therefore, processing
occurs over all the fragments on each server with communication between
them, requiring each server to run the same function/program at the same
time. FRIBs can be seen as a subset of secure multi-party computation, but is
a simpler technique, as encryption is only required for network communication.
The benefit of FRIBs over current secure multi-party computation schemes is
how FRIBs builds garbled circuits and that fragments (known as shares in
multi-party computation) are not encrypted. This will be explored further in
this chapter.
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5.3 System Model
As data is being uploaded, each bit is split into fragments–FA, FB and FC–in
Figure 5.4, where Obs is an obfuscation function. Each fragment is protected
using public-key cryptography2 and sent to a separate fragment server, man-
aged by different cloud providers and organisations. When these fragments are
stored on the servers, they can be encrypted when at rest3, but the keys are
managed by the cloud. Depending on the fragmentation algorithm used, each
fragment server can learn all of the bits, through to zero (the ideal solution)
as touched upon with Figures 5.2 and 5.3.
5.3.1 Fragmentation
The fragmentation algorithm defines how the fragments are joined together to
get the result bit. Keeping the fragmentation algorithm private can be seen as a
type of secret; however, there are a limited number of algorithms available, for
example when using two logic operations }0 and }1, where }0,}1 ∈ {⊕,∨, ↓
,∧,Z}4, and with three fragment servers such that FA}0FB}1FC = bitx gives
less than 25 possible combinations. Therefore, in this thesis we will say the
fragmentation algorithm is known.
The fragmentation algorithm can leak bits if it is known by the fragment
servers; setting }0 = }1 = ∧ (AND logic gates) reveals information if the
fragment server receives a 0, because the result must therefore be low. Ran-
domising the fragments gives Table 5.2, where only one entry gives a high
result value. Assuming an equal probability for receiving a low or high bit, a
fragment server could learn approximately 28% of the bits if the fragmentation
operations are known.5 Limiting the number of 0 fragments to one, as shown
in Table 5.3, reduces this to approximately 17%. For a 32-bit value, this is
only five bits, whereas using }0 = }1 = ⊕ means no bits are leaked to the
fragment servers even if }0 and }1 are known. Therefore, this is the fragmen-
tation algorithm used in this thesis, with any analysis assuming }0 and }1 are
known.
2Because any communication between servers, and/or the client should be encrypted
3Data at rest is when data is in a stored state, i.e. not being processed or in transit
4Symbol definitions: ⊕ =XOR, ∨ =OR, ↓=NOR, ∧ =AND, Z =NAND
5Calculated by 12 of bits low, and
4
7 fragments are 0 if the fragment is low.
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Table 5.2: All options for fragment
values.
Value FA FB FC
low 0 0 0
low 0 0 1
low 0 1 0
low 0 1 1
low 1 0 0
low 1 0 1
low 1 1 0
high 1 1 1
Table 5.3: Reduced options for
fragment values.
Value FA FB FC
low 0 1 1
low 1 0 1
low 1 1 0
high 1 1 1
An example of encoding an 8-bit value 011011012, where }0 = }1 = ⊕ is
given as FA = 01010011, FB = 11011001 and FC = 11100111. Fragments FA
and FB can be random, where FC is required to make FA ⊕ FB ⊕ FC equal
the bit value. The fragments FA, FB, and FC are encrypted for transmission
to their respective fragment server. This encryption will be part the secure
connection from the client to the server; for example, transport layer security.
5.3.2 Fragment Servers
The fragment servers store fragments and execute operations over these frag-
ments. Note that a 32-bit plain-text value is comparable to 32 fragments
(where the fragments are from a 32-bit value), meaning at rest the size of the
encrypted data stored is the same as if it were plain text (size(E(value)) ==
size(E(fragments))). Programs are executed over the fragments by concate-
nating fragments together, which later have the operation applied at the re-
duction stage. These concatenated values or fragment states need to maintain
the order of operations; an operation over two fragments will be denoted by
0, where low fragments are represented as 11 during processing: for example,
the fragment 010100112 is represented as < 11, 1, 11, 1, 11, 11, 1, 1 >.
Applying an operation (NAND, OR, or any an arbitrary bit operation) to the
set of fragments F0 =< 11, 1, 11, 1, 11, 11, 1, 1 > and F1 =< 1, 1, 1, 11, 11, 1, 11, 11 >,
gives the resulting fragment F3 =< 1101, 101, 1101, 1011, 11011, 1101, 1011, 1011 >.
Applying another operation to F3 and itself (F3), gives F4 =< 1101001101,
10100101, 1101001101, 1011001011, 110110011011, 1101001101, 1011001011,
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1011001011 >. In this case, the concatenation needed to use 00 to maintain
state; for example, 1101001101 is (0 } 1) } (0 } 1) where } represents the
operation. Note that once an operation has been applied, the same operation
must be applied until the fragment is reduced back to a single bit.6
5.3.3 Reduction Server
As more fragments are concatenated together, the resulting fragment states
will continue to grow. At a predefined point in the program, the fragments
are reduced, which in turn applies the operation as it reduces the fragment
back to a single bit. The point where a reduction occurs can be hardcoded
into the program or added by a compiler, but reduction is needed once the
fragment states are known to be at a certain size. The program is the same
across all fragment servers; therefore, each server performs a reduction at the
same time, because reducing a fragment requires information about all frag-
ments for the operation to be computed correctly. At this point, we will say a
separate server–known as the reduction server–is used, where all N fragment
servers send their fragments to (over a secure medium) during the reduction
step. Once the reduction server has received each fragment, it uses a precom-
puted Lookup Table (LUT) to get the reduced fragments to send back to each
fragment server, thus, applying the operation. However, if each fragment was
sent and returned from the reduction server in the current format (1011 for
example), then some of the data could be decoded with a known fragmentation
algorithm.
Since the reduction server is performing a simple lookup, we can obfuscate
each fragment to a unique value, like a garbled circuit. For example, each
server can hash the fragment with a server unique salt value or use a random
mapping. Now, the reduction server should not know the state of the fragments
it has received.7 Protecting the reduced fragments is slightly more difficult. A
public-key cryptography scheme can be applied to each reduced fragment, such
that only the single server can decrypt the fragment.8 The LUT is built oﬄine
and sent to the reduction server; therefore, the reduction server only receives a
6This is for the universal case, where the reduction could be defined such that 110101101
is (0⊕ 1) ∧ (0⊕ 1).
7At this point, patterns can be seen if states are the same; this is addressed in Section 5.4.3
8The need to encrypt the resulting fragments is removed in Section 5.4.
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protected lookup table, and all the reduced fragments are already encrypted.
Another security benefit given is that each public key for the individual servers
and their reduced fragments can remain private from the reduction server
(which would also allow a symmetric encryption scheme to be used).
For example, when reducing the non-obfuscated fragments FA, FB and FC
below, each index into the fragment vectors is reduced; therefore, each index
is treated separately.
FA =< 1101, 101, 1101, 1011, 11011, 1101, 1011, 1011 >
FB =< 11011, 1101, 1101, 1011, 1011, 1011, 11011, 1101 >
FC =< 101, 1011, 11011, 1101, 101, 1101, 101, 11011 >
The result fragments (which are not encrypted in this example) are FA =<
0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0 >, FB =< 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0 > and FC =< 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0 >.
The 8-bit values for this example are a = 133 and b = 27 where a Z b = 254,
as can be solved via FA ⊕ FB ⊕ FC = 111111102.
One improvement to reduce the usability of patterns observed by the reduc-
tion server is to use multiple reduction servers. For example, two reduction
servers could be set up where the fragment servers alternate reduction requests
between the two, as shown in Figure 5.5. The lookup tables should be unique,
using different keys and obfuscated values. A pseudo-random number gener-
ator can be used to define which reduction server to send the requests too,
where all the fragment servers use the same seed value.
5.3.4 Current Mathematical Models
To further explain the reduction server model of the FRIBs scheme, a Petri Net
is given in Figure 5.6. This defines the model with two fragment servers and
one reduction server. Places P1, P2 and P3 are running on the first fragment
server, with places P4, P5, and P6 on the second fragment server, where places
P7 and P8 are on the reduction server. The transition Process is the algorithm
computing over the data, which combines fragments until a fixed point in
the execution, with both Process transitions computing the same operations.
Once the fragments need reducing, the transition Reduction is reached. This
transition obfuscates the fragment and sends it to the reduction server. Once
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Figure 5.5: System model with three fragment servers and two reduction servers
the reduction server has received both obfuscated states, the Lookup transition
can get the obfuscated result fragments for each fragment server. When a
fragment server receives its reduced fragment, computation can continue.
Expanding on the Petri Net model, Pi-Calculus will be used to define the
reduction server model in a dynamic manner. The lookup operation is defined
in Equation 5.1, which takes the LUT, and the channel key. Note that the
key can be made up of many states, and can return multiple states. It is used
to obfuscate a state on a fragment server, and for the reduction server to get
the result fragments.
Lookup(table_name, key) =
key(state0, ... , statex, result).
(state0, ... , statex, table_name)
map−−→ (new_state0, ... , new_statex).
result < new_state0, ... , new_statex > .
Lookup(table_name, key)
(5.1)
A reduction server waits for the obfuscated values, using them to get the new
states, and returns them to the fragment servers, shown in Equation 5.3.
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Reduction(server_frag0, ... , server_fragx, table) =
server_frag0(state0, c0)| ... |server_fragx(statex, cx).
table < state0, ... , statex, tc > .tc(new_state0, ... , new_statex).
c0 < new_state0 > | ... |cx < new_statex > .
Reduction(server_frag0, ... , server_fragx, table)
(5.2)
ReductionServer(server_frag0, ... , server_fragx, table_name) =
Lookup(table_name, table) |
Reduction(server_frag0, ... , server_fragx, table)
(5.3)
The fragment servers are made of two parts: Equations 5.4 and 5.5. Equa-
tion 5.4 handles obfuscating the state, sending it to the reduction server, and
returning the result, where Equation 5.5 is the program being executed; this
will be the same program for each fragment server, where some states are com-
bined and then reduced. An example fragment server is given in Equation 5.6.
Reduce(server_red, table, state_in) =
state_in(state, state_out).table < state, c > .c(obf_state).
server_red < obf_state, rc > .rc(new_state).
state_out < new_state > .
Reduce(server_red, table, state_in)
(5.4)
Program(reduce) =
state
operations−−−−−−→ new_state.reduce < new_state, o > .o(state)
(5.5)
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FragmentServer(table_name, server_red) =
Lookup(table_name, table) | Reduce(serverred, table, rstate) |
Program(rstate)
(5.6)
Sample configuration is given in Equation 5.7, with two fragment servers and
one reduction server. The table names represent that a different LUT is being
used, and was constructed oﬄine.
Compute = (new server1, server2)
ReductionServer(server1, server2, “reduction_table′′) |
FragmentServer(“frag_1_table′′, server1) |
FragmentServer(“frag_2_table′′, server2)
(5.7)
5.4 Removing the Reduction Server
Currently, the system model for FRIBs is similar to that of multi-party com-
putation schemes where garbled circuits are used. The difference is that the
reduction server has no knowledge of the data or the program, and can only
learn patterns based on reusing of LUTs (hence why other multi-party compu-
tation schemes also cannot reuse garbled circuits). However, instead of using
a singular LUT which contains the reduced fragments, separate LUTs can be
used such that each result only reveals one fragment servers reduced value.
5.4.1 Performance Orientated Model
With the reduction server model, each fragment server sends their obfuscated
state and waits for the reply, as shown in Figure 5.7. Therefore, the Round
Trip Time (RTT) will be responsible for the majority of the computation time.
This can be halved by removing the need for the fragment servers to wait for
a response. To achieve this, each fragment server can be its own reduction
server, removing the need for encrypting or obfuscating the output states, as
each LUT will only output its own result fragment value. This is shown in
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FA FB
R
→
FA FB
R
Figure 5.7: Reduction server model, where fragment servers wait for the response
FA FB FC
Bob
LUT
A
LUT
C
LUT
B
Fragment
Servers
Figure 5.8: System model with three fragment servers and no reduction servers
Figure 5.8, where the reduction server is removed and each fragment server
has a unique LUT. During the reduction step, each fragment server sends an
obfuscated state9 to the other fragment servers, as shown in Figure 5.9.
Figure 5.10 gives a dynamic Petri Net model, where the fragment server
waits for all obfuscated states before being able to get its reduced fragment
value during the Receive transition, which then allows processing to continue.
Figure 5.11 presents the performance model with three servers. This shows
that even if the servers are running at slightly different timings, they all must
wait until each is at the same stage of the program.
A slight redefinition of Equation 5.1 is given in Equation 5.8, where the
9The concatenated fragment is mapped to an obfuscated state value.
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FA FB
FC
Figure 5.9: No reduction server model; the fragment servers send all at once
P1
Process
P2
Reduction
...P3 Px
Receive
Figure 5.10: Variable server Petri Net for the FRIBs performance model
output is now a single result fragment value.
Lookup(table_name, key) =
key(state0, ... , statex, result).
(state0, ... , statex, table_name)
map−−→ (new_state).
result < new_state > .
Lookup(table_name, key)
(5.8)
A new process is defined in Equation 5.9, which obfuscates the servers’ state.
The obfuscated state is then sent to one of the other servers. The process waits
to receive the other servers obfuscated state and returns it.
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SubReduce(server_in, server_out, table, state_in) =
state_in(state, state_out).table < state, c > .c(new_state).
server_out < new_state > .server_in(r_state).
state_out < r_state > .
SubReduce(server_in, server_out, table, state_in)
(5.9)
The process Reduce is redefined such that its parameters are now channels to
a SubReduce process, for example sr1. It still waits to receive the current state
through state_in and sends it to each SubReduce process. Upon receiving the
obfuscated values of the other servers, it uses the LUT to get its new state.
Reduce(sr1, ... , srx, table, state_in) =
state_in(state, result).(sr1 < state, s1 > .s1(state1) | ... |
srx < state, sx > .s1(statex)).table < state, state1, ... , statex, s > .
s(new_state).result < new_state > .
Reduce(sr1, ... , srx, table, state_in)
(5.10)
Therefore, a fragment server must now be redefined, and is given in Equa-
tion 5.11. An example configuration is given with three fragment servers in
Equation 5.12.
FragmentServer(server1−0, server0−1, ... , serverx−0, server0−x) =
Lookup(“result_table′′, tabler) |
Lookup(“table1′′, table1) | ... | Lookup(“tableX ′′, tablex) |
SubReduce(server1−0, server0−1, table1, state1) | ... |
SubReduce(serverx−0, server0−x, tablex, statex) |
Reduce(state0, ... , statex, tabler, rstate) |
Program(rstate)
(5.11)
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Compute =
FragmentServer(server1−0, server0−1, server2−0, server0−2) |
FragmentServer(server0−1, server1−0, server2−1, server1−2) |
FragmentServer(server0−2, server2−0, server1−2, server2−1)
(5.12)
An expanded version of Equation 5.12 is presented in Equation 5.13, showing
the differing LUTs more clearly.
Compute =
Lookup(“table0′′, table0) |Lookup(“table1′′, table1) |
Lookup(“table2′′, table2) |Lookup(“table0− 1′′, table0−1) |
Lookup(“table0− 2′′, table0−2) |Lookup(“table1− 0′′, table1−0) |
Lookup(“table1− 2′′, table1−2) |Lookup(“table2− 0′′, table2−0) |
Lookup(“table2− 1′′, table2−1) |
SubReduce(server1−0, server0−1, table0−1, state0−1) |
SubReduce(server2−0, server0−2, table0−2, state0−2) |
SubReduce(server0−1, server1−0, table1−0, state1−0) |
SubReduce(server2−1, server1−2, table1−2, state1−2) |
SubReduce(server0−2, server2−0, table2−0, state2−0) |
SubReduce(server1−2, server2−1, table2−1, state2−1) |
Reduce(state0−1, state0−2, table0, rs0) |
Reduce(state1−0, state1−2, table1, rs1) |
Reduce(state2−0, state2−1, table2, rs2) |
Program(rs0)|Program(rs1)|Program(rs2)
(5.13)
5.4.2 Privacy Orientated
The limitation of the performance orientated design is that each fragment
server knows if another is in the same state or not, allowing for patterns to be
observed. A simple method to reduce the observability would be to have mul-
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FA FB FC
Bob
FA
FB
FC
LUT
B
LUT
A
LUT
C
Fragment
Servers
Figure 5.12: System model with three fragment servers, where the LUTs are
rotated
tiple obfuscated states for the same real state (concatenated fragment value).
However, this would increase the size of the LUTs, as more combinations are
required. Depending on size requirements, this is something that should be
done regardless, as it will limit any pattern learning over each state having a
single entry. This method can also be used if a state is being reached more
often than others, as the number of obfuscated states can be a ratio of the
number of times it is thought to be reached.
The knowledge learnt about other fragment servers’ states can be minimised
further, such that a fragment server only knows if all the other servers are in
the same state. Therefore, if only one other fragment server changes state, the
fragment server gains no knowledge to which other fragment server changed
state (it could be more than one). This method will be explained for a system
with three fragment servers. Instead of a fragment server storing its own
result LUT, the LUTs are rotated such that each server has another server’s
result LUT, as shown in Figure 5.12. On reduction, instead of a fragment
server sending two obfuscated values to the other two servers (one to each),
the possible result output values (becomes a smaller LUT) are sent to the
fragment server which the LUT belongs to, and an index for the other server.
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The smaller LUT only has two keys, which are indexes, because the fragment
server storing the LUT only selects the rows based on its own state. When the
fragment server receives its small LUT, it can select the row based on its own
state, then uses the other server’s index to get the output value. The Petri
Net for this model is still the same as Figure 5.11, except the values sent are
different.
Currently, this still reveals if any state remains the same. To hide individual
states, the two other fragment servers have a pseudo-random number generator
(for this fragment server) using the same seed.10 At each reduction step, the
generator is used to change the values. Each row in the smaller LUT can be
XORed with r0, where r0 is a random number. The rows can then be bit
shifted11 by another random number r1. The other fragment server has the
same values r0 and r1, and can use r1 to shift the index value it sends, and use
r0 to determine if the result bit needs to be flipped. When a fragment server
receives both the now obfuscated LUT and index (plus a flip value), it still
uses its state to determine the row in the LUT. The issue remaining is that if
all the other fragment servers’ states remain the same, the column in the LUT
could reveal the two other states are the same.
5.4.3 Enhanced Privacy Model
To hide the fact the other states are the same can be achieved, but this will
require additional latency. The same model as Section 5.4.2 is used, with a
step added before a server receives the obfuscated LUT. A server must first
ask for a subset of rows–in random order–it wants in the obfuscated LUT.
Therefore, instead of the obfuscated LUT containing all possible states for the
server, it only has a subset (now known as a small obfuscated LUT). This also
reduces the amount of data being sent over the network. By enforcing varying
subsets, the column approach12 to see if the other servers’ states remained the
same cannot work as efficiently (if at all). The enforcement of varying subsets
can be done by the server creating the small obfuscated LUT, by refusing to
10The user can set the seed values, or the fragment servers could securely agree/generate a
new seed at given intervals.
11A shuﬄe function could be used as well, where the random number defines how the shuﬄe
should occur.
12Where the column of the result state in the obfuscated LUT will always remain the same.
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send the same rows if some condition is met, such as two requests for the exact
same rows.
The final step is to hide all of the possible outputs of the small obfus-
cated LUT apart from the resulting reduced state. To achieve this, each row
in the small obfuscated LUT now uses different random values for r0 and r1
(recall that r0 is XORed over the row, and r1 is a bit shift index). The fragment
server sending the index and whether the bit needs to be flipped now receives
an index number for the correct row in the small obfuscated LUT, which it uses
to get the correct r0 and r1 values. Note that this index number is not a state
value, and will change even if the same state value is being reduced. So now
we have two transfers (one RTT) between each fragment server, represented in
Figure 5.13. Note that the flow will be shown visually in Section 5.5.1, which
will help explain this concept.
At this point, the small obfuscated LUT is protected, where the random
values could be thought of as secret keys. However, Hypothesis 3 requires
that only encoding is to be used for achieving privacy-preserving computation.
Classifying the simple XOR and rotation functions as a form of encryption is
subjective. With 64 possible states for each reduction, the XOR value will be
between 0 and 63, while the rotate value will be between 0 and 7. With so
few possibilities, trying all combinations requires little effort–knowing which
is correct is the challenge. Therefore, this technique can be considered a form
of Privacy-Preserving Encoding, as it is too weak to be encryption.
Given the complexity of this model (known as the enhanced privacy model),
the Pi-Calculus equations are defined for a three server model and are not
dynamic. The same Lookup process can be used, as described in Equation 5.8.
To generate the small obfuscated LUT, SubLookup is defined in Equation 5.14.
This waits for the list of obfuscated states and creates the small obfuscated LUT
accordingly. The process then waits to receive the row index i that this frag-
ment server will use to get its reduced state. The value i is sent to the other
server. It then applies a different random value r0 and a random shift r1 to
each row using the pseudo-random number generator rgen to the small ob-
fuscated LUT. The small obfuscated LUT is sent to the other server, before
waiting to receive the index value and bit flip value from that server, for row
i of the small obfuscated LUT this server will receive.
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SubLookup(table_name, key, server_in, server_out, index,
r_gen) = key(state, result) . server_in(ostate0, ... , ostatex).
index(i) . server_out < i > .
(state, ostate0, ... , ostatex, table_name)
map−−→ (sub_table).
(sub_table) ran(rgen)−−−−−→ (rsub_table) .
server_out < rsub_table > | server_in(rindex, rflip).
result < i, rindex, rflip > .
SubLookup(table_name, key, server_in, server_out, r_gen)
(5.14)
The opposite process of SubLookup is the new definition for SubReduce in
Equation 5.15. This process obfuscates the server’s state, and randomises it
using rgen and the row index ri used by the other server (row index ensures the
right r0 and r1 values). The output is the index in the row and whether the bit
needs to be flipped, which is sent to the other server through channel serverout.
The second part of this process is to receive the small obfuscated LUT. First,
it uses a different LUT to get a different obfuscated value, obf_state0, and
generates a random array of possible obfuscated states, including obf_state0
at index i. The array is sent to the fragment server, which has the full LUT
for this server (received in a SubLookup process). The small obfuscated LUT
is received through channel serverin, and returned.
SubReduce(server_in, server_out, table, index, state_in, r_gen) =
state_in(state, result).table < state, c1 > .c1(obf_state).
(obf_state) rstates−−−−→ (i, ostate0, ... , ostatex).
server_out < ostate0, ... , ostatex > .
index < i > . server_in(ri) . (obf_state) rgen,ri−−−−→ (rindex, rflip).
server_out < rindex, rflip > | server_in(rsub_table).
result < rsub_table > .
SubReduce(server_in, server_out, table, state_in, r_gen)
(5.15)
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The Reduce process has three arguments, where server1 is a channel to a Sub-
Reduce process, server2 is a channel to a SubLookup process, and statein is
the input/output channel for the process. Upon receiving a state to reduce,
the state is sent to each server through either SubReduce or SubLookup. The
values received are a row index, bit flip value, and a randomised small obfus-
cated LUT. Using the row index i which is the server’s state, the reduced state
can be retrieved by subtable[i][rindex]⊕ rflip.
Reduce(server1, server2, state_in) =
state_in(state, result).
server1 < state, tr1 > |server2 < state, tr2 > .
tr1(subtable)|tr2(i, rindex, rflip).
(i, rindex, rflip, subtable) map−−→ (new_state).
result < new_state > .
Reduce(server1, server2, state_in)
(5.16)
A fragment server can then be defined in Equation 5.17. It requires two LUTs
to obfuscate the server’s state for communicating with the other two servers
using the Lookup process. A SubLookup and SubReduce process is needed to
communicate with the other fragment servers. Finally, the Reduce and Program
processes are required.
FragmentServer(server1−0, server0−1, server2−0, server0−2,
table_r_name, table_0− 1_name, table_0− 2_name, r_gen1,
r_gen2) =
Lookup(table_0− 1_name, table0−1) |
Lookup(table_0− 2_name, table0−2) |
SubLookup(table_r_name, server2, table0−2, server0−2, server2−0,
index, r_gen2) |
SubReduce(server1−0, server0−1, table0−1, index, server1, r_gen1) |
Reduce(server1, server2, rstate) | Program(rstate)
(5.17)
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Now, three fragment servers can be setup in parallel, as shown in Equation 5.18,
to execute an arbitrary function/program over the fragmented data.
Compute =
FragmentServer(server1−0, server0−1, server2−0, server0−2,
“table2′′, “table0− 1′′, “table0− 2′′, r_gen1, r_gen2) |
FragmentServer(server2−1, server1−2, server0−1, server1−0,
“table0′′, “table1− 2′′, “table1− 0′′, r_gen2, r_gen0) |
FragmentServer(server0−2, server2−0, server1−2, server2−1,
“table1′′, “table2− 0′′, “table2− 1′′, r_gen0, r_gen1)
(5.18)
During a reduction step, a fragment server only learns its new state, a list
of possible states for one fragment server (ostate0, ... , ostatex), and no infor-
mation about the other fragment server. It learns no information, because all
it receives is an index into the correct row, and whether to flip the bit. This
is not enough information to determine the server’s state or if the state has
changed.
5.5 Data Flow
5.5.1 Reduction
To help explain the enhanced privacy model in Section 5.4.3, Figure 5.14 (on
page 106) gives a data flow diagram for a reduction step from the point of view
of one fragment server. The steps are given below:
Step 1: The client has fragmented and distributed a single bit to the frag-
ment servers, which are preparing for computation. Recall that
11 is a 0 when processing is occurring. Therefore, the bit is high
(1⊕ 0⊕ 0 = 1).
Step 2: An operation is applied to the bit and itself (the bit). This operation
could be a NAND function, and is shown as a 0 to give the current
order of operations.
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Step 3: A reduction stage has been reached, so each server converts the
concatenated fragment to an obfuscated state value. Servers FB and
FC have a unique random mapping for their concatenated fragment
to server FA. Server FA also needs obfuscation for sending the list
of states to FC .
Step 4: Server FA generates a random vector of states it would like included
in its small obfuscated LUT. In this example, because there only
four states, it asks for all four.
Step 5: Server FA sends this vector to server FC , which reveals nothing
about its actual state. Server FA also sends server FB the index
into the vector for the correct state. In this case, state 3 is at index
1. Server FB also learns nothing, because it does not know the order
of the vector.
Step 6: The result LUT for server FA is stored on server FC , meaning server
FC can get the possible resulting fragment values using its obfus-
cated state, which is the last index in this example. This is the
small obfuscated LUT in plain form.
Step 7: The small obfuscated LUT is now rearranged to match the request
vector. Both server FB and FC possess the same seed SA for the
pseudo-random number generator–FA has no knowledge of the seed.
Server FC gets eight random values from this generator and applies
an XOR and bit shift to each row in the small obfuscated LUT. The
rotate could also be a shuﬄe function, so long as it is deterministic.
Because server FB has the same generator as FC and knows the
index of the correct row, it can get the random numbers it needs,
in this case r2 and r3. It uses r3 and its obfuscated state value 2 to
set j to the correct index. Then it uses its obfuscated state and r2
to determine if the result bit needs to be flipped or not, stored in f .
Step 8: Finally, the small obfuscated result LUT and values j and f are
securely transmitted to server FA, which can use them to get the
result fragment value r.
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r = LUT [1][j]⊕ f
Figure 5.14: Reduction flow example for fragment server A
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5.5.2 Securing Uploading and Downloading
There are many ways to transfer the fragments from the client to the fragment
servers, with a few mentioned here.
Public-Key Cryptography
The most efficient method of uploading data to and from the fragment servers
is with a public-key cryptosystem. Each fragment server can have its own
private key and the public key of the user. Then, when the user wants to
upload data, the fragments can be encrypted for each server. In terms of
overhead, the client is only sending N times as much data as uploading to a
single server, where N is the number of fragment servers. For example, a 32-
bit integer split into three fragments would need 3× 32-bit values encrypted.
For downloading, the fragment server just encrypts the 32 fragments as a 32-
bit integer using the client’s public key. The client can decrypt each set of
fragments and join them together to get the resulting 32-bit value.
Goldwasser-Micali
Depending on the size of the data being downloaded, each fragment server can
use the XOR partially homomorphic encryption scheme by Goldwasser et al.
to encrypt each fragment. For example, posting results on a publicly accessible
web server, the web server can homomorphically join the fragments together.
Clients with the decryption key can then download the encrypted bits. The
disadvantage of using this scheme is the amount of memory/storage used,
where a single bit becomes thousands.
The partially homomorphic encryption scheme can also be used for upload-
ing data but requires a distributor server. For example, a client can encrypt a
bit E(bit) and send it to the distributor. Here, two random bits are encrypted
FA = E(r0) and FB = E(r1), giving two fragments. The final fragment is
FC = E(bit) × E(r0) × E(r1). These fragments can then be sent to the frag-
ment servers. Another disadvantage appears where at least one fragment server
would have the same decryption key as the original encrypted value E(bit).
Ultimately, using this partially homomorphic encryption scheme adds more
overheads than positive properties, but is shown as a possibility.
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FA FB FC
= + +
Bob
Figure 5.15: Splitting a public key across three fragment servers
Encryption within Fragments
With arbitrary processing available in the FRIBs scheme, encryption algo-
rithms can be computed. The public key can be split into fragments like any
other piece of data; an abstract example is given in Figure 5.15. When data is
being downloaded, it can first be encrypted with the user’s public key within
the fragments. Therefore, even if the fragments are stolen, the data is still
encrypted. Decryption can also be computed within the fragments. This al-
lows data to be encrypted before storage and decrypted when needed, adding
another layer of protection. The downside is that if all the fragment servers are
compromised, so would the decryption key. Ideally, the decryption key would
not be stored on the fragment servers, but only be used when a program is
running over the data. Then, if a server is compromised, the malicious user
would have to wait for the decryption key fragments on each server, adding
more difficulty and time.
5.5.3 Fragment Data Channels
Data is sent between the fragment servers during processing. These channels
need to be protected from eavesdropping to stop resulting states from being
captured. Any encryption scheme can be used, but for performance, a sym-
metric scheme such as AES is recommended. For most implementations, it
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would be possible to utilise a transport layer security library when setting up
the connection.
5.6 Summary
Two core models have been presented for FRIBs in this chapter: one focused
on performance, and the other on privacy, known as the performance model
and the enhanced privacy model respectively.13 The enhanced privacy model
is the primary model, where a fragment server does not learn any information
about states of the other fragment servers, and no patterns can be observed.
This allows the LUTs to be reused, which is a challenge for most multi-party
computation techniques. However, the reusability comes at the cost of the
data not being protected by a secret key, like encryption, as retrieving all the
fragments from each server will reveal the data. The other cost is each re-
duction request takes the largest RTT between all fragment servers, where the
performance model halves this and sends less data over the network. The prac-
ticality can be estimated by network latency times, as lookup and processing
requires little overhead. This means the fragment servers will spend most of
their time waiting for network transfers, allowing for parallelisation to improve
performance even with a single processor.
13The model using dedicated reduction servers would not be used in practice, and was only
given as a form of explanation. It was also an important step in researching this scheme,
and the basis of the original paper [23].
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The system model for the Fragmenting Individual Bits (FRIBs) scheme was
defined in Chapter 5 but did not describe the lookup operation or how the
Lookup Tables (LUTs) obtain fragmented results. This chapter will use a
three-server model with the XOR fragment algorithm (bit = FA ⊕ FB ⊕ FC)
to further elaborate FRIBs. Simple functions such as addition and multi-
plication are described, while redundancy and randomisations techniques are
introduced. Note that because FRIBs uses a simple lookup to compute over
data, there are many more possibilities for what an LUT defines than what is
given in this thesis.
6.1 Obfuscating States
With the performance or enhanced privacy model (described in Sections 5.4.1
and 5.4.3 respectively), because each fragment server performs its own reduc-
tion, the possible states of the other servers are known. For example, if one
fragment server has the state 1011001 ((1 ⊕ 0) ⊕ 1), then the other fragment
servers will have the same order of operations; therefore, 1011011 is not a pos-
sible state. The result LUT can be thought of as a collection of mini result
LUTs, that can be generated for each set of possible states. For this chapter,
the result LUT will consist of one order of operations unless otherwise stated.
The representation of Table 6.1 in memory can be a 64-bit number, where the
least significant byte is index zero. To perform a lookup, the state is compared
against all entries until its index is found. Another way of representing this
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Table 6.1: Obfuscated
states, mapping to the
index.
Index State
0 1101011
1 11011011
2 10101
3 110101
4 101011
5 1011011
6 101101
7 1101101
Table 6.2: Obfuscated states, mapping to multiple
values.
Index State Obfuscated States
0 11011011 14, 22, 0
1 1101101 20, 7, 3
2 1101011 9, 21, 8
3 110101 13, 16, 15
4 1011011 1, 23, 5
5 101101 11, 17, 18
6 101011 6, 10, 19
7 10101 4, 12, 2
LUT is by keeping the order of the states as per Table 6.2 (but with one
obfuscated state); therefore, the LUT can be a 24-bit number, where the least
significant three bits are index zero. Each index would contain a value between
zero and seven (which is the obfuscated state), but a challenge is knowing the
index of the state quickly. If all the operations are removed and 11 is converted
back to 0, then 110110112 →< 11, 11, 11 >→ 0002 ≡ 0, or 10110112 →<
1, 11, 11 >→ 1002 ≡ 4. This saves on the amount of memory and storage
required for all the mini result LUTs. Table 6.2 can be represented the same
way, except 3 × 5-bits are required per index, in this case requiring 120 bits.
With one obfuscated state per fragment state, four operations require 32 × 5
bits, or 20 bytes. Increasing the number of operations to eight requires 29 × 9
bits. The number of mini result LUTs depends on the number of different state
forms that can be reached. For example, if only addition and multiplication
operations are required, many state forms (order of operations) will not be
reached.
For the performance model, a different set of result LUTs is used for each
fragment server; therefore, with three servers, two obfuscated states are ob-
tained and sent to their corresponding fragment server. For example, fragment
server A would obfuscate its state using an obfuscation LUT for fragment
server B (the result is sent to fragment server B), and obfuscate its state
again but with an obfuscation LUT for fragment server C.1 When a fragment
1An obfuscation LUT is the random mapping between real state and obfuscated state.
112
6.2 NAND Logic
server receives the two other obfuscated states, it can get the index into its
result LUT. Once again, mini result LUTs can be used because the state form
is known–keeping key sizes small. The result LUT is actually a 3-dimensional
array where each state is part of the key. If a fragment server’s own state is
s0 and the obfuscated states are s1 and s2, then the result can be accessed by
s0×n2+s1×n+s2, where n is the number of possible states. The result value
is the reduced state (a single bit) for that fragment server; therefore, with eight
states, the result LUT is 64 bytes, where 64 states would require 32, 768 bytes.
To add randomness, if there are three obfuscated states per state, the result
index becomes s0 × 3n2 + s1 × 3n+ s2.2
6.2 NAND Logic
The simplest result LUT configuration is to make the results from NAND logic
gates–the proposed operation in the original paper on FRIBs[23]; therefore, ar-
bitrary operations are supported. The result LUTs are formed from the output
of the different state (concatenated fragments) combinations. For example, the
result of three fragment states FA = 101101, FB = 10101 and FC = 110101
is (0 Z 0) Z 1 = 0; this is given below as well to show how the columns form
the result. The output for fragment server A could be resultlutA[5, 2, 7] = 0,
where 5 is its state, and 2 and 7 are the two other obfuscated states.3 Frag-
ment server B could be resultlutB[7, 4, 4] = 1 and fragment server C could be
resultlutC [3, 1, 0] = 1. Therefore, the resulting fragment is 0, but the fragment
servers do not know the result. This will be explained further in this section.
FA= 1 0 11 0 1
⊕ ⊕ ⊕
FB= 1 0 1 0 1
⊕ ⊕ ⊕
FC= 11 0 1 0 1
(0 Z 0) Z 1 = 0
2Note that the enhanced privacy model only needs one obfuscated state per fragment state
because the obfuscated states from the other servers are not known.
3The notation resultlutX [s0, s1, s2] represents the lookup using three keys.
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Table 6.3: Random
mappings for fragment
server A’s result LUT
State FA FB FC
11011 2 2 2
1101 1 0 3
1011 3 1 0
101 0 3 1
Table 6.4: Random
mappings for fragment
server B’s result LUT
State FB FC FA
11011 1 2 0
1101 3 1 3
1011 0 3 1
101 2 0 2
Table 6.5: Random
mappings for fragment
server C’s result LUT
State FC FA FB
11011 1 3 2
1101 3 2 3
1011 2 0 1
101 0 1 0
6.2.1 Sample Tables
An example will now be given to further explain the concept of building LUTs
that only reveal the fragment server’s state. Only two states will be allowed to
be concatenated (single operation) in order to have easier examples, and will
use the enhanced privacy model. The performance model can use the same
technique for constructing LUTs, but the enhanced privacy model requires
more steps, hence it will be used here. Also, the performance model would
need many obfuscated states per state for an example this simplistic, where
the enhanced privacy model does not. All LUTs are generated on the client
and sent to the fragment servers hosted in the cloud. The LUTs can be reused,
so this operation only needs to be done on first setup, but it is recommended
to change them when possible to reduce any patterns being observed.
A fragment server will obfuscate its state value when sending it to another
fragment server; therefore, each requires an obfuscation LUT to be generated
with randomised order of states. For example, in Table 6.3, if fragment server
C is in state 11011, it will use the value 2 when sending/handling requests for
fragment server A; similarly, fragment server B will use the value 1 when it
is in state 1011; therefore, Table 6.3 represents the keys into the result LUT
for fragment server A. Examples of random mappings for the result LUTs
for fragment server B and fragment server C are given in Tables 6.4 and 6.5
respectively. Each fragment server receives (from the client) their column
from Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5, meaning fragment server A uses [2, 1, 3, 0] for
its own result LUT, [0, 3, 1, 2] for the result LUT used by fragment server B,
and [3, 2, 0, 1] for fragment server C, thus giving the obfuscation LUT in Ta-
ble 6.6. The fragment servers have no knowledge of the mappings on the other
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Table 6.6: Obfuscation LUT sent to fragment server A
State For Itself (FA) Sending to FB Sending to FC
11011 2 0 3
1101 1 3 2
1011 3 1 0
101 0 2 1
Table 6.7: Step towards the obfuscated result LUT for fragment server A
FA FB FC Label
0 (101) 0 (1101) 0 (1011) 1010110101011
0 (101) 0 (1101) 1 (101) 101011010101
0 (101) 0 (1101) 2 (11011) 10101101011011
0 (101) 0 (1101) 3 (1101) 101011010101
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
3 (1011) 3 (101) 0 (1011) 1011010101011
3 (1011) 3 (101) 1 (101) 101101010101
3 (1011) 3 (101) 2 (11011) 10110101011011
3 (1011) 3 (101) 3 (1101) 1011010101101
fragment servers. Note that with the enhanced privacy model, the need for ob-
fuscating the state when the fragment server is sending the index and whether
the bit should be flipped is not actually required, but to aid explanation and
implementation, all inputs will be obfuscated.
The three result LUTs now need to be constructed. An initial step is shown
in Table 6.7 for fragment server A, where the obfuscated states (0, 1, 2, 3) from
each fragment server are the keys, and a temporary label is used keep track of
the real input. This table also has the real values next to the obfuscated states
to help link back to the obfuscated mappings given in Table 6.3. Table 6.8 is
given as another example for fragment server C, and shows the labels are still
in the order FA 0 FB 0 FC . These labels are used to show the link between
the three result LUTs, as the result needs to be fragmented across the three
tables; thus, all three tables need to be calculated at once.
An example of a possible result LUT for fragment server A is given in Ta-
ble 6.9; the result bit is fragmented, such that each label is replaced with a bit,
where RA ⊕ RB ⊕ RC = Result. This table can be represented in memory as
an integer or bit string 1001...1011; in this case 64 bits. Increasing the num-
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Table 6.8: Step towards the obfuscated result LUT for fragment server C
FC FA FB Label
0 (101) 0 (1011) 0 (101) 1010101011011
0 (101) 0 (1011) 1 (1011) 10101011011011
0 (101) 0 (1011) 2 (11011) 101011011011011
0 (101) 0 (1011) 3 (1101) 10101101011011
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
3 (1101) 3 (11011) 0 (101) 11011010101101
3 (1101) 3 (11011) 1 (1011) 110110101101101
3 (1101) 3 (11011) 2 (11011) 1101101101101101
3 (1101) 3 (11011) 3 (1101) 110110110101101
Table 6.9: A sample result LUT for fragment server A
FA FB FC RA
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 2 0
0 0 3 1
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
3 3 0 1
3 3 1 0
3 3 2 1
3 3 3 1
ber of concatenated fragments to four with a fixed order of operations would
need 4096 bits, and eight concatenations require 2MBs for the result LUT.
With the enhanced privacy model sending a smaller LUT across the network,
if four rows are requested, then each reduction sends 64 bits and 1024 bits
for four and eight concatenations respectively. At 16KBs, as would be the
case with 12 concatenated fragments, even though it is still within the maxi-
mum Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) size, the Maximum Transmission
Unit (MTU) will probably be smaller, meaning the small result LUT will be
split across packets; however, as long as the data is streamed, then the RTT
will still account for the majority of the processing time.
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6.2.2 Using the LUTs
After the previous subsection, the LUTs have been generated for each fragment
server: the result LUT that returns the fragment servers new state as a single
bit, and the LUT that obfuscates the fragment servers state when sending to
the other servers. From the point-of-view of fragment server A, recall that it
gets column FA from Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 for obfuscating its state, giving
Table 6.6. However, its result LUT is actually stored on fragment server B,
while it receives the result LUT of fragment server C. Note that the fragment
servers receive the LUTs from the client or user, so they know nothing about
their own result LUT, or any of the other tables that it was not sent.
For a reduction–which in this example will need to happen each operation
over fragments–fragment server A will first obfuscate its state according to
Table 6.6, giving the obfuscated states OA, OB and OC . It then generates a
random vector to request rows from its result LUT stored on fragment server
B. For example, the vector could be < 1, 0, 3, 2 >, where the index of OA is
the actual row it will use to get its new state. With a larger number of possible
states, this vector will be a subset of the result LUT, but in this case, all rows
can be requested. The vector is sent to fragment server B, while fragment
server C will send a similar vector to fragment server A, because fragment
server A has the result LUT for fragment server C. Upon receiving this vector
from fragment server C, the result LUT is first reordered; for example, with
the vector < 1, 0, 3, 2 > and a result LUT of 64 bits, the order will become
bits8−15 bits0−7 bits24−31 bits16−23. The reordered LUT (and in cases where a
subset is requested, smaller reordered LUT) then needs to be obfuscated. This
is done through pseudo-random number generators, where a 64-bit number
can be generated and XORed with the reordered result LUT. More values
are generated to shift the groups of bits, where each set of bits is rotated
using different values (note that the shift could be replaced with a shuﬄe
function). This obfuscated result LUT can then be sent back to fragment
server C. In parallel (at the same time), fragment server B has sent fragment
server A an index value into the randomised vector it sent fragment server C
when it was requesting its result LUT, using the same seed (for the pseudo-
random number generator) that fragment server C will use for obfuscating the
result LUT that fragment server B will receive. Fragment server A can use its
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obfuscated state for fragment server B to get the new index–since the result
LUT is shifted/rotated–and see if that bit will need to be flipped. The index
and flip value are sent back to fragment server C. To summarise, a fragment
server is computing an obfuscated result LUT, and an index and flip value in
parallel.
Fragment server A receives its obfuscated result LUT from fragment server
B, and an index plus flip value from fragment server C. It knows the index of
the group of 8 bits in the received obfuscated result LUT from its own state
(the index into the vector sent to fragment server B), then uses the index from
fragment server C to get the bit from the group of 8 bits. Finally, it will flip
the bit if needed before the final result fragment is revealed. This section has
been similar to the example in Section 5.5.1, but has given a detailed look into
the use of LUTs and how they are created using NAND function.
6.2.3 Network Data Transferred
To summarise the data being transferred across the network during a reduc-
tion request, this section will briefly cover the scenario of six concatenated
fragments. The performance model has only a few bits transferred for each
reduction request. With 64 reachable fragment states for each order of oper-
ations, only 6 bits are sent between each of the fragment servers (excluding
packet data). With 100 fragments being reduced at once, 700 bits are sent be-
tween each fragment server. Labels or ordering information are not required,
because each fragment server is running the same instruction set; therefore,
order is already known. With TCP connections already established, only half
the latency of RTT is experienced.
As mentioned in the previous section, the enhanced privacy model sends a
small obfuscated LUT, an index vector, an index and flip bit between each
fragment server; the last three variables do not add much data to be trans-
ferred. With 64 states, a vector of length 4, an index into that vector and flip
bit would need 31 bits–already more than the performance model. The small
obfuscated LUT is much larger at 32 bytes, giving approximately 36 bytes per
fragment. Therefore, for 100 reduction requests, 3.5KBs would be transferred
between each fragment server. This is far less than given in Table 3.3 for an
existing multi-party computation scheme, where only tallying 6 votes required
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Figure 6.1: NAND gate full adder
approximately 10KB. Even with the data split over multiple packets, when the
first packet is received, processing can occur straight away, meaning once the
reduction requests are processed, the next packet should have already arrived.
So long as each small obfuscated LUT can fit in a packet, then with multiple
reduction requests, if data is split over multiple packets, it should not affect
performance in any significant manner.
6.3 Simple Operations
In this section, the NAND result LUTs described in the previous section will
be used to define two simple operations: addition and multiplication.
6.3.1 Addition
The addition of two 32-bit integers can be achieved with 31 full-adders and
a single half-adder. A full-adder comprised of NAND gates can be seen in
Figure 6.1. In order to get the best performance for our proposed scheme,
we must reduce the number of network requests required by combining many
reductions requests into a single request. First, we compute all values for
N4 in Figure 6.1–which for worst-case is where Ai and Bi are both 0–giving
(AiZ(AiZBi))Z(BiZ(AiZBi))→ 110110110011011011. The fragment therefore
can grow up to 18 bits during this step, or more importantly 26 possible states.
We can then combine all 32 fragments for N4 into a single network payload
and send them to be reduced to single bits. Therefore, all N4 states become a
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single bit for the cost of one reduction4. With each fragment server executing
the same program, the order of states will be consistent; therefore, no labels
are required.
The method for how the carry bits are reduced can vary depending on imple-
mentation, as we need to define how large the fragments are allowed to grow.
A smaller size requires more reduction requests, thus decreasing performance.
Because the first bit does not have an input carry value, the input for N9 is N1
and N1 (equates to !N1). The other carry bits involve gates N1, N4, N5 and
N9, where the result from N9 is connected to the next bits’ N5 gate. Given
that N4 will be a reduced fragment, and that the worst-case value for N1 is
11011, each carry step will at most add 8 bits to the fragment (11011011) or
23 possible states multiplied by the existing state possibilities. If the enhanced
privacy model is used, at the same time all N4 gates are being reduced, all the
N1 gates could also be reduced. This would mean the N9 input from N1 is now
a single bit, meaning only a multiple of 22 states are added to the LUT. Fur-
thermore, if the result LUT is only used for the addition carry bit, then even if
N1 is not reduced, only 22 states are added, because the left-most and centre
fragments are equal (101011 is valid, where 1011011 is not). Note that this
could also be applied to N4, where there are only two input states. Ultimately,
there many different ways of constructing this carry operation; for example,
the carry could just be the input values Ai and Bi, where padding is zeros, such
as 00B2A2B1A1C1, where the first carry is a single bit. This also highlights
why the enhanced privacy model is critical to FRIBs, because when only a few
possible states are reachable, then the performance model knowing the others
states in not ideal. In this case, the performance model would require many
obfuscated states for a single state; therefore, the enhanced privacy model is
superior.
Knowing that the order of operations will be constant, means only the reach-
able states need to be in the obfuscation LUT (mapping from state to obfus-
cated value) specifically used for addition carry. The length of the fragment
states would vary, so padding is required for the N9 gates earlier, using known
high or low values, such as, 1 Z 1 Z 1 = 1 and 0 Z 1 Z 1 = 0, where Z1 Z 1
4Depending on the amount of data being transmitted, if many packets are required, there
will be a small amount of time added compared to a single reduction.
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provides padding of length 2. Padding of length 2 is important, as that is how
many fragments are concatenated for each carry. Once the number of allowed
carryovers has occurred, a reduction takes place for all N9 gates up to that
point (with padding), repeated until all N9 gates have been reduced. Finally,
like N4, all N8 reductions can be grouped together and sent in the same reduc-
tion request, which gives the final output, because all inputs to N5 and N7 are
now a single bit (a reduced state). The result is still hidden from the fragment
servers.
With this approach, the minimum number of reduction requests would be
3: all N4 gates, all carry bits, then all N8 gates. However, this produces a very
large and impractical LUT for the carry bits (where the LUT for both N4 and
N8 would remain the same) for a 32-bit number. Dividing the operation up
such that four 8-bit values are added together still requires a few terabytes. For
small LUT sizes, adding eight 4-bit values together is more optimal, requiring
only a few hundred kilobytes. For the enhanced privacy model, this means
transferring a small obfuscated LUT that is only a few kilobytes. Therefore,
10 reductions are required in total, meaning that the worst network latency
at 10ms (20ms RTT), the cost for the performance and enhanced privacy
model would be ≈ 100ms and ≈ 200ms respectively. If the inputs Ai and Bi
are used directly instead of the NAND gates, the number of requests drops
to 9, and consists of the carry operations and all output bits (same as N8).
The performance model can actually have an LUT for 6-bits, meaning only 6
reduction requests are required for the carry (without additional obfuscated
states), and the enhanced privacy model can increase to 5 bits for the carry,
giving 7 reduction requests for the carry. With the performance model, the
number of obfuscated states per state will greatly affect the size of the LUT,
where with the enhanced privacy model, the small obfuscated LUT sizes need
to be considered for network transfers and obfuscation.
6.3.2 Multiplication
Binary multiplication can be thought of as a series of AND operations added
together. Below (next page) is an example of multiplying 5 and 11 on an 8-bit
machine. For each bit in 1110, we AND it with each bit in 510, giving 8 values;
adding each of these values together gives 55.
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00000101
× 00001011
00000101
0000101
000000
00101
0000
000
00
+ 0
00110111
To make the additions more efficient, we add together the biggest and second
biggest values together, then the next pairing, down to the smallest and second
smallest. This is shown below.
00000101 0000 000000 00
+ 0000101 + 000 + 00101 + 0
00001111 0000 001010 00
This step is repeated below.
00001111 0000
+ 001010 + 00
00110111 0000
The final addition gives the result:
00110111
+ 0000
00110111 ∴ = 00110111
This gives a total of seven addition operations for this example, but by adding
similar sized numbers together in parallel, we can reduce the number of reduc-
tion steps required. When adding multiple values in parallel, each addition
can combine the reduction requests into one, meaning the performance is close
to that of a single addition. Therefore, the performance of this example will
be slightly slower than three additions. For 32-bit values, there are a total of
31 additions, but they perform like five additions.
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Figure 6.2: NAND and XOR gate full adder
6.3.3 Free Operations
A simple operation that can be free is bit shifting by a constant, if the shift
value can be known.5 Depending on the fragmentation algorithm, another free
operation can be available. The fragmentation algorithm used primarily in
this thesis is XOR; therefore, the XOR operation can be applied for free on
each fragment server without a need for reduction, as shown below. Two sets
of fragments are XORed; each fragment server can XOR its two fragments
together, where the result fragment produces the correct value.
1⊕ 1⊕ 1 = 1
0⊕ 1⊕ 1 = 0
1⊕ 0⊕ 0 = 1
The full adder made from NAND gates actually consists of two XOR opera-
tions, as shown in Figure 6.2. Therefore, the reduction requests for N4 and N8
can be removed and performed for free. Building the carry operation such that
4 bits are concatenated together would now only require 8 reduction requests.
Another function that is free with an XOR fragmentation algorithm is NOT
functions. If only one fragment server has an instruction to flip its result, then
this is equivalent to a NOT function This same concept will be used to provide
randomness in Section 6.5.
5A free operation is where the operation can be applied without information from the other
fragment servers.
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Index State Obfuscated State
0 00000000 242
1 00000001 51
2 00000010 466
3 00000011 163
· · · · · · · · ·
508 11111100 135
509 11111101 245
510 11111110 64
511 11111111 159
6.4 Other LUT Operations and Functions
This section expands on generic NAND logic, by providing examples of tar-
geted result LUTs.
6.4.1 Addition
Section 6.3.1 detailed how to perform an addition operation using NAND gates
and introduced the idea of specialising LUTs to reduce LUT sizes. This idea
will be explored further, where the result is 5 bits, instead of a single bit. An
example of 8 bits (4 bits of A, and 4 bits of B) plus a carry is given. The first
operation will need to set the carry to zero. The output from the result LUT
will be 4 bits plus a carry. The result LUTs are a moderate size at 80MB,
but a 32-bit integer is only going to require 8 reduction requests. Each small
obfuscated LUT that gets sent would be 320 bytes per row requested. With
this type of operation, using the enhanced privacy model is recommended.
6.4.2 Multiplication
When compared to addition, multiplication is more difficult, because the re-
sulting values are twice the size of the input, where the result of 4 bits × 4 bits
is 8 bits. The bits are also not just column based but affect each other column;
therefore, no further time was spent on designing a dedicated multiplication
LUT, where just using the addition function and AND function will be effi-
cient for the purpose of this thesis. A speedup could be realised by building
a result LUT for 4-bits multiplied by 4-bits, and adding the 8-bit results to-
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gether. Below shows that only four addition operations are required, halving
the number previously required. With reduction requests parallelised, this will
perform similar to two additions. However, for 32-bit integers, it will perform
worse.
00010101
× 00011011
00110111
00001011
00000101
+ 00000001
0000001000110111
6.4.3 Conditional Statements
Supporting an operation to compare two values can dramatically affect the
security of a secure processing scheme. For example, if a group of cipher values
only encrypts the set {0, 1}, then the ability to calculate if two cipher values
are equal will result in two subgroups of cipher values, where one subgroup
must either encrypt a 0 or 1 and the other subgroup must encrypt the opposite.
However, our proposed scheme has the bits fragmented across many servers,
meaning all the servers must compute over the same instruction set. This
prevents a compromised server trying to compare all the fragments it has,
as the other fragment servers would need to be doing the same malicious
action. Therefore, our scheme has the ability to support conditional operations,
which can be implemented to return the result in either a secure or non-secure
manner.
Secure Results
Returning results securely means the result is a fragmented bit, where none
of the fragment servers have knowledge of the result. This can make some
programs difficult to implement, as the result of the comparison is not known.
Two examples are given in Algorithms 4 and 5, for an equal and greater than
or equal if statement. For both examples, we have to increment c without
knowing the result of the comparison.
125
Chapter 6 Lookup Table Design
Algorithm 4 If equals example
1: if a = b then
2: c← c+ 1
3:
4: function ifEqual(a, b)
5: m← a− b
6: inout← 0
7: carry ← 0
8: for i← 0 to 32 do
9: tmp← m[i] + inout+ carry
10: inout← tmp & 1
11: carry ← tmp >> 1
12: return !(inout | carry)
13: c← c+ (1× ifEqual(a, b))
Algorithm 5 If greater than or equal example
1: if a >= b then
2: c← c+ 1
3:
4: function ifGreaterEqual(a, b)
5: sign_neq ← a[31]ˆb[31]
6: c← a− b
7: return (!sign_neq & !c[31]) | (sign_neq & !a[31])
8: c← c+ (1× ifGreaterEqual(a, b))
Non-Secure Results
Instead of returning a fragmented bit, this approach returns the whole bit by
using a different set of LUTs than for a standard operation. This allows each
server to know the result of the conditional statement, making programs easier
to design and in some cases faster to compute. However, there is more risk
associated with this method, so the secure method should be considered first.
6.4.4 Modulus
The work presented in Appendix A details a custom modulo algorithm devel-
oped as initial research into the research question for this thesis. This algorithm
uses a simple LUT to compute the modulo function; therefore, it can easily
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be used with FRIBs (assuming a static modulo value). Bit shifting is a free
operation, and a custom LUT can be created to add the overflow value, since
this value is likely to be smaller (for example, adding a single bit to a 32-bit
value). A static modulo value could be used to encrypt the data within the
fragments, or to prevent array overflows. If the modulo value is dynamic, then
the value that is being added with each overflow needs to be calculated first.
For a 32-bit value, modulo result LUTs of 8 bits can be constructed, meaning
the best case scenario is only a few shift lookups and additions are required.
The challenge with this algorithm is knowing if an overflow occurred after the
shift addition is complete, because when this happens, another lookup and
addition is required. With the worst-case overflow for addition being a single
bit, the modulo LUT can include an extra bit, resulting in 8 bits plus 1 bit
to handle the possibility of an overflow occurring previously. Note that this
will work with larger numbers as well, such as 2048-bit values. This does not
remove initial issues, as the final subtraction step needs to know when to stop
subtracting such that the result is correct. Depending on the requirements,
having the result a few bits larger could be acceptable. If not, then the program
is going to need to know when to stop subtracting. This is a case where the
non-secure conditional statement mentioned in the previous section could be
used. In terms of privacy, this could reveal how close the modulo algorithm
got to producing the right result but it will still difficult to learn meaningful
information.
An approach to mitigate this would be to have another lookup for subtrac-
tion, where a set number of subtractions occur before checking if the result is
less than the modulo value. This subtraction would either remove modulo or
zero from the result. Also, because the algorithm specifies working in blocks
of size of the modulo value, this could help reveal the highest order bit of
the modulo value. Therefore, the block size should be greater, but this then
requires more subtractions at the last step. Ultimately, this is a challenging
algorithm to implement in FRIBs, but it is possible.
6.4.5 Hidden Operations
With variable operations, the ability to try and hide the operation is possible.
Instead of the program saying ADD, this could be replaced with FUN1. The
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fragment servers would know to use the LUTs associated with FUN1 ; however,
it may be possible to guess the function based on how it is used. For exam-
ple, there is a big difference between an addition and multiplication operation
because of the number of reductions required. Hence, hiding the program is
out-of-scope of this thesis but worth mentioning.
6.5 Randomisation
The randomisation properties of an encryption algorithm affect the overall
strength of the scheme. The same is true with any obfuscated or hidden value
such as the fragments in FRIBs; therefore, this section will demonstrate how
to add randomness during processing.
6.5.1 Randomising Result Values
With the enhanced privacy model and three fragment servers, a single fragment
server has control over whether two of the three resulting fragment bits are
flipped or not. Given the three values in the equation a ⊕ b ⊕ c, flipping any
two bits does not change the result; for example, 1 ⊕ 1 ⊕ 0 = 0, flipping two
bits gives 0 ⊕ 0 ⊕ 0 = 0, 0 ⊕ 1 ⊕ 1 = 0 or 1 ⊕ 0 ⊕ 1 = 0. Therefore, to add
some form of randomness to the results, a fragment server can choose to flip
two bits. It does this by flipping its own resulting bit, and by toggling the flip
value6 sent to another fragment server.
A slower technique, but one that will support the performance model, is
where one fragment server is chosen at random to be the randomiser. The
other two fragment servers send the result fragment encrypted using the Gold-
wasser–Micali cryptosystem. Each fragment server uses its own key to encrypt
its fragment result so only it can see it. When the randomiser fragment server
receives the encrypted results, it flips an even number of bits: either none or
two. This keeps the overall result the same but changes the result fragment.
However, this is much slower and less efficient than the previous method.
6The value sent along with the index into the small result LUT.
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6.5.2 Randomising Fragment Values
The same idea (for randomising result values) can be used to randomise the
stored fragments. Using a shared seed for a pseudo-random number generator,
each fragment server can decide whether to flip its fragment or not. For ex-
ample, we can generate a number r between 0 and 100, where most values do
not change operations, but if rAB (such as 56) is generated, fragment servers
A and B flip their fragment value. This would allow all stored fragments to
be randomised periodically.
6.6 Redundancy and Malicious Fragment Servers
Processing data–especially sensitive information or mission critical informa-
tion like voting–needs some form of redundancy, while the ability to handle
purposeful corruption is also desirable. This would prevent a malicious or
compromised server from corrupting the results.
6.6.1 Parity Bit
Using a single parity bit for the fragments when bit fragmentation is achieved
with XOR gates means the parity bit may not reveal any information, whereas
if the fragmentation algorithm used all AND gates, the parity bit would reveal
the value. However, using three fragment servers in order to support the
presented enhanced privacy model would mean only two fragments are inputs
into the fragmentation algorithm, and the remaining fragment is for parity.
Therefore, the parity bit reveals the value, where if FA = 0 and FB = 1,
the parity bit must be 1 (assuming high bits modulo 2 is zero for parity).
Even with the assumption of only one server containing corrupt data, data
cannot be recovered during processing; however, the user could be notified of
the corruption and processing can be halted. The user can then try and solve
which server is corrupting the data in order to attempt to recover it.
Allowing for more fragment servers would mean multiple parity bits could
be used, stopping an individual parity bit representing the plain-text value.
An example is shown in Table 6.10 and 6.11, where two bits are processed
using the XOR fragmentation, such that bit = FA ⊕ FB ⊕ FC and parity
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Table 6.10: Parity bit examples with three initial fragments and two parity bits
Bit FA FB FC p0 p1
0 = 1 0(11) 1 0(11) 0(11)
1 = 1 1 1 1 0(11)
Table 6.11: Parity bit example showing a corrupt fragment
Fragment Valid Corrupt
FA 101 101
FB 1101 11011err
FC 101 101
p0 1101 1101
p1 11011 11011
Result 1101 110??
bits p0 and p1 check the number of high bits is zero modulo 2. Table 6.10
shows the two sets of fragments, each with three data fragments and two
parity fragments. Combining these two sets of fragments together gives the left
column of Table 6.11. The result of the left column is 1101 and importantly the
parity bits show that both sides of {FA, FB, FC , p0, p1} have an equal number
of high bits. However, in the right column, FB has been corrupted7, which
gives a parity error for the rightmost side of {FA, FB, FC , p0, p1}; therefore,
the result value is unknown and the user can be notified. Ultimately, because
parity bits do not allow correction during processing and only one fragment
server can be malicious, it is not beneficial to privacy-preserving processing.
6.6.2 Linear Block Codes
Another method of error checking is by using binary linear block codes, which,
unlike parity bits, can support data recovery during processing. This increases
the number of fragments required; for example, three fragments become five
fragments (for redundancy detection) or six fragments (for automatic recov-
ery); however, both only require three fragments for decoding. This section
will focus on six fragments, as it will be used for a voting implementation in
Section 7.2. Redundancy is achieved by trying all the combinations of three
out of the six fragments. If all the decoded values are the same, then no cor-
7The xerr notation indicates an error or corruption to the fragment.
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Table 6.12: Erasure encoding for three sets of fragments
Value Fragments Encoded
1 111 111000
0 101 101101
0 011 011110
ruption has occurred. However, if one fragment is corrupt then only decoded
values which included that fragment will vary. Recovering automatically from
multiple corrupt fragments becomes similar to the parity bits method, where
the user input is required.
G =

1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1

With the fragmentation algorithm F0⊕F1⊕F2, Table 6.12 shows some values
being encoded with FRIBs, then with the generator matrix G shown above.
For example, the fragment value 101 becomes 101101 by vector multiplication
within modulo 2. The second bit in 101101 is calculated by [1 0 1]×[0 1 0]→
0⊕ 0⊕ 0 = 0.
[1 0 1]×

1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1
 = [1 0 1 1 0 1]
These three encoded fragment sets are combined, giving the middle column
of Table 6.13. The right column contains the same values, but FA has one
corrupt value. The valid concatenated value for FA is the leftmost bits from
the encoded column in Table 6.12: 1, 1 and 0 giving 101011.
Table 6.13: Erasure encoding example after three concatenations
Server Valid Corrupt
FA 101011 1011011err
FB 101101 101101
FC 10101 10101
FD 110101 110101
FE 1101101 1101101
FF 1101011 1101011
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Using FC , FD and FE from the corrupt column of Table 6.13, the values 100,
110, and 111 are obtained. The value 100 is the leftmost fragment (1, 11, and
11) of the corrupt column for rows FC , FD and FE. Decoding with generator
G, then with the fragmentation algorithm, gives 1, 0 and 0, which are the
original bits (plain-text) in Table 6.12, shown below. Note that decoding from
generator G can be achieved by finding which inputs for FC , FD and FE give
the encoded values ??100?, ??110?, and ??111?.
??100? ??110? ??111?
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
G G G
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
111 101 011
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
F0 ⊕ F1 ⊕ F2 F0 ⊕ F1 ⊕ F2 F0 ⊕ F1 ⊕ F2
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
1 0 0
Using FB, FD and FE gives the correct values as well, as shown below.
?1?00? ?0?10? ?1?11?
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
G G G
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
111 101 011
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
F0 ⊕ F1 ⊕ F2 F0 ⊕ F1 ⊕ F2 F0 ⊕ F1 ⊕ F2
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
1 0 0
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However, using FA, FD and FE below gives an incorrect value, because of the
corruption to FA.
1??00? 0??10?err 0??11?
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
G G G
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
111 010err 011
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
F0 ⊕ F1 ⊕ F2 F0 ⊕ F1 ⊕ F2 F0 ⊕ F1 ⊕ F2
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
1 1err 0
By trying all the combinations (3C6), the results are only wrong (or different)
when FA is used. This allows processing to continue even with a fragment
server compromised or producing corrupt values.
With the performance model, implementing linear block codes is straight
forward, as a large result LUT with six keys/inputs can be constructed. This
is because the block code (the six bits) can be treated the same as a fragment
algorithm when constructing the LUT oﬄine. However, the enhanced privacy
model currently only supports three keys/inputs. With only three inputs re-
quired to decode the 6-bit linear block code, the same concept can be used,
but with multiple result LUTs. Using six bits, means requiring six fragment
servers, where each combination of three bits is tried, resulting in twenty sets
of LUTs required for each fragment server. If the fragment server assumes it
is not corrupting data (because if it were then it would corrupt the output as
well), this reduces the number of sets of LUTs to ten. The negative of this
assumption is that if an accidental corruption occurred, it would not be fixed
straight away8; however, it does mean that purposeful or malicious corruption
on a single fragment server cannot corrupt the overall result.
The result for the fragment server is the majority result from the ten result
8The corrupt fragment may be fixed as more processing occurs.
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LUTs. This does mean that the result fragments need to be the same across
all ten result LUTs (which can be handled oﬄine when generated), such that
with a non-corrupt system all the fragment servers’ result LUTs give the same
fragmented bit. The other consequence of this is that fragment servers cannot
randomly flip bits; however, this is not really necessary, with the protection
that the enhanced privacy model gives. To expand further, we build the LUTs
with only three inputs, and compare the outputs of each, where we select the
output (∈ {0, 1}) that occurs more frequent. Hence, the result of each result
LUT needs to be the same.
The RTT is still the major factor for computation time, where the largest
RTT between any of the six fragment servers (because there are now six bits)
can still be used to estimate overall processing times. Depending of the size
of the LUTs, performance may be slightly impeded by more data needing to
be in memory, and more frequent cache misses. Also, by each fragment server
needing to do more lookups and obfuscating, it will also negatively impact
performance. Therefore, supporting the ability to recover from errors or a
malicious fragment server will come at a cost of performance, but RTT and
bandwidth are still the main overheads.
In Chapter 7, the enhanced privacy model is analysed with and without re-
dundancy. The technique used to allow the enhanced privacy model to support
six fragment servers is to construct the result LUTs using six keys. Therefore,
if one key was corrupt, the result would still be the correct state. The chal-
lenge was keeping the network traffic to a minimum for greater performance.
To accomplish this, a fragment server will send a vector to every server, as
shown in Figure 6.3 . This means when the fragment server is generating the
small obfuscated result LUT, it need only contain 45 entries (four values in
the vectors). The index into each vector also needs to be sent to the fragment
server handling the index and bit-flip calculation as well; therefore, in total
each fragment server is receiving five vectors, and five indexes.
Figure 6.3 shows a similar process to Figure 5.14. They start to differ at
step 3, as now six obfuscated states are obtained from the fragment servers’
original state. Fragment server A then generates vectors for each of the other
fragment servers, where the vector for D is actually sent to fragment server E.
There is no vector for fragment server F , as fragment server A is responsible
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FA FB FC
FD FE FF
FA FB FC
FD FE FF
FA FB FC
FD FE FF
FA FB FC
FD FE FF
FA FB FC
FD FE FF
FA FB FC
FD FE FF
1
4
5
2
3
6
1 11 11
1 11 11
101 11011 11011
101 11011 11011
3, 2
1, 2
0, 2
2, 1
0, 2
3, 2
3, 1
1, 3
2, 2
0, 0
1, 2
3, 2
2, 3
0, 1
3, 1
3, 1
1, 3
2, 2
d = [1, 3, 0, 2]
e = [3, 1, 2, 0]
f = 2
a = [3, 1, 2, 0]
b = [3, 1, 0, 2]
c = [3, 1, 0, 2]
3, 2
1, 2
0, 2
2, 1
0, 2
3, 2
3, 1
1, 3
2, 2
0, 0
1, 2
3, 2
2, 3
0, 1
3, 1
3, 1
1, 3
2, 2
f = 2
[3, 1, 2, 0] [3, 1, 0, 2]
[3, 1, 0, 2] [1, 3, 0, 2] [3, 1, 2, 0]
i = 3
i = 2
i = 1
i = 0
i = 2
i = 2 i = 3
i = 2 i = 1
Figure 6.3: Reduction flow for fragment server A with built-in redundancy support
for generating the small obfuscated LUT for fragment server F . Once step
5 has sent the vectors to all other servers, step 6 sends the indexes for those
vectors. For example, with the vector sent to fragment server B, the index of
the correct value is sent to fragment server F . No value is sent to fragment
server E, and fragment server A calculates the index and flip value for fragment
server F . The results in Chapter 7 for the redundancy model show useable
performance, even with the built-in redundancy and the fact there are six keys
for the result LUTs.
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Set A Set B Set C Set D Result
Figure 6.4: Linked LUT flow diagram
6.6.3 Corrupting Fragments
In Section 5.4.3, an approach is used such that no fragment server can learn the
states or repeating of states when a reduction occurs. This can be improved
further by purposely corrupting fragments sent to the servers from the client.
With the performance model, if redundancy is not required, every bit can have
a corrupt fragment. Therefore, a fragment server does not know which one the
corrupt fragment is, making it harder to learn anything during the reduction
stage. Furthermore, if a fragment server receives two obfuscated fragments
with the same value, they are not guaranteed to be equal.
6.7 Linking Tables
With network latency affecting performance, reducing computation time means
either smaller RTTs, or fewer reduction requests. The RTTs will vary based
on the location of the fragment servers; however, limiting reduction requests
means more fragments must be combined before a reduction occurs. With
three fragment servers or three inputs as in the case of redundancy, six con-
catenated fragments will produce a 32KB result LUT for one order of opera-
tions. Increasing to 12 concatenated states, halving the number of reductions
required, it now has a 8GB result LUT. For the enhanced privacy model,
where part of the result LUT is transferred over the network, this is not ideal.
With six concatenated fragments, there are (26)3 possible states or results.
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If one more concatenation is allowed, the possibilities becomes (26)323 or (27)3.
However, splitting the concatenations into groups of four and linking the re-
sult LUTs together will still give the same result but needs less space/memory.
For example, the first result LUT s = (24)3 giving slog2(s/2) as the result is
no longer a single bit, and requires 1MB. Now, combining with another LUT,
where the first set of four concatenated fragments are combined with another
set of four concatenated fragments, gives (((24)3)/2)((24)3) possibilities. Keep-
ing the output states to 11 bits gives 11MB. Then, the next set of four con-
catenated fragments can be combined in the same manner, requiring another
1MB LUT, which has the result for 12 concatenated states. Figure 6.4 shows
an example of four sets of concatenated fragments being linked together. This
totals to ≈ 13MB for the result LUTs, down from 8GB.
For the performance model, this is easy to accomplish, as the fragment server
holds its own result LUT. However, the security or strength is weakened due
to two outputs giving the same obfuscated state to be used or linked to the
next LUT, meaning both must be the same result bit after x concatenations.
The enhanced privacy model is more difficult, because each fragment server
does not store its result LUT, and privacy is achieved by the result only being
a single bit. Therefore, this concept was not explored further.
6.8 Summary
This section has shown that most functions can be implemented by using
precomputed LUTs, and with the enhanced privacy model, the LUTs can
be reused. Generation of the obfuscation and result LUTs is simple, and once
computed on the client can be uploaded to the fragment servers. The enhanced
privacy model can reuse these LUTs, because only a single bit is exposed,
whereas the performance model will require frequent generation of new LUTs
to prevent patterns being observed. However, as Section 6.2 shows, generation
requires little effort and could even be computed on a mobile device. As the
modulo function in Section 6.4.4 proves, some algorithms or functions that
need the conditional operation can be more problematic but are still possible.
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Experiments and Analysis
This chapter presents proof-of-concept implementations for FRIBs for two ap-
plications: (1) secure cloud voting, and (2) secure string searching. The first
is a dedicated implementation written in Python, which aimed at providing
useable performance, while keeping votes hidden. Secure searching is a flexible
implementation in Lisp to show that FRIBs is practical in areas other than
performance. The data privacy strength of FRIBs is analysed and shows that
with an even distribution of high and low bits, no state bias is experienced.
Finally, this chapter introduces the idea that distributing data has benefits for
companies and personal users in regards to data privacy laws, making it more
difficult to retrieve all the fragments.
7.1 Prerequisites
Before the practicality of FRIBs can be evaluated, there are two pre-processing
steps that need to be explained: (1) how to keep the fragments in order while
processing, and (2) generating the LUTs for FRIBs to use.
7.1.1 Fragment Scheduler
When an organisation or entity is processing their own data in the cloud, such
that they manage all fragment servers, then scheduling may not be required,
because they know where and how the data is stored. This means if the pro-
gram needs some value x, then the fragments can be passed as an argument
to the program on each fragment server. However, when data is sent to the
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fragment servers from a client and processed automatically, then the order of
the fragments needs to be guaranteed. This is because if multiple clients are
submitting data at the same time, the fragment servers could receive the frag-
ments in a different order to each other, causing corruption during processing.
Adding identifiers to each fragment during reduction would be one method
of ordering the fragments; however, with the voting use case where a single
tally is being incremented, each addition references the previous operation,
requiring the order to be defined before any operation occurs. This section
will briefly introduce a simple fragment scheduler to address this problem.
Each fragment server is responsible for a pool of fragments, where each pool
is processed one after another, similar to a circular buffer. Each fragment
server has the same set of pools, but each pool has a controlling fragment
server to define order. When a fragment received is for a pool managed by
that fragment server, it adds the fragment to the pool and records the index
in the pool. The fragment server then sends the voter identification number
(or another form of identifier) and index to the other fragment servers. Upon
receiving this tuple, the other fragment servers can add the fragments for that
voter (or identifier) into the pool at the same index. This guarantees the
ordering in the pools, as only one fragment server is deciding the position.
Note that the fragments are currently distributed between the pools by the
voter identification number within modulo number of fragment serves.
To add support for a corrupted or malicious fragment server, when the next
pool for processing is being staged, the fragment servers first check the num-
ber of fragments, and then that the ordering of each pool is the same. This is
achieved by each sending a signature of the pool, by hashing the voter iden-
tification numbers in order, and sending the signature to the other fragment
servers. If all the signatures are the same, the pool is processed, otherwise
the pool needs to be rescheduled. The rescheduling will be done by another
fragment server (which can be the previous pools fragment server); meanwhile,
the next pool will be used.
The flow for how the scheduler gets the next pool of fragments is given in
Figure 7.1. This can be seen as a state machine for a subthread of the scheduler
to handle rotating the pools. A short description of each state is given below.
• Init: The entry point for the thread.
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• Conn: Connect to all the other fragment server schedulers.
• Next: Start the process of getting the next fragment pool. There could
be a delay or a trigger that signifies that the next pool is required.
• Len: Send the length of the next pool queue to the other fragment servers.
• Recv0: Receive all the lengths of the other fragments servers. Technically
it only needs the length from the fragment server managing that pool;
however, they can be used to detect malicious activity.
• RLen: Wait until the length of the next pool queue is the same length
as the managing fragment server. This is in case there has been a delay
in receiving an index and guarantees the lengths of the next pool on
each fragment server is the same. Any difference in length would cause
corruption for all following reduction requests. A timeout would need to
be added here.
• Sign: Send the signature of the next pool to the other fragment servers.
This can be accomplished in many ways, where for proof-of-concept the
fragment identifiers are hashed to guarantee the order of the next pool.
Any variation in the ordering would again cause corruption. For the
voting example given in this chapter, the voter identification number can
be used as the fragment identification.
• Recv1: Received all the signatures from the other fragment servers. This
allows the detection of malicious activity, as all the signatures should be
equal.
• Q: This state is reached if the signatures are equal, or in the case of the
redundancy model, where all but one signatures are the same. The state
adds the fragments in the next pool to the processing queue.
• Fix: A difference in the signatures occurred, so the fragments cannot be
added to the processing queue. Another fragment server will attempt to
sequence the fragments in this pool.
The next thread would be responsible for receiving the fragments from the
clients/end users, and adding them into a pool. Figure 7.2 gives a brief
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Init
Conn
Next Len
Recv0
RLenSignRecv1
Q
Fix
All Received
Waiting
Correct Len
Waiting
V alid
Difference
Waiting
Figure 7.1: Flow for the scheduler to get the next fragment pool
overview, where it waits for a new user, receives the fragment value, and stores
it as a key pair with some identification. The Pool state would check if the
fragment server is managing the pool this fragment would go into. If it is the
managing fragment server, it sends the index into the pool, the pool number,
and fragment identification number to the other fragment servers. Otherwise,
the server waits for a new user. Finally, Figure 7.3 will handle the receiving
of indexes for the pools. Upon receiving an index and pool for a fragment
identification number, the server checks to see if another fragment exists for
that index in the pool. If that slot is empty, the fragment is added to the pool.
Any errors here will be handled by the next pool thread.
With enough fragments being received and an even distribution between
the pools, this simple scheduler will allow FRIBs to process fragments in order
with no overhead of fragment identification, where after each addition the next
fragment can be processed. This is because the cost of adding a new fragment
to a pool is less than a reduction request. However, in order for the scheduler
to not impact the performance of computation with FRIBs, it should be run
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Figure 7.2: Scheduler subthread flow for receiving fragments from clients.
Recv
CheckPool
Waiting
Figure 7.3: Scheduler subthread flow for receiving new indexes a pool
over a different ethernet stack/interface. Also, a consideration is available
processing cores, where the scheduler threads should not impact or take away
processing time from the FRIBs processing requirements.
7.1.2 Table Generation
To implement FRIBs, the LUTs need to be generated by a single entity. For
an organisation storing and processing data in the cloud, they would generate
their own tables. However, for processing across multiple entities, as it would
be for government voting, another entity would be required to generate the
tables. The performance of LUT generation is not critical to the performance
of FRIBs, because they can be reused and only need to be generated once
(they can be regenerated regularly to limit patterns, but each request can use
the same LUTs).
Depending on the operation that is being implemented, only the function
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that defines what result a combination of fragments represents needs changing.
For example, Listing 7.1 defines the function to add a carry bit to x-bits
using the XOR fragmentation algorithm. The argument args is an array of
N = len(args) fragment states, where the carry bit is at bit index 0 of each
fragment. The resulting array contains the result fragments, where N − 1 can
be random, and the last fragment is chosen so that the fragments give the
correct result. Sample fragment input of 15, 10, 5 (01111 ⊕ 01010 ⊕ 00101 =
00000) could give 30, 25, 7 (11110⊕ 11001⊕ 00111 = 00000), or input 15, 10, 7
(01111⊕ 01010⊕ 00111 = 00010) which is 0001 plus the carry bit 0, gives an
output of 19, 4, 22 (10011⊕ 00100⊕ 10110 = 00001), where bit index 4 is the
resulting carry of the addition.
Listing 7.1: Function to get the result of fragments for addition
def getAddResult(args):
r = []
v = c = 0
for arg in args:
c = c ^ (arg & 1)
v = v ^ (arg >> 1)
v = v + c
rv = 0
for i in range(len(args) -1):
r.append(random.randint (0 ,31))
rv = rv ^ r[i]
r.append(rv ^ v)
return r
Adding redundancy makes the table generation more difficult, as different
state combinations need to give the same result. Instead of randomly choos-
ing the resulting fragments, the results need to be precomputed such that if
corruption to one state occurs, the same result is returned if there was no
corruption. The function for getting the fragments would be a lookup to get
the precomputed result, as shown in Listing 7.2. The locations of sample code
for generating the precomputed results are given in Appendix D.
Listing 7.2: Function to get the result of fragments for addition with redundancy
def getAddRedResult(args):
if str(args) in validResults:
return validResults[str(args)]
return None
Another example of a resulting fragment function would be that of a NAND
function with variable usage. This would be a result LUT that could be used to
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compute nearly any arbitrary operation in a privacy-preserving manner. The
LUTs can be computed before the algorithm or function has been defined, al-
lowing for new functions or changes to existing functions without regenerating
LUTs. If all the fragment servers are managed by different entities, as would
be the case for voting, each entity can agree or disagree to running the new/-
modified function. The process of getting the result fragments with a variable
usage NAND function requires more steps than a static function. First, the
state needs to be split such that the order of operations is observed, as shown
in Listing 7.3. Recall that 0 is used to represent an operation and the number
of 0s define order. For example, the state 1107 = 10001010011 would give
[1, [[1, 1], 11]], which in terms of NAND functions is (1⊕ ((1⊕ 1)⊕ 0)).
Listing 7.3: Function to split each fragment by NAND operation
def splitFragment(f, ops):
if ops == 0:
return f
f1 = f.split(’0’ * ops)
if len(f1) == 1:
return splitFragment(f, ops - 1)
output = []
for sf in f1:
output.append(splitFragment(sf , ops - 1))
return output
With the order of operations preserved, the fragments need to be joined by
the fragmentation algorithm (XOR). A sample is given in 7.4.
Listing 7.4: Function to join the fragments by the fragmentation algorithm
def fragmentEvalXor(f0 , f1):
if type(f0) is str:
if f0 == "11" and f1 == "11":
return "11"
if f0 == "1" and f1 == "1":
return "11"
return "1"
result = []
for i in range(0, len(f0)):
result.append(fragmentEvalXor(f0[i], f1[i]))
return result
The fragment result can now be solved with Listing 7.5, giving a single bit. To
implement a different operation, the NAND function can be replaced.
Listing 7.5: Function to split each fragment by NAND operation
def fragmentEval(f):
if type(f) is str:
if f == "11":
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return 0
return 1
e = fragmentEval(f[0])
for i in range(1, len(f)):
e = int(not(e and fragmentEval(f[i])))
return e
Finally, the random result fragments, which are single bits, unlike the dedicated
addition example, can be computed. Sample input 1107, 1577, 6355 into the
function for 7.6 would be a randomised fragment for (1 Z ((0 Z 1) Z 1)) = 1,
which could be 0, 1, 0.
Listing 7.6: Function to get result fragments for variable NAND operations
def getNandResult(args):
r = []
rv = 0
v = fragmentEval(reduce(lambda x,y: fragmentEvalXor(x,y
), map(lambda arg: splitFragment(bin(arg)[2:], 3),
args)))
for i in range(len(args) -1):
r.append(random.randint (0,1))
rv = rv ^ r[i]
r.append(rv ^ v)
return r
The remaining step for generating the LUTs is to generate a list of valid
states, which in the case of the addition example in Listing 7.2 is 0 → 2x−1,
where x is the number of bits (including the carry bit). The generic NAND
example requires validation because 29 = 11101 would not be a reachable state.
Once a list of states is generated, a random mapping for each fragment server
to obfuscate its state for sending to the other fragment servers is generated
(as described in Chapter 6). All possible state combinations can be tried and
the resulting fragments can be generated using the functions defined earlier
in this section. Finally, the obfuscation and result LUTs are outputted and
distributed to their corresponding fragment servers.
7.2 Proof-of-Concept Voting Implementation
The comparison application and requirements for privacy-preserving computa-
tion used in Chapter 3 was electronic voting. This is due to the basic nature of
voting being an addition, but it can also be made more complex by expanding
to surveys and only allowing a certain number of votes for a set of options.
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Two implementations are given in this section: the enhanced privacy model
both with and without redundancy, requiring three and six fragment servers
respectively.
7.2.1 Addition
Using the simple voting system introduced in Chapter 3, for the population of
smaller countries such as New Zealand or Singapore, 224 − 1 would be large
enough for every voter to vote yes for an option/candidate. Instead of adding
two 24-bit numbers together, because a vote is a single bit, the system can be
designed to add a single bit to a 24-bit number. This simplifies the adding
process and allows for a customised addition operation to be defined. Smaller
bit-sized values could be in tally pools, such that 4-bit values are used, but once
14 votes have been added to the tally pool value, it would need to be added
to the final tally. This could help performance with parallelisation, but for
comparisons with Chapter 3, a single 24-bit value will be used. The addition
function for table generation in Listing 7.1 was used, such that the first x
bits are added with the vote, before the next set of x bits are added with the
carry bit from the previous operation. In this chapter, the enhanced privacy
model without redundancy will have x = 4; therefore, six reduction requests
are needed to add the vote to the 24-bit tally. The redundancy implementation
sets x = 3 to reduce the size of the result LUTs and the LUTs sent over the
network, meaning eight reduction requests are required.
With each set of x bits depending on the previous x bits, instead of adding
the vote to the tally and then adding the next vote, they can be pipelined.
Pipelining is common with hardware design, where stages of a function or
operation are split over clock-cycles, such that the previous stage is processing
the next segment of data. When the final stage is complete, after the next
tick, the next segment has finished even though the actual function takes a
number of clock-cycles. The reduction request can be treated as the clock-
cycle, so each x bits are processing a different vote. Therefore, instead of a
vote taking the time of six or eight reductions to be processed, the tally is
actually updated every reduction, meaning if enough votes are queued, the
input of a new vote and output of the final tally is achieved every reduction.
This is shown in Figure 7.4, where after each reduction, a new vote has been
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Reduce → v5 v4 v3 v2 v1 v0
Reduce → v6 v5 v4 v3 v2 v1
Reduce → v7 v6 v5 v4 v3 v2
Reduce → v8 v7 v6 v5 v4 v3
→ Tally= v0
→ Tally= v0 + v1
→ Tally= v0 + v1 + v2
→ Tally= v0 + v1 + v2 + v3
Tally
0 23
Figure 7.4: Reduction pipeline for adding votes to a 24-bit tally
added to the 24-bit tally; each block represents the x-bits, with the carry bit
from the block on the left, but from the previous reduction. To get to the
state shown in Figure 7.4, where v0 is at the upper-most part of the tally, five
reductions have already occurred. The first reduction shown in the figure is
the sixth reduction overall and completes one addition.
7.2.2 Verification
Proving a vote is either “yes” or “no” comes free by only accepting a single
bit from the voter (vote ∈ {0, 1}); however, there are other aspects of voting
that may need verifying. With multiple candidates, there could be a need to
guarantee only one vote has been cast, as discussed in Section 3.3.4 (this could
also be seen as answers to a question in a survey). A sticky adder can be used to
verify that at most one candidate receives a “yes” vote, by keeping the second
bit high if it is ever set. Algorithm 6 is an example of a ballot consisting of
x candidates, where each voter only gets a single vote. If votera casts [0, 1, 0],
the function will return [0, 1, 0], because the variable sticky does not get set.
However, when voterb casts [1, 0, 1] the sticky bit is set, meaning the resulting
array is [0, 0, 0]. This nullifies the three votes from voterb, because multiple
candidates received a “yes”. The same nullification would happen with paper
voting if multiple candidates are chosen. Another example for a ballot is where
each voter gets three votes to use however they like. Now, each vote is multiple
bits, instead of a single bit. In this case, the sticky bit would represent the
third bit, so would only be set with four or more votes.
The concept behind Algorithm 6 can also be used for a ranking ballot:
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for example, three available options, where the voter must pick an order.1
In this example, there would be three separate ballots: first choice, second
choice and third choice, giving nine tallies in total. For each choice, the votes
are verified to only contain a single “yes” vote. Then, each option (option
As first, second and third choice) has the votes verified, meaning for the 2-
dimensional array (3x3), a high bit can only have one bit set per column and
one per row. The only change to the function is the valid bit gets applied
to the whole 2-dimensional array. This does not stop a voter only choosing a
first choice, but even with paper based voting this can still occur. If this was
a requirement, then the logic for the valid bit on Line 7 of Algorithm 6 could
be valid← ¬sticky ∧ add, meaning that add must be set.
To record who has voted, the valid bit can also be stored. For each voter,
their voter identification number would return 0, where the valid bit can be
XORed with it to keep records of who has voted. This value can be combined
with Line 7 of Algorithm 6, such that the vote is only valid if the voter has not
submitted a valid vote previously. The voter identification number would be
visible to each fragment server, but if a secure search could be implemented,
the identification number could be fragmented and, therefore, kept private.
The verification process was not tested in practice, because the performance
of the addition is what is being compared to Chapter 3. However, all of the
verification examples given can be easily implemented with FRIBs, where the
XOR and NOT operations can be free (no reduction requests required). With
the remaining operations being single bit functions, parallelisation for many
voters could yield usable performance. A result LUT could even be generated
to get the sticky bit of an array of votes (for each candidate), where the result
is fragmented and therefore unknown.
Another requirement for a voting scheme would be that the voter can verify
if their vote was cast correctly. This is out-of-scope of this use case, but worth
discussing. A common technique is to use public bulletin boards [170][171],
and that can be used here. When a voter sends their vote fragments to each
fragment server, they can also send a random string (for each set of fragment).
The voter also sends the random string to each public bulletin board and
1This type of approach would have allowed the New Zealand flag referendum to be imple-
mented [169].
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Algorithm 6 Verifying a single vote is cast
1: function verifyVote(votes)
2: sticky ← 0
3: add← 0
4: for v in votes do
5: sticky ← sticky|(add ∧ v)
6: add← add⊕ v
7: valid← ¬sticky
8: for i in votes.length do
9: votes[i]← votes[i] ∧ valid
10: return votes
receives back an index value. After the ballot (or periodically) the fragment
servers can send their public bulletin board (one for each) the fragments with
random strings. Note that the public bulletin boards should be hosted by
different entities to the fragment servers as well. The public bulletin boards
secretly decided together the index for each random string, which was sent
back to the voter; therefore, after the ballot the voter can then verify their
vote was cast correctly, by checking the index in the list of votes on the public
bulletin boards. This also allows all the votes to be tallied to confirm the
result. The votes and voter identification numbers are therefore kept separate.
This is purely an idea and has not been explored for this thesis.
7.2.3 Enhanced Privacy Model
The implementation structures for the enhanced privacy models both with
and without redundancy are nearly identical, with only a few differences for
dealing with the different number of fragment servers. Both will be described
in this section, but only the code for without redundancy will be given as
examples, where both implementations can be found in Appendix D. Imple-
menting FRIBs can be divided into three threads/processes: (1) performing
the addition and reduction, (2) handling requests for another fragment server’s
result LUT, and (3) handling requests for correcting the obfuscation through
indexes.
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Performing the Addition and Reduction
The first stage of this thread is getting the next vote from the queue and
setting it to be the first carry bit, where the remaining carry bits were set
during the last reduction. In Listing 7.7, the vote_window_len will be six, as
four bits plus the carry bit are reduced at once for the 24-bit tally. The carry
bits are then appended to the list of states to be reduced.
Listing 7.7: Stage 1 for adding a new vote by getting it from the queue
carry_window [0] = self.voteaddQueue.get()
states = []
for i in range(vote_window_len):
carry = carry_window[i]
if carry == None:
continue
states.append(tally_window[i] + (carry << 4))
The second stage involves obfuscating the fragment server’s state for itself
to use in the vector, and for handling requests from the other two fragment
servers. Listing 7.8 gives an example of this process, where qosb and qosc
are queues between the other two threads, as each thread needs to know the
current state. Once the fragment server has obfuscated its own state (in osa)
for use in the vector request, it generates three other random states to add
to the vector, before shuﬄing it. Now that the vector is shuﬄed, the index
of the correct obfuscated state is found and sent to fragment server C (via
sendc). Note that each fragment server considers itself as fragment server A,
so fragment server C is always the one to send the index too and to receive
the new index and flip bit back from. The vector is sent to fragment server
B (sendb) at the same time. This implementation is reducing the states in
parallel and tries to fill the packets to improve performance. The only variable
not covered so far is vis, which will be used later to recover the current index
into the vector for that state.
Listing 7.8: Stage 2 for adding a new vote is to obfuscate the state
vis = []
sendb = sendc = ""
for state in states:
osa = self.a.obfuscate(state)
self.qosb.put(struct.unpack("<B", self.b.obfuscate(
state))[0])
self.qosc.put(struct.unpack("<B", self.c.obfuscate(
state))[0])
151
Chapter 7 Experiments and Analysis
vec = [osa]
i = 0
while i < 3:
r = struct.pack("<B", random.randint(0, 31))
if r not in vec:
vec.append(r)
i += 1
random.shuffle(vec)
vi = vec.index(osa)
vis.append(vi)
sendb += vec [0]+ vec [1]+ vec [2]+ vec [3]
sendc += struct.pack("<B", vi)
self.b.ssl_sock.sendall(sendb)
self.c.ssl_sock.sendall(sendc)
The thread waits for the small obfuscated LUT from fragment server B, and
the index and flip bit from fragment server C. Listing 7.9 shows the states
being retrieved by selecting the correct row (using vis from earlier) and using
the index and flip bit to get the result state.
Listing 7.9: Stage 3 for adding a new vote is to process the obfuscated LUT with
the received index and flip bit
rstates = []
for si in range(len(states)):
small_lut = []
rows = self.b.ssl_sock.recv (128)
row = rows [32 * (3 - vis[si]): 32 * (3 - vis[si]) + 32]
for by in row:
small_lut.append(by)
index = struct.unpack("<B", self.c.ssl_sock.recv (1))[0]
flip = struct.unpack("<B", self.c.ssl_sock.recv (1))[0]
rstates.append(struct.unpack("<B", small_lut[index ])[0]
^ flip)
The final step is to modify the carry_window for the next vote and update the
tally (as shown in Listing 7.10). The thread then goes back to the first stage
in order to add the next vote.
Listing 7.10: The final stage for adding a new vote is to set up the windows for the
next vote
results = []
for i in range(vote_window_len):
if carry_window[i] == None:
continue
carry_window[i] = (rstates[rsi] & 16) >> 4
tally_window[i] = (rstates[rsi] & 15)
for i in range(vote_window_len -1, 0, -1):
carry_window[i] = carry_window[i-1]
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Handling Requests for Another Fragment Server’s Result LUT
This thread is responsible for generating the small obfuscated result LUT for
another fragment server. Note that for all the implementations and expla-
nations in this thesis, the result LUT is for the lower fragment server; for
example, fragment server B generates the LUT for fragment server A. With
the three-server enhanced privacy model, this thread receives the randomised
vector of states from the lower fragment server, and gets the possible results
for each index in the vector, whereas the redundancy model will receive multi-
ple vectors; in this implementation, it is five vectors (from all other fragment
servers), in order to keep the data transferred to a minimum.
The simplicity of this thread can be seen in Listing 7.11. The thread re-
ceives four possible states from the lower fragment server. It then gets its own
obfuscated state (osc) in order to get the result vector for each of the four
states received. The result vector is shuﬄe, before a random value is XORed
with it to hide the values. Once all four result vectors are obfuscated, they are
sent back to the lower fragment server.
Listing 7.11: Loop which generates the obfuscated result LUT
while True:
b4 = conn.recv (4)
if len(b4) == 0:
break
osc = self.qosc.get() * 32
rbs = ’’
for i in range (4):
i = (struct.unpack("<B",b4[i])[0] * 32 * 32) +
osc
row_bytes = self.result_lut[i:i+32]
self.c.random.shuffle(row_bytes)
for rb in row_bytes:
tmp_r = self.c.random.randint (0 ,31)
rbs += struct.pack("<B", struct.unpack(
"<B", rb)[0] ^ tmp_r)
conn.sendall(rbs)
Handling Requests for Correcting the Obfuscation through Indexes
The final thread provides the upper fragment server (for example, at fragment
server B, the upper fragment server is C) with the index for the small ob-
fuscated result LUT that is generated by the previous thread. The thread
receives the index for the vector sent by the upper server, where the index is
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for the position of the correct state (as only one state in the vector is correct).
Using this index and its own obfuscated state, it can generate the index for the
new state of the upper fragment server. Again, the redundancy model would
receive more indexes, as five vectors are sent to generate the obfuscated LUT.
To further explain, Listing 7.12 contains the loop which is responsible for
generating the index value. It waits to receive the index value, then gets its
own obfuscated state value. The thread must handle the random shuﬄe and
numbers generated by the previous thread to keep the pseudo-random number
generators aligned. In this implementation, the approach to solve this is very
basic; it first shuﬄes an empty array of the same size, then for each state in the
result vector it generates a random number. Recall that this thread shares the
same seed for the pseudo-random number generator as the thread generating
the small obfuscated result LUT. Once the correct index is reached, the index
and the random value is saved to send back to the upper fragment server. Note
that it cannot be sent once it is found to prevent timing attacks [172].2 The
random value is the flip bit mentioned previously, to reveal the new state.
Listing 7.12: Loop which generates the obfuscated index
while True:
b1 = conn.recv (1)
if len(b1) == 0:
break
ri = struct.unpack("<B", b1)[0]
osb = self.qosb.get()
osbf = 0
for i in range (4):
row_bytes = []
for j in range (32):
row_bytes.append(j)
self.b.random.shuffle(row_bytes)
osb_new = row_bytes.index(osb)
for j in range (32):
tmp_r = self.b.random.randint (0 ,31)
if i == ri and j == osb_new:
osbf = tmp_r
osbi = osb_new
conn.sendall(struct.pack("<B", osbi) + struct.pack("<B"
, osbf))
2Timing attacks are where a function takes a varying amount of time for different in-
puts [172], thus potentially revealing the index.
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7.2.4 Performance
To be able to claim practical performance for the addition aspect of voting,
the following question must be true.
Question 3 Can all eligible voters cast their vote during the voting period, and
the result be available shortly after the ballot is finished?
Definitions of some of the terms in the question above can vary, where scope
is needed. For this analysis, the voting period is 24 hours, but the majority
of the votes will be cast during a 12-hour period, for a voting population of
around five million. The distribution of votes cast will greatly affect when the
results are available, because if all votes are cast in the last hour, the results
cannot be expected to be finalised when the voting period ends. Therefore,
if all votes are cast at 5am, the tally should be complete by 5pm, reducing
analysis to throughput (votes per second). All results in this section were
from a cloud implementation in AWS using C5.large instances, consisting of
2 virtual central processing units, 4GB memory, and up to 10Gbps network
performance.
For the enhanced privacy model consisting of three fragment servers, the
LUT sizes for both results and a single obfuscation LUT were 32KB and 32B
respectively. In terms of memory requirements, these tables can fit easily into
main memory and higher levels of cache. By doubling the number of fragment
servers, the redundancy model result LUT is 16MB, but the obfuscation LUTs
drop to 16Bs, as the number of states has halved (only reduces three bits plus
a carry, whereas without redundancy, the reduction occurs on four bits plus
the carry); however, these tables will still be able to reside in memory, meaning
the memory requirements of the two implementations are very small.
The biggest overhead for any FRIBs implementation will be the network,
including latency, bandwidth, packet loss and the cost of moving data to/from
the networking stack. This is shown in Figure 7.5 where different RTT times
are compared against multiple voting tallies (parallel tallies) for the time taken
to process a single vote. Focusing on the single 24-bit tally, the difference be-
tween 0ms RTT (actually 0.05ms) and 1ms (1.05ms) is practically nothing;
therefore, the time to process a single vote is primary processing time on the
central processing unit and transferring data to/from the networking stack.
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Figure 7.5: Votes added per second, for a three-server model
However, once more latency is added, the time to process a single vote in-
creases at a near linear rate. Computing multiple 24-bit tallies in parallel
hides a lot of the networking overhead, as the other data lines in Figure 7.5
show. An example is ten parallel tallies, where the time to add a single vote
stays consistent even with varying latencies. The overhead for the network
would therefore just be bandwidth availability and packet loss. Note that the
difference between sending the data over a secure channel or unsecured channel
did not affect throughput in a noticeable manner.
Adding a vote to the single 24-bit tally takes 0.013 seconds for a 10ms RTT
between each fragment server, giving a throughput of 75.4 votes per second.
Within a 12-hour period, over 3 million votes could be tallied–a nearly accept-
able rate. However, with ten tallies in parallel, the throughput increases to
173.7 votes per second, allowing for over 7.5 million votes to be tallied in 12
hours. This is an acceptable throughput for the use case of New Zealand or
Singapore. Once the tallies are complete, the ten tallies can be summed to-
gether within a FRIBs environment or in plain text. Note that by parallelising
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Figure 7.6: Votes added per second, for a six-server model with built-in redundancy
multiple tallies, the fragment servers wait for ten vote fragments in the queue,
then reduce the ten tallies in parallel to saturate the network. The aim is to
prevent the threads from waiting (going to sleep) while new data arrives from
the network. The number of parallel tallies will vary on implementation and
network quality between the fragment servers.
The redundancy model results for the time to process a single vote are given
in Figure 7.6. Similar results to Figure 7.5 are observed; however, with more
servers and more data transferred, the throughput is less.3 The maximum
throughput achieved was 30 votes per second, meaning only 1.3 million votes
could be summed in twelve hours. For other application or scenarios, this per-
formance would be acceptable, especially because it has built-in redundancy,
3Figure 7.6 has a small anomaly for RTT values between 1 and 4. The results were
obtained by averaging additions for all x parallel tallies for each RTT, meaning each
tally is running at the same time per RTT; therefore, any variation in the network at
that time could cause the hump seen for RTT values 1 and 2. Instead of averaging the
results over multiple days to remove this hump, the results were left as a single run to
demonstrate how the network can affect performance.
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but with the voting use case, the enhanced privacy model with redundancy is
too slow for practical performance. Instead, it would be better to run three
enhanced privacy model instances, giving nine fragment servers in total. The
performance would be superior and also allow for one instance to be compro-
mised, as the other two instances would give the same result.
In Chapter 3, partially homomorphic encryption was shown to give the best
performance for secure voting in the cloud. Performance for the homomor-
phic addition taking under a millisecond gives unmatchable throughput value;
however, because the zero-knowledge proof is required to guarantee votes are
a single bit, it also must be included in the throughput calculation. Re-
evaluating the performance of the partially homomorphic encryption scheme
on the same AWS instance (one of the fragment servers used for testing in this
chapter) gives a result of 22ms for a 2048-bit key, and 117ms for a 4096-bit key.
Given the instances are dual-core, throughput achieved is 91 or 17 votes per
second, depending on key size. Using the same number of servers as the en-
hanced privacy model results in six tallies, two per server with a throughput of
273 or 51 votes per second. Therefore, using the same compute power as the
FRIBs implementation, partially homomorphic encryption can still produce
a greater throughput; however, the client-side performance for generating the
zero-knowledge proof is still an issue, especially within web browsers. However,
FRIBs has client-side performance similar to that of plain text, and when com-
bined with the flexibility offered by FRIBs (allowing for different operations
to be computed, including advanced voting specifications), it compensates for
the slightly slower throughput.
7.3 Proof-of-Concept Search Implementation
In Chapter 4, an approximate string searching scheme was presented and will
be extended in this section with FRIBs. The previous section detailed a custom
function for the result LUTs, and can only be used for adding a single bit to an
integer. Therefore, in this section, a generic NAND result LUT will be used,
allowing for arbitrary functions to be defined. This section will also use the
performance model, as search operations will not occur as regularly as adding
votes for millions of people. Up until this section, practicality has been defined
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as performance (both for client and in the cloud), but this section will look
at another aspect of practicality: flexibility and utility. Providing a service
where the LUTs need to be generated for every execution or different function
can limit the usage of the data. For example, data is hosted in the cloud but
other organisations would like to run a custom function over the data. The
organisations managing the fragment servers can verify and accept to run the
function, without the need to verify the LUTs.
7.3.1 Secure Searching Use Case
A challenge for law enforcement agencies is keeping their investigations private,
but also having the ability to share information. INTERPOL helps to facilitate
this collaboration between its member countries [173]; however, there is still
the issue of trust and privacy around information sharing. For example, if
an entity hosts information regarding cryptocurrency, then ideally the other
entities can search, view and download this information, without revealing
what information they were accessing.
The design of INTERPOL’s in-house developed tool “Bitcoin Explorer” is
not relevant; however, the secure searching aspect–a proof-of-concept design–
will be described. In this use case, there are some suspicious Bitcoin wallet
IDs–a unique string–which a country would like to flag without revealing the
ID to anyone else. The country can provide some details on the ID, which
is only revealed when the ID is matched. When combined with anonymous
routing [141], the country and wallet ID remains hidden. With FRIBs, a
few member countries and INTERPOL can each host a fragment server, thus
ensuring no single entity has access to the data.
7.3.2 Building FRIBs Functions in Lisp
Common Lisp was chosen as the implementation language of FRIBs for NAND
functions in this thesis, because functions are first class objects, and it is de-
signed for lists (values are a list of fragments). This makes defining programs
for FRIBs seem natural, without knowing the underlying FRIBs scheme. For
example, the function + can be redefined to execute an addition in FRIBs.
Local testing can then be run on plain-text values, before being submitted to
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the fragment servers where + is redefined to automatically translate the pro-
gram to run in the FRIBs environment, as shown in Listing 7.13. This makes
development of algorithms/programs simpler and means no custom compiler is
required. Note that for a performance optimised implementation, the approach
for voting in Section 7.2 is recommended where custom LUTs and threads are
defined.
Listing 7.13: Redefining the addition function in Lisp
(unlock-package ’common-Lisp)
(unlock-package ’common-Lisp-user)
(defconstant +old-plus+ (fdefinition ’+))
(defun local+ (&rest args) (apply +old-plus+ args))
(defun + (a b) (fribs-add a b))
The basic structure for a fragment is given in Listing 7.14, where fragment
is the fragment value (1101), len is the bit length, and num is the number of
operations applied to this fragment value. The last two variables are used to
improve performance, but are not necessary.
Listing 7.14: Fragment structure
(defstruct frib
fragment
len
num
)
Two NAND functions are defined in Listings 7.15 and 7.16. The first is a
generic function with no optimisations, where the second function also gets
passed (as an argument) the number of operations to set the operation value
faster (for example, 000 is the third layer of operations).
Listing 7.15: Lisp NAND function definition
(defun nand(a b)
(prog (o)
(setf o (make-frib :fragment 0 :len 0 :num 0))
(setf (frib-num o) (+ 1 (max (frib-num a) (frib-num b))))
(setf (frib-fragment o) (logior (frib-fragment a) (ash (
frib-fragment b) (+ (frib-len a) (frib-num o)))))
(setf (frib-len o) (+ (frib-len a) (frib-num o) (frib-len b
)))
(return o)
)
)
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Listing 7.16: Lisp optimised NAND function definition
(defun nandc(a b c)
(prog (o)
(setf o (make-frib :fragment 0 :len 0 :num c))
(setf (frib-fragment o) (logior (frib-fragment a) (ash (
frib-fragment b) (+ (frib-len a) (frib-num o)))))
(setf (frib-len o) (+ (frib-len a) (frib-num o) (frib-len b
)))
(return o)
)
)
The base functions have now been defined, allowing other basic functions to
be built upon them, with some given in Listing 7.17.
Listing 7.17: Lisp functions for NOT and AND gates
(defun fribs-not(a)
(nand a a)
)
(defun fribs-notc(a c)
(nandc a a c)
)
(defun fribs-and(a b)
(fribs-not (nand a b))
)
(defun fribs-andc(a b c)
(fribs-notc (nandc a b (- c 1)) c)
)
The basic operations grow the fragment value; therefore, a reduction function
is required. The reduction function in Listing 7.18 is for the performance
model but can be redefined to use the enhanced privacy model. The function
in Listing 7.18 first obfuscates its states for the other two fragment servers and
sends the value to the network sockets (st_ob and st_oc). It then waits to
receive the obfuscated states of the other fragment servers before getting its
new state.
Listing 7.18: A reduction function for the performance model
(defun reduction(fs)
(prog (frag data bytedata a b c)
; Send fragments to the other servers
(loop for f in fs do
(setf frag (frib-fragment f))
(setf b (mod (position frag *table_b *) 64))
(setf c (mod (position frag *table_c *) 64))
(write-byte (logand 255 b) *st_ob *)
(write-byte (logand 255 c) *st_oc *)
)
(force-output *st_ob *)
(force-output *st_oc *)
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; Get reduced fragments
(loop for f in fs do
(setf frag (frib-fragment f))
(setf a (position frag *table_a *))
(setf b (read-byte *st_ib* nil))
(setf c (read-byte *st_ic* nil))
(setf data (aref *table_abc* (+ (* a 4096) (* b 64) c)))
(setf (frib-fragment f) data)
(setf (frib-num f) 0)
(setf (frib-len f) (integer-length data))
)
)
)
7.3.3 Matching Operation
When applying an XOR operation over two binary values, if resulting bits are
all low, the values must be identical. A single matching bit can be obtained by
ORing each bit together and flipping the result. An example is shown below,
where a and b are compared, with the result stored in m. For multiple values,
combining the match result with m = m ∨ mi will keep track of whether a
match was found. Therefore, the fragment servers have no knowledge if a
result was found, or the data that is being compared. The XOR operation is
provided for free by FRIBs when using XOR as the fragmentation algorithm.
c0−31 = a0−31 ⊕ b0−31
m = ¬(c0 ∨ c1 ∨ ... ∨ c30 ∨ c31)
The OR function can be defined similar to Listing 7.19, where an array of
bits are ORed together to produce a single bit. Essentially, the function checks
if any bit is high for a. This function highlights a limitation for the LUTs that
were generated, where they need the fragment to have six operations applied.
The variable *frib-one* represents a high bit value, and is set during config-
uration. For three fragment servers and the XOR fragmentation algorithm,
each *frib-one* can be set to 1.
Listing 7.19: An OR function in Lisp for FRIBs that process an array of bits,
returning a single bit
(defun fribs-1-or(a)
(prog (i j tmp tmp2)
(setf i (list-length a))
(setf tmp a)
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(loop while (> i 1) do
(setf tmp2 (list))
(loop for j from (- i 1) downto 0 by 2 do
(setf tmp2 (append tmp2 (list (nandc *frib-one* (nandc *
frib-one* (nandc (nandc (nth j tmp) (nth j tmp) 1) (
nandc (nth (- j 1) tmp) (nth (- j 1) tmp) 1) 2) 2) 2))
))
)
(reduction tmp2)
(setf tmp tmp2)
(setf i (/ i 2))
)
(return (nth 0 tmp))
)
)
The overall result bit can then be set by defining an AND function that includes
the reduction, as shown in Listing 7.20. Again, this function needs to make the
fragment value have the required number of operations for the result LUTs.
The matching bit for this entry is then ANDed against the information stored
for that entry, and another AND function is defined to handle this, given in
Listing 7.21.
Listing 7.20: An AND function in Lisp for FRIBs that includes the reduction step
(defun fribs-and2(a b)
(prog (o)
(setf o (list (nandc *frib-one* (nandc *frib-one* (
fribs-and a b) 2) 2)))
(reduction o)
(return (nth 0 o))
)
)
Listing 7.21: An AND function in Lisp for FRIBs where a single bit is ANDed
against an array
(defun fribs-and3(a b)
(prog (o)
(setf o (list))
(loop for i from 0 to (- (list-length b) 1) do
(setf o (append o (list (fribs-andc (nth i b) (fribs-notc
a 1) 2))))
)
(reduction o)
(return o)
)
)
The functions for addition and multiplication can be found in Appendix D,
but are the same as described in Section 6.3.
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7.3.4 Search Implementation Example
The example implementation for string searching in FRIBs built from NAND
functions included a matching value and a detailed information field. The
matching value was a 32-bit integer, but for the use case in Section 7.3.1, it
would be a bitcoin address. The details field had a character limit of 100,
with padding to hide length. Each fragment for the detailed information can
be ANDed with the matching value, before being ORed with the resulting
detailed information. Therefore, only the matching fields’ detailed information
is set. This also means that the same address cannot be tagged twice, but
information would need to be appended to the existing entry. Listing 7.22
gives the searching algorithm, using the functions previously given, where the
value a is compared against a list of stored values in frags.
Listing 7.22: Searching for the 32-bit integer a in a list of stored values
(setf r 0)
(setf ro 0)
(setf rt (list))
(loop for i from 0 to (- (list-length frags) 1) do
(setf ro (fribs-1-or (fribs-xor (nth i frags) a)))
(if (> i 0)
(setf r (fribs-and2 r ro))
(setf r ro)
)
(loop for j from 0 to 99 do
(if (= i 0)
(setf rt (append rt (list (fribs-and3 ro (nth j (nth i
text))))))
(progn
(setf fa3 (fribs-and3 ro (nth j (nth i text))))
(loop for k from 0 to 31 do
(if (= (frib-fragment (nth k (nth j rt))) (
frib-fragment (nth k fa3)))
(progn (setf (frib-fragment (nth k (nth j rt))) 3)
(setf (frib-len (nth k (nth j rt))) 2))
(progn (setf (frib-fragment (nth k (nth j rt))) 1)
(setf (frib-len (nth k (nth j rt))) 1))
)
)
)
)
)
)
The implementation example is given in Appendix D; with an example of the
implementation running given in Figure 7.7 (a larger version of this screenshot
is given in Appendix C). The client is shown in the upper-left terminal, and the
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fragment servers are given in the other three terminals. The time for the client
to send and retrieve the result for one stored value with this implementation
was 0.540 seconds, with a RTT of 5ms between each of the three fragment
servers and the client. This is not ideal, because as the number of stored
values begins to grow, the performance of this design will decay, as each entry
needs to be compared, and even if it is not a match, the resulting details also
need to be computed. Parallelisation is a possibility using a divide-and-conquer
approach, or the results from different threads can be combined. However, Bin
Encoding presented in Chapter 4 could be used to provide a subset of entries
to search over. Bin Encoding itself is a best effort searching scheme, but it can
be combined with FRIBs to provide accurate results. There are issues raised
Figure 7.7: A proof-of-concept screenshot of searching for tagged wallet ID
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with this proposal; for example, if a Bin Encoded query has no matches to
begin with, then the servers know that no match was found. However, if Bin
Encoding can give a subset of ten entries from thousands of stored values, then
5.4 seconds to securely search thousands of records is acceptable. A dedicated
design like voting in Section 7.2 would yield faster results, but the purpose of
this section was to show how a universal function such as NAND could build
more complex functions in FRIBs.
7.4 Advanced Security Analysis
For this section, the enhanced privacy model will be used unless stated oth-
erwise. It offers the best privacy out of the models presented in this thesis,
while providing practical performance for applications such as voting.
7.4.1 Frequency Analysis Attacks on Repeating States
For the performance model, frequency attacks are viable, because each server
can see the obfuscated states of the other server; however, with the enhanced
privacy model, a configuration of three fragment servers and using a fragmen-
tation algorithm with all XORs, a frequency analysis attack becomes very
difficult. For example, with Table 7.1, there is an equal probability for any
fragment value; even for a high or low result, there is an equal probability
of a fragment server receiving a 0 or 1. A frequency analysis attack becomes
more viable when an entity has multiple fragment values. However, decoding
the real value depends heavily on having all the fragments. For example, with
knowledge of FB and FC in Table 7.1, there is still an equal probability of the
result being high or low.
During processing, each server has no knowledge of the others state, apart
from a vector list from one other server. The reduction flow example given in
Figure 5.14 would not be vulnerable, because all states are requested. There-
fore, there is a 100% chance each state appears in the vector; however, if only
a subset is requested, then a frequency attack becomes viable. This attack
would look for a server repeating states continuously, or at a certain point
in the program. Figure 7.8 shows 100 reduction steps, where the server was
always in the obfuscated state 0. The vector contains any of the 32 states in
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Table 7.1: Fragment options for three servers using XOR
FA FB FC Result
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
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Figure 7.8: Occurrences of 32 states in a vector where the server is in obfuscated
state 0 for 100 times in a row
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Figure 7.9: Occurrences of states in a vector when the server state has two
obfuscated states, in this case 0 and 1 are the same state and repeated 100 times in
a row
random order; therefore, state 0 is in the vector 100 times–standing out from
the others. If two obfuscated states per single concatenated fragment are used,
they still occur more often than the others, as shown in Figure 7.9.
A solution to stop a single obfuscated state from occurring more often than
any other is to group the states together, meaning if state 0 occurs, so does
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Figure 7.10: Occurrences of states in vector when the server in obfuscated state 0
for 100 times in a row, where obfuscated states are in groups
another set of states. In Figure 7.10, states are grouped together in groups
of eight. Again, state 0 is reoccurring and the vector sends 32 states. Here,
eight states occur more often, making it more difficult to learn what state is
reoccurring, or if it is switching between states in that group.
If the states are changing, it becomes less clear which states are being
reached. Figures 7.11, 7.12 and 7.13 randomly switch between obfuscated
states 0 − 3, 0 − 7 and 0 − 15 respectively. Even with only four states being
reached, the states are starting to become hidden within the states that are
not occurring. Once 25% of the states are being reached randomly, they are
completely hidden. Therefore, if fragments’ values are changing, as long as
there are a few different states being reached, they are hidden in the vector.
With the randomisation that can occur by a fragment server flipping two of
the three resulting bits, as discussed in Section 6.5.1, the resulting states could
vary even if all fragment servers had the same state. To summarise, the prob-
ability of a fragment being 0 or 1 is theoretically equal, and states will be
hidden in the requested vector if states change.
7.4.2 Analysis for Voting Implementation
In this section, the security of the three-server enhanced privacy model is
analysed with randomisation enabled (described in Section 6.5), to prove that
FRIBs does not leak any information about votes and the final tally. This
will be done by recording the tallies’ state and transitions to see if there are
any differences based on the vote. If all the votes for a tally are no, then
there should not be any bias in which states the fragment server reaches while
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Figure 7.11: Occurrences of states in 1/2 vector when the server is in the
obfuscated state 0, 1, 2, or 3 for 100 times in a row
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Figure 7.12: Occurrences of states in 1/2 vector when the server in obfuscated
state 0− 7 for 100 times in a row
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Figure 7.13: Occurrences of states in 1/2 vector when the server in obfuscated
state 0− 15 for 100 times in a row
processing. Figure 7.14 gives the states reached when adding thousands of no
votes with random fragments. There is no obvious bias to any one state, and
furthermore, there was no bias between states with an even or odd number of
bits. Figure 7.15 gives the state transitions from state 1 (000012) and again
there is no bias between states (including even or odd number of bits). The
same results are seen in Figure 7.16 and Figure 7.17 for random votes, where
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Figure 7.14: Percentage for each state reached with all votes cast as no (zero)
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Figure 7.15: Percentage of states reached after state 1 for all no votes
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Figure 7.16: Percentage for each state reached where all votes cast are random
there is no bias for any state (Figure 7.16), or transition (Figure 7.17).
The final analysis for the voting implementation is recording the states re-
ceived in the vector (from the lower fragment server) and which state the
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Figure 7.17: Percentage of states reached after state 1 with random votes
fragment server is in. Figures 7.18 and 7.19 show the distribution of states in
the vector of size four received from fragment server C when fragment server
A was in state 1, for all no votes and random votes respectively. These results
show there is no favouritism towards any state, where with enough runs the
results would be theoretically equal. The results in this section show that even
a simple XOR fragmentation function with fragment servers randomly flipping
bits, can provide enough randomness to keep the tally protected.
The other attack vector is brute-force; continuously guessing which state the
other fragment servers are in. A fragment server knows its own state, and four
possible states of another, but has no information about the remaining frag-
ment server. This gives 4×32 combinations for a 4-bit value; however, knowing
which is correct is improbable. Note that the four states received in the vector
are obfuscated (a random mapping), so they do not directly reveal the real
state. There are 32! ≡ 2.63× 1035 possible mapping combinations, so unless a
large amount of data is being attempted to be broken, it is more efficient to
guess the state, giving 32 × 32. Therefore, the 24-bit tally value would have
(32×32)6 combinations, where again it is improbable to know when the correct
combination is found. With 10 tallies in parallel, there would be (32 × 32)60
overall combinations for the system (4.15 × 10180). In this case, using the
mapping combinations produces fewer overall combinations at 32!× (4× 32)60
(7.12 × 10161). The enhanced privacy model with redundancy does not pro-
vide the same number of combinations; even with ten parallel tallies, it gives
(32!)2× (4× 4)60 (1.22× 10143), because each fragment server receives at least
two vectors, and only three values are needed for a decoding (including its own
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Figure 7.18: Percentage of states received in the vector when the fragment server is
in state 1 for all no votes
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Figure 7.19: Percentage of states received in the vector when the fragment server is
in state 1 for all random votes
state). It is possible to reduce the number of combinations by the number of
voters, but the challenge is knowing when the correct combination is found,
even with just 4-bits and only fifteen voters. Unlike encryption, solving one of
the 4− bit values does not reveal the other values, meaning with megabytes of
data to try and solve, the number of overall combinations is similar or greater
than brute forcing encryption schemes. In summary, the enhanced privacy
model gives the best security properties for FRIBs, whereas the redundancy
model provides an additional feature, sacrificing some performance and secu-
rity.
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7.4.3 Two Fragment States
To gain an understanding of the security for the state obfuscation and ran-
dom mappings, a three-fragment server model for the reduction server and
performance model will be analysed to see what can be learnt from the states
received. The fragmentation operation is again known to be XOR. This section
will be analysing how many possible mapping options there are for a fragment
or concatenated fragment to their corresponding obfuscated state.
7.4.3.1 Two States
We will start with two states (meaning no operation can actually occur), where
fragments = {1, 11} and states = {0, 1}. The example of reducing fragments
of size 1, allows only two possible options for the data, if the order (the frag-
ments are reduced in order, meaning f0, then f1, through to f31 for a 32-bit
integer) and operation is known. Comparing two sets of fragments i and j
during a reduction stage gives the following set of rules. In this example A, B
and C represent different fragment servers, and R is the resulting value.
Rules for two obfuscated states:
1. ifAi = Aj & Bi = Bj & Ci = Cj then Ri = Rj
2. ifAi 6= Aj & Bi 6= Bj & Ci = Cj then Ri = Rj
3. ifAi 6= Aj & Bi = Bj & Ci 6= Cj then Ri = Rj
4. ifAi = Aj & Bi 6= Bj & Ci 6= Cj then Ri = Rj
5. ifAi 6= Aj & Bi 6= Bj & Ci 6= Cj then Ri 6= Rj
6. ifAi 6= Aj & Bi = Bj & Ci = Cj then Ri 6= Rj
7. ifAi = Aj & Bi 6= Bj & Ci = Cj then Ri 6= Rj
8. ifAi = Aj & Bi = Bj & Ci 6= Cj then Ri 6= Rj
Given these rules, if 32 fragments were reduced in order such that they
formed a 32-bit value, there only exists two solutions. Even without knowing
the result of the first fragments from A, B, and C, the result must exist in
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{0, 1}. Therefore, trying both options for the first fragment will give the results
of the remaining fragments, forming 2× 32-bit values.
Adding another obfuscated state for each fragment gives fragments =
{1, 11} and states = {0, 1, 2, 3}. Each fragment server now has three group
combinations (mappings for each fragment to state), assuming two states per
fragment, where 4!/(2!(4 − 2)!) = 6, and only unique groups are needed
(6/2 = 3). When the fragment servers can see the obfuscated states using
the reduction server model, this gives 33 = 27 possible combinations, which
reduces the problem back to two states, hence 27 × 2, giving 54 possibili-
ties. Without the reduction server (using the performance model), because
its own state is known to a fragment server, there would be 32 × 2 = 18 pos-
sibilities. Increasing the number of obfuscated states to four per fragment
gives fragments = {1, 11} and states = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. The number of
state mapping combinations increases to 35, where 8!/(4!(8 − 4)!) = 70 and
70/2 = 35. Both the reduction server and performance model have a much
larger number of possibilities now, with 353× 2 = 85, 750 and 352× 2 = 2, 450
respectively. This was a simple example, where reducing a fragment which is
not concatenated is pointless. However, it has shown how quickly the number
of possibilities increases.
7.4.4 Many Fragment States
Looking at concatenated fragments, starting with two fragments being concate-
nated (an operation applied), gives fragments = {101, 1011, 1101, 11011} and
states = {0, 1, 2, 3}. The reduction server and performance model now have
(4!)3 = 13, 824 and (4!)2 = 576 possibilities for mappings respectively. The
number of obfuscated states is doubled, where states is now {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7},
giving 8!/(2!(8−2)!) = 28 grouping options. Therefore the number of mapping
possibilities per fragment server is 8!/(2!(8− 2)!)× 6!/(2!(6− 2)!)× 4!/(2!(4−
2)!) × 2!/(2!(2 − 2)!) = 2520. Overall possible mappings is now (2520)3 =
16, 003, 008, 000 and (2520)2 = 6, 350, 400. The number of obfuscated states is
again doubled, such that states = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15},
where there are now 16!/(4!(16 − 4)!) × 12!/(4!(12 − 4)!) × 8!/(4!(8 − 4)!) ×
4!/(4!(4 − 4)!) = 63, 063, 000 possible mappings per fragment server, giving
63, 063, 0003 ≈ 2.5× 1023 and 63, 063, 0002 ≈ 3.9× 1015.
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Allowing 4 concatenated states, where fragments = {1010101, 10101011,
10101101, 101011011, 10110101, 101101011, 101101101, 1011011011, 11010101,
110101011, 110101101, 1101011011, 110110101, 1101101011, 1101101101,
11011011011} , and gives 16 obfuscated states. Therefore, the number of pos-
sible options for the system is (16!)3 ≈ 9.16× 1039 and (16!)2 ≈ 4.38× 1026 for
the reduction server or the performance model. Allowing two more fragments
to be concatenated gives (26!)2 ≈ 1.61× 10178
The number of possibilities given are purely theoretical and the best-case.
But they show the large number of possible mapping options across a system
using three fragment servers either using a reduction server, or the performance
model. The attack vector of being able to guess the mapping options of the
system has been mitigated with the enhanced privacy model, as no fragment
server knows the exact obfuscated state of any other (can only see a vector
of possible obfuscated states). The challenge with this attack is knowing if
the current mapping for each fragment server has been found, whereas with
encryption, it is mathematically provable that the correct decryption key was
found.
7.4.5 Remarks on the Privacy Provided by FRIBs
This section has covered the security analysis for FRIBs, primarily the en-
hanced privacy model, as it offers the best privacy out of all the models pre-
sented in this thesis. Bin Encoding presented in Chapter 4 introduced the idea
of Privacy-Preserving Encoding, where having knowledge of (1) the encoded
data, (2) the algorithm for encoding and (3) the random mappings cannot
directly decode the data. The protection/strength comes from the number of
possible combinations and the difficulty of knowing whether possible decoded
values are correct. The same is true with FRIBs, especially with the enhanced
privacy model and one set of fragments. Naturally, if all the fragments are
retrieved (leaked by a malicious entity), the only challenge is joining them
together in the correct order. For example, fragments f0, f1, f2, f3 could be
ordered f2, f1, f3, f0 on one fragment server, and f2, f3, f0, f1 on another. In
this case, the program would need to know the ordering; however, it means
that if the data is stolen, the fragments cannot be directly joined together.
There will exist other techniques to reduce the number of combinations,
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Figure 7.20: Network latency experienced across nine AWS datacenter locations
but these will be more implementation specific. Therefore, it is important to
test any implementation to see if the states are being reached in a seemingly
random manner. The security results presented for the voting implementation
showed with an equal probability of a fragment server receiving a 0 or 1 and
with the client randomly generating its fragment, there were no patterns in
states or transitions. Therefore, if the fragment servers are hosted by different
providers (AWS, Azure, Google Cloud Platform are a few examples) then a
company’s or personal data is hidden. Similarly, in the case of voting, if all
fragment servers are hosted by different providers and managed by different
organisations/entities (government, universities, companies to name a few),
then a user’s vote is hidden.
7.5 Other Areas of Analysis
A few other topics for analysis will be covered in this section: fragment server
locations and thread mismatches. Another aspect of FRIBs is introduced–
data privacy laws–which also play a role in keeping the fragments protected.
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7.5.1 Latency
Figure 7.20 represents the average latency between nine AWS locations across
the world. Note that all the AWS instances were free-tier so have the least
priority for network and bandwidth. This figure shows that close groups have
RTT ranging between 20− 100ms for the majority, whereas locations such as
Sydney do not have usable RTT times. Section 7.2.4 showed that parallelisa-
tion can hide latency; however, with large physical distances (cross-continent),
then the traffic is susceptible to higher packet loss and reduced bandwidth.
Therefore, for high-performance implementations of FRIBs, having all the frag-
ment servers in the same/near countries with high bandwidth is required.
7.5.2 Data Privacy Laws
Laws governing data privacy differ between countries and jurisdictions [174].
This means organisations and personal users need to understand where their
data is physically at rest, not just which country the user resides in. Given
that FRIBs has been designed to protect against any single entity, if a law en-
forcement agency thinks some data/user is malicious or is under investigation,
their data can be requested. However, the requests will be to each different
hosting company, which can be in different jurisdictions, thus differently the
laws that cover the data. For example, if fragments are hosted in country A
and country B, the strength and/or weaknesses of both protect the privacy
of the data. If country A has weak privacy laws, but country B has strict
laws, then even if the fragments from country A are requested and received,
the legal process of country B still needs to be followed. If all organisation-
s/countries agree that the data should be handed over to law enforcement,
then the data can be decoded, but if only one country or state thinks the data
should be handed over, then the data is still protected. Some examples of
country and company data policies are given in Appendix E, to help highlight
how distributing data can improve data protection and spread the decision for
data requests across different courts and judges. This thesis does not claim
the novelty of distributing data for distributing data privacy laws, but instead
shows it is another property offered by FRIBs.
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Figure 7.21: Thread scheduling across two fragment servers for fifty randomly
started user jobs
7.5.3 Threading Mismatches
Each fragment server executes the same instructions before a reduction is
needed, and all the fragments need to be received before a reduction can re-
turn a result. Ideally, all the servers are running the user’s threads at the
same time; in reality, this cannot be guaranteed. A test was executed where
50 user threads were started in random order with a 10ms delay between each,
where the thread order for two fragment servers was recorded. The user task
computes 100 addition operations using the performance model implementa-
tion in Lisp. Figure 7.21 shows 10% of the threads for the first few addition
operations, where each line represents the start of an addition operation across
both servers, and the colour represents a unique user task. The labelled thread
starts early on FB, but takes longer to start on FA. However, the start of the
next five additions happens at nearly the same time on both servers. This
happens as each thread must wait for the other to reach the reduction stage;
therefore, the threads are able to line up on both servers, where the thread
counts on each are similar.
7.5.4 Pseudo-Random Number Generators
The security strength of pseudo-random number generators is out-of-scope
of this thesis; however, to mitigate the chance or consequences of the target
fragment server learning the seed used to obfuscated its result LUT, we can
periodicity change the seed. One of the other two fragment servers can use a
true random number generator to create a new seed, and securely send it to the
remaining fragment server, or both could work together to create a new seed–
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distributing the entropy–but this would require more network communication.
A commonly used pseudo-random number generator (including Python) is
the Mersenne Twister [175], which due to linear recursion is not considered
cryptographically secure [176]. The output of the pseudo-random number
generator is hidden from the target fragment server because it is XORed with
the LUT row, making it difficult to be able to recover the output needed
to predict new output. Other techniques can make the Mersenne Twister
secure, including using a secure hashing algorithm or combining multiple out-
puts. Therefore, even though analysing the security of pseudo-random number
generators is out-of-scope, the combination of periodicity changing seeds, the
output of the pseudo-random number generator being XORed, and the fact
pseudo-random number generators can be cryptographically secure, means the
security strength of FRIBs should not be compromised by the use of pseudo-
random number generators.
7.6 Summary
This chapter demonstrated implementations for both cloud voting and search-
ing, while describing the wrapper functions and processes (scheduler and LUT
generation). The primary hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) of this thesis is to find a
method where privacy-preserving processing in the cloud can be practical. In
terms of the definition of practicality in Chapter 3, performance is the main
attribute being evaluated for computation on the client and within the cloud.
For client performance, FRIBs will be similar to plain text except for the
fragmentation generation and that data needs to be sent to multiple servers.
Partially homomorphic encryption schemes with the required zero-knowledge
proof cannot match the client-side performance of FRIBs, especially within
web browsers. FRIBs also offers reasonable computation performance in the
cloud for dedicated implementations, where it could process 174 votes per
second. Using one server, a partially homomorphic encryption scheme with
zero-knowledge proofs could achieve a maximum of 91 votes per second, and
with the same number of servers as FRIBs, it could reach 273 votes per sec-
ond. Even though the cloud performance of FRIBs is not at the same level as
partially homomorphic encryption, taking into consideration client-side perfor-
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mance, the two techniques have their claims for having the best performance.
The second aspect of practicality is utility and flexibility, for both the client
and cloud. Partially homomorphic encryption can only add a single vote to the
tally, where FRIBs can implement more advanced voting schemes. So, in terms
of utility and performance, FRIBs is more practical than existing partially
homomorphic encryption schemes. This chapter also presented a searching
example using FRIBs, where the lower layer implementation was generic, so
any program could be built upon it without regenerating new result LUTs.
This is a feature that traditional multi-party computation techniques lack,
along with LUT reuse. However, the fact that FRIBs only reveals the servers
next state, and hides some of the inputs to the lookup, means it can reuse the
same LUTs. This was proven in Section 7.4, where there was no bias between
states reached and transitions between states, while the vector received had an
equal probability of containing any state. This means FRIBs is able to offer
privacy-preserving processing without the need for the data to be encrypted
by the client or on the fragment servers, answering Hypothesis 3 (data is only
encrypted when transmitted on the network).
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8.1 Revisiting the Hypotheses
As discussed, Hypotheses 1 and 2 did not lead to any breakthroughs for an-
swering the research question “Can fully homomorphic encryption be practical
in the cloud?”. This question still remains open, as Hypothesis 3 widened the
scope from only homomorphic encryption to any privacy-preserving technique.
Hypothesis 3 was realised with the novel scheme presented in this thesis, Frag-
menting Individual Bits (FRIBs), a form of multi-party computation that uses
encoding and distribution to protect privacy. Chapter 5 introduced the concept
of FRIBs, presenting two core models: a performance model and an enhanced
privacy model. The enhanced privacy model requires twice the network latency
as the performance mode, but offers greater privacy and therefore is the rec-
ommended model. The models use LUTs to compute operations, and support
generic logic (NAND gates) and custom functions, as discussed in Chapter 6.
Each result from the LUT only gives the new fragment value (a single bit) for
one fragment server; therefore, keeping LUT sizes small. The LUTs for the en-
hanced privacy model can also be reused without revealing patterns, addressing
an issue for most multi-party computation schemes. Other improvements over
current multi-party computation schemes are that homomorphic encryption is
not required and less network data is transmitted.
Two implementations are given in Chapter 7, representing the different as-
pects of practicality in order to prove that FRIBs can be practical in the cloud.
The voting implementation allowed the comparing of FRIBs to the schemes in
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Chapter 3, showing that the performance is close to that of partially homomor-
phic encryption in the cloud. Client-side performance is actually comparable
to plain text, which was a limitation of partially homomorphic encryption,
especially for the survey application in Chapter 3. The second implementa-
tion was an exact searching function, which can be combined with the work in
Chapter 4–Bin Encoding–for faster search times. This work showed the flexi-
bility of FRIBs and how programs could be written oﬄine before automatically
running on top of FRIBs in the cloud.
The research presented in this thesis has endeavoured to find the balance
between security, performance and utility. Both performance and utility were
met by FRIBs, but Hypothesis 3 also required privacy to be protected (the
security aspect). Chapter 7 covered the privacy analysis for FRIBs, where the
enhanced privacy model gave acceptable results; the value cannot be decoded
with one set of fragments even while spying on the server during operation.
The experiments included analysing the patterns in the states received in the
request vector and patterns in the fragment servers own states. For the voting
implementation (the primary use case), there was an equal probability of any
fragment server state being reached, even with millions of no votes cast. With
an equal probability of reaching any state, and an equal probability of receiv-
ing a 1 or 0 fragment (even with all no votes), means FRIBs provides sufficient
voter privacy. The values can only be decoded if all the fragments are retrieved
(stolen or leaked) similar to threshold cryptography; therefore, encoding and
distribution can protect data privacy while being practical, where basic en-
cryption is only needed for network transfers, thus realising Hypothesis 3.
8.2 Revisiting the Use Cases
An implementation for the first use case given in Section 1.3.1 for voting has
been presented in Section 7.2. A vote of 0 or 1 can be fragmented, sent to each
fragment server, verified, then added to the tally of the ballot. During the
fragmentation, because the vote is a single bit, no proofs are required by the
user to prove the vote is valid–an improvement over partially homomorphic
encryption. Restrictions such as only one vote per set of candidates can be
computed by the fragment servers without revealing any information about the
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vote. Votes are added to the tally, allowing millions of users to cast electronic
votes while protecting their privacy.
Low powered devices are collecting and sending data to the cloud for analysis
in the second use case. Chapter 3 showed that client performance is also critical
for a practical scheme, where encrypting and generating proofs could take min-
utes on a mobile device. With the simple fragmentation algorithm for FRIBs
requiring very little computational power, a device can use already optimised
encryption algorithms [115] to send the fragments to the fragment servers;
giving FRIBs superior client side performance over other solutions. The data
collected by the low powered device is kept privately in the cloud at all times
while maintaining its functionality. The second use case mentions heartbeat
monitoring, which could be analysed using neural networks [177][178]. Once
trained, neural networks only use basic functions which could then identify
irregularities in health data. The fragment servers need to be split across or-
ganisations, where the models (or functions) can be kept confidential from the
user, while the users’ data is kept private from the organisations.
The third use case has companies moving to cloud environments, but re-
quires data to remain secure, even from the cloud hosting companies. With
this requirement, encryption either needs to be performed on a client device
or a company gateway before being transmitted to the cloud. Fully homomor-
phic encryption cannot be used due to processing overheads; therefore, any
processing requires downloading the data from the cloud back to a device.
A multi-party computation scheme such as FRIBs would give more flexibil-
ity than current homomorphic encryption schemes. FRIBs allows LUTs to be
reused for different users and applications within the company, allowing a more
user-centric implementation over other multi-party computation schemes.
Sharing data between organisations in the cloud is the final use case in Sec-
tion 1.3.1. For example, with the health sector, patient records need to remain
private, thus making data sharing difficult. Data anonymisation techniques
exist [144][145][146] but are not perfect [179], where the FRIBs scheme does
not need data to be anonymised. Each organisation can host a fragment server,
and fragmented patient data can be stored across all the fragment servers (all
organisations); therefore, each organisation has fragments of all the data but
cannot do anything with them. When all the fragment servers perform the
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same operation, only then can operations be performed over the data; if an
organisation does not agree with the function, they can deny it and the func-
tion cannot be run. When data is shared using an anonymisation technique,
it is difficult to recall the data – control is no longer with the owner of the
data–whereas with FRIBs, the organisation can delete the fragments on its
server, rendering the other fragments useless.
Use cases presented in Section 1.3.1 are implementable with FRIBs, allowing
for practical privacy-preserving processing in the cloud to protect users and or-
ganisations with current technologies. Not all functions or applications would
be possible, but FRIBs provides more flexibility over homomorphic encryption
and other multi-party computation schemes.
8.3 Future Work
The research presented in this thesis has proven the plausibility of using en-
coding for privacy-preserving processing in the cloud. However, there are a
number of areas that can be explored for the FRIBs scheme.
The functionality to hide the program being executed from the cloud exists
but has not been explored. Custom LUTs can be used, and instead of the
program having the instruction ADD, it could be FUN1. The reason hiding
programs has not been tested is because the patterns of each function could
reveal the operation, where an add or multiply will have a different number of
reductions (even if named FUN1 and FUN2 ). Combining the hidden function
name with the redundancy model would help hide the program even further
if the redundancy aspect is not actually required, because then purposeful
corruption could be applied to each instruction set received by the fragments
servers, where one always contains an error.
A useful property for FRIBs would be the ability to bootstrap, where it can
generate new LUTs in the cloud without revealing any information or needing
a client. Because data is fragmented using a single algorithm, the data does
not need to be re-encrypted to use any new LUT. This was not researched,
because it is very easy for a client to generate the LUTs and securely send
them to the fragment servers.
Currently, there is no verification or proof mechanism built into FRIBs where
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the fragment servers could prove the operation and the bit fragments operated
on. There is a form of verification for operations if there is at least one honest
fragment server, as the other fragment servers cannot run arbitrary functions.
Hash chaining could be used to provide a form of accounting; for example,
when a fragment server receives a fragment, it could also receive the hash
values for other fragment servers. During execution, each fragment server can
chain the hashes for the corresponding fragments. All the hash chains should
give the same value across each fragment server.
System level mechanisms can also be put in place to harden security. A
dedicated server could be built to only run the FRIBs scheme, for example,
using an FPGA [36] or programming on bare metal. In a virtual environment,
while an operation is being performed, central processing unit task switching
could be disabled, keeping states in registers, and can be encrypted before
leaving the central processing unit. Given all the fragment servers have to
process fragments at the same time, storage locks could be designed so that
each fragment server needs to approve the access to the fragment.
Further analysis is required for the network traffic produced by FRIBs com-
pared to other multi-party computation schemes, especially in terms of the
oﬄine processing (for example, generating the triples [95]). There are possible
improvements for performing operations faster, such as multiplication, to get
it closer to the performance of addition with pipelining. Finally, getting a
real-world system to use FRIBs and to promote further development on the
scheme would be a big goal for the future.
8.4 Final Remarks
The concept of using encoding instead of encryption for privacy-preserving
processing is possible with FRIBs; however, encryption still remains impor-
tant for network transfers, otherwise all the fragments could be stolen when
transferred to the fragment servers. Another important requirement is the frag-
ment servers should be hosted in different cloud environments, both virtual and
physical, to prevent any single entity having access to more than one fragment
server. Aside from that, FRIBs offers a balance between security, performance
and utility for cloud computing, unlike state-of-the-art techniques presented in
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Chapter 2. FRIBs is a subset of multi-party computation but does not require
the garbled circuits or inputs to be encrypted, while also allowing the LUTs
(garbled circuits or garbled gates) to be reused. In terms of multi-party com-
putation versus homomorphic encryption, both have positives; homomorphic
encryption ultimately has better security, but distributing data such that it
cannot be reconstructed without each fragment also distributes trust, privacy
laws, system level security, and allows for greater redundancy support.
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A
Custom Modulo Algorithm
The research presented in this appendix is a summary of the published pa-
per [180], which tried to find an improvement or optimisation for a modulo
algorithm. This was due to Hypothesis 1, as the modulus algorithm is heav-
ily used in encryption schemes, any improvement would therefore make the
encryption schemes themselves more practical. With the same modulo value
being applied for encryption, precomputing values for the operation could help
improve performance. The algorithm proposed in this appendix calculates the
modulus, as shown in Algorithm 7 which computes X mod Y . The functions
are shown before the pseudo code, where α denotes the parameter into the
function. Lower case variables with a subscript represent bits at an index in
the upper case variable, as shown by the definition of T . Finally, ˆ denotes the
variable is an array or set. These notations will be the same for the theorems
and proofs in Section A.2.
The bit shifting operation is the key feature of this algorithm, as it allows
the use of a single precomputed value to find the modulus of all bits above the
bit width of Y . We can also use multiple precomputed values in the form of
a LUT and use a larger bit shift to improve performance, which is described
in Section A.3. By using a LUT, actually allows the algorithm to be mostly
implemented with FRIBs without much effort, as mentioned in Section 6.4.4.
A similar algorithm, proposed by Cao et al. [181] requires a precomputed
value for each bit above the bit width of Y . This can be very costly as the
precomputed values have a fixed size, where the algorithm proposed in this
appendix can vary the number of precomputed values. The other key property
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Algorithm 7 Custom mod algorithm
Compute: X mod Y
Width(α) = width of α in terms of bits
Split(α,w) = {∑w−1i=0 αi2i, ...,∑w−1
i=0 αWidth(α)−w+i2i}
Num(αˆ) = number of elements in αˆ
T = ∑Width(T )−1i=0 ti2i, ti ∈ {0, 1}
1: Gˆ = Split(X,Width(Y ))
2: N = Num(Gˆ)− 1
3: while N > 0 do
4: T = Gˆ[N ]
5: for i = Width(Y )− 1 downto 0 do
6: T = T << 1
7: while tWidth(Y ) = 1 do
8: tWidth(Y ) = 0
9: T = T + (2Width(Y ) mod Y )
10: Gˆ[N − 1] = Gˆ[N − 1] + T
11: while Gˆ[N − 1]Width(Y ) = 1 do
12: Gˆ[N − 1]Width(Y ) = 0
13: Gˆ[N − 1] = Gˆ[N − 1] + (2Width(Y ) mod Y )
14: N = N − 1
15: while Gˆ[0] > Y do
16: Gˆ[0] = Gˆ[0]− Y
return Gˆ[0]
of our algorithm is that it only reads data of X once (reads an element in Gˆ
once), starting from the uppermost bits and working down to the 0th bit.
This gives the algorithm excellent spatial and temporal locality. In terms
of a hardware implementation, it also means the data can be streamed from
memory. Then because only a fixed amount of data is read and computed
at a time, allows custom hardware to be faster, have better area usage, and
be more power efficient. This guaranteed data width is another property that
other solutions cannot offer easily.
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A.1 Description
Before the algorithm is described in further detail, first the functions must be
explained.
• Width: Given the parameter α, this function will return the minimum
number of bits in α. Put simply, it results the index of the uppermost
high bit, plus one. For example, if 13 were inputted, the result would be
4.
• Split: The first parameter α is the value to be split, and the second w
is a bit width value. This function splits α into a vector, so that each
element is bit width w. If α cannot be be split up evenly (the bit width
of α is not a multiple of w), then α can be padded with zero bits. For
example, splitting 35 into a vector with an element bit width of 4, results
in {3, 2}. In terms of binary values, such as 35 = 1000112, the result
would be {00112, 00102} (note the padded zeros at index 1).
• Num: Number of elements in the vector αˆ after the split function.
The first line of Algorithm 7 splits X into a vector Gˆ so that the elements
have the same width as Y . Then we set N to the uppermost index of Gˆ,
because we will process the elements in reverse. Once we enter the loop, we
will set T to element N for ease of understanding the algorithm.
The For loop will count from 0 to the number of bits in Y . Each iteration we
shift T left by one, thus doubling the value T ; if an overflow occurs, meaning
that the width of T is no longer equal to that of Y (the bit at index Width(Y )
is high), we clear this overflow bit and add 2Width(Y ) mod Y to T . The value
we add should be precomputed so that it is already in modulo Y ; therefore, it
costs just one addition operation. The reason for this is because if an overflow
occurs, we are guaranteed that T is greater than Y ; we add the modulo value
of this overflow bit back to the answer, which keeps T the same bit width
as Y . Therefore this means that T is or is close to the correct value. When
adding 2Width(Y ) mod Y to T , another overflow may occur, which requires
us to repeat line 7 until no overflow occurs. The LUT could be designed to
handle two overflows meaning this repeating of line 7 is not required. Note
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that clearing the overflow bit could also be achieved by subtracting Y from T .
But depending on implementation, it is possible that multiple subtractions of
Y are required to clear the overflow bit. Also subtraction would not allow the
use of a lookup table.
Once we have finished the For loop, we have performed Width(Y ) number
of shifts on T . We then add T to the next element in Gˆ; it is possible for an
overflow to occur at this step, so we have to include the loop on Line 11 to deal
with this. Once we reach element 0–the lowermost bits of X–we know that
we are already close to the correct result, meaning the loop can break. More
subtractions could be required before the correct result is reached (depending
on implementation).
The correct answer is now in element 0, which can be returned. In order
to prove that this algorithm will produce the correct modulus answer, the
theorems and proofs that the algorithm is based upon will now be discussed.
A.2 Theorems and Proofs
The algorithms main operation is to double the value of T , and by doing this,
we are also doubling the modulus. This is shown in Theorem 1. Note that
it is important to find the modulus of 2M because by doubling M , the result
could become greater than Y .
Theorem 1 If X mod Y =M , then 2X mod Y = 2M mod Y
Proof 1 Given X mod Y =M where X, Y ∈ Z and M ∈ ZY0
X
Y
= Q+M (Q = Quotient)
∴ X mod Y ≡M mod Y
2X
Y
= 2(Q+M)
2X
Y
= 2Q+ 2M
∴ 2X mod Y ≡ 2M mod Y
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Because an integer represented in binary is made up of powers of 2s, it is said
that the number is the sum of power of 2s; therefore, if we take the modulus
of each power of 2 and sum them, it is equivalent to summing the power of 2s
then taking the modulus, as in the theorem below.
Theorem 2 Given an integer X, which is the sum of power of 2s, then the sum
of the modulus’s of the power of 2s in Y , is equivalent to the modulus of X
in Y .
Proof 2 Given X mod Y where X, Y ∈ Z
X =
n−1∑
i=0
xi2i (where xi ∈ {0, 1})
xi2i
Y
= Qi +Mi (where Qi,Mi ∈ Z)
xi2i mod Y ≡Mi mod Y
∴ X mod Y ≡
n−1∑
i=0
Mi mod Y
Theorem 3 in the general context of the algorithm is the same as Theorem 1.
However, Theorem 3 is required because the proposed algorithm can use a LUT
which Theorem 1 does not make clear.
Theorem 3 Given an integer X, which is to be shifted bit left by w, the modulus
of X bit shifted by w is equivalent to finding the modulus of X after being bit
shifted.
Proof 3 Given (X << w) mod Y =M where X, Y,M,w ∈ Z
Because left bit shifting X by w is equivalent to doubling X w times, we can
use Theorem 1 to prove that:
((X mod Y ) << w) mod Y ≡ (X << w) mod Y ≡M
The first three theorems are the basic underlying operations used in the
algorithm. Now the proof for the fundamental idea behind the algorithm is
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required. Theorem 4 proves the initial step of the algorithm, splitting up X
into elements of an array/vector so that they can be concatenated together to
give X. Then when finding the modulus of X, the modulus of each element
(with bit shifting) is summed.
Theorem 4 When finding X mod Y , if X is larger then Y in terms of number
of bits, the modulus is equivalent to dividing X into elements of the same bit
size as Y , follow by the bit shifting and summing the modulus values of each
element.
Proof 4 Given X mod Y =M where X, Y,M ∈ Z
Because the concatenation of Xˆ is equivalent to X. Then by shifting each
item in Xˆ to the correct bit position and summing, is equivalent to X; therefore,
we can use Theorem 2 and 3 so that
(n/k)−1∑
i=0
(Xˆi << ki) mod Y ≡ X mod Y
Note: if n mod k 6= 0, then X can be padded with 0s until n mod k = 0.
Theorem 5 proves that a single precomputed value (or a LUT), can be used
to help find the modulus in each element greater than 0. This is an important
property of the algorithm, as it allows the use of more precomputed values in
the form of a lookup table.
Theorem 5 When calculating the modulus off Xˆi in Y where i > 0, the modulus
is equivalent to multiplying Xˆi by
(
2k mod Y << k(i− 1)
)
.
Proof 5
Xˆi << ki mod Y
≡ Xˆi2ki mod Y
≡ (Xˆi mod Y )× (2ki mod Y )
≡ (Xˆi mod Y )× (2k << k(i− 1) mod Y )
Instead of multiplying (as in Theorem 5), we instead shift each individual bit
in an element and add if an overflow occurs. These are proven to be equivalent
in Theorem 6.
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Theorem 6 Left shifting Xˆi by ki in modulo Y where i > 0, is equivalent to
shifting Xˆi one shift at a time. Then, if the kth bit becomes high after any
shift (or add operation), drop it, and add 2k mod Y to Xˆi. Therefore, keeping
the bit width of Xˆi constant, while remaining in modulo Y .
Proof 6
Xˆi × 2ki mod Y
≡ Xˆi << ki mod Y
≡ (((Xˆi << 1 mod Y ) ... ) << 1 mod Y )
After each shift we put Xˆ back into modulo Y , and because Xˆ has k bits, if the
kth bit becomes high (an overflow), we know that Xˆ is definitely bigger than
Y . Then by using Theorem 4 and 5, we can say that Xˆ is equivalent in modulo
Y to adding 2k mod Y to Xˆ (after dropping the kth bit).
Theorem 6 is the main theorem for this algorithms operation (producing the
correct answer); however, for implementations would suffer from performance
issues. This is due to the amount of shifting and potential adding which we
would need to perform. So instead of shifting an element to its correct position
directly, we can just shift it by the number of bits in Y , then start shifting the
next element as well. This is shown in Theorem 7, and in terms of performance
of the algorithm, is the most important theorem.
Theorem 7 If we start calculating the modulus of X in Y at Xˆ(n/k)−1, then
instead of performing k (((n/k)− 1)− 1) number of shifts, we can perform k
shifts, then add Xˆ(n/k)−1 to Xˆ(n/k)−2. Repeating until we reach Xˆ0 which will
contain the result.
Proof 7
(
Xˆ(n/k)−1 << k((n/k)− 2)
)
+
(
Xˆ(n/k)−2 << k((n/k)− 3)
)
≡
(
Xˆ(n/k)−1 << k << k((n/k)− 3)
)
+
(
Xˆ(n/k)−2 << k((n/k)− 3)
)
≡
((
Xˆ(n/k)−1 << k
)
+
(
Xˆ(n/k)−2
))
<< k((n/k)− 3)
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A.2.1 Example
Below is an example on how to solve 1620 mod 11 on a 4-bit processor using
the proposed algorithm.
1620 = 0110010101002
11 = 10112
Gˆ = {01102, 01012, 01002}
T = Gˆ[2]
= 01102
T = T << 1
= 11002
T = T << 1
= 1 10002
T = 10002+
(100002 mod 10112)
= 10002 + 01012
= 11012
T = T << 1
= 1 10102
T = 10102 + 01012
= 11112
T = T << 1
= 1 11102
T = 11102 + 01012
= 1 00112
= 00112 + 01012
= 10002
T = T + Gˆ[1]
= 10002 + 01012
= 11012
T = T << 1
= 1 10102
T = 10102 + 01012
= 11112
T = T << 1
= 1 11102
T = 11102 + 01012
= 1 00112
T = 00112 + 01012
= 10002
T = T << 1
= 1 00002
T = 00002 + 01012
= 01012
T = T << 1
= 10102
T = T + Gˆ[0]
= 10102 + 01002
= 11102
T = T − 11
= 11102 − 10112
= 00112
∴ 1620 mod 11 = 3
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Table A.1: Simple modulo LUT for a
single bit
Key Value
0 0
1 2k mod Y
Table A.2: Simple modulo LUT for two
bits
Key Value
00 0
01 2k mod Y
10 2k+1 mod Y
11 (2k + 2k+1) mod Y
A.3 Lookup Table
A useful property of this algorithm is the use of a variable sized LUT. LUTs
may not be suitable for all applications or functions, such as key generation,
because the overhead in creating the table could be too expensive. However,
for applications where large amounts of data must be computed with the same
modulo value, such as smart-cards or secure tunnels, there is the potential of
a performance gain. The algorithm in its most basic form already uses a LUT.
For each shift, if an overflow occurs a precomputed value is added, else add 0,
as shown in Table A.1.
This can be extended to look at more bits at once. For example, looking
at two bits, the LUT would be that of Table A.2. By shifting two bits at a
time (instead of a single shift), still only requires a single add. However, this
makes a software implementation slightly more difficult, because the overflow
bit cannot be used anymore; therefore, the upper two bits of T need to be
looked at before shifting. The proof-of-concept software implementation used
an AND operation then a shift to get these upper bits. On a 64-bit processor,
a LUT with a key size of up to 64-bits, only requires the AND and shift
operations to be executed on a single 64-bit register, regardless of the size of
Y . To possibly improve performance even more, one approach that could be
explored is reversing the bits in each element (and keys), meaning only an
AND operation would be required.
Given that the LUT is of variable size, it is important to make the whole
table fit into the processors cache. This makes the lookup time require sig-
nificantly less clock cycles than fetching from main memory, thus improving
performance. The size of Y has the biggest impact on the size of the lookup
table. For example, if Y is a 2048-bit value then each item in the table requires
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2048-bits, plus the number of bits for each key.
A.4 Concluding Remarks
As mentioned, an algorithm similar to the one proposed in this appendix is
the Fast Modular Reduction Method proposed by Cao et al. [181]. Their
method also uses a fixed size LUT similar to precomputed tables described
in [182]. Comparing these tables, the Fast Modular Reduction Method [181]
has a fixed size lookup table. So for example, if Y is 2048 bits, then there must
be 2048 entries in the table, each of a size of 2048 bits. Resulting in a size of
approximately 4Mb. Also because of this, the bit width of the input X, can be
no more than double the bit width of Y . This is because the lookup table only
contains entries for the bits up to double that of Y , which for this example is
22048 to 24096. This is a major limitation of their algorithm. However, when
looking at the LUT proposed in this appendix, it can vary in size and can
support an arbitrary bit length of X. This is important to allow the table
to fit in cache, and for devices which have limited storage. Using the same
example where Y is 2048 bits, if the LUT key is 8-bits, then the total size is
approximately 0.5Mb.
An implementation in hardware, for example an FPGA would yield faster
results than software; however, performance in software did not improve over
other modular algorithms. Even though these algorithms have already been
highly optimised, any improvement in the implementation of the proposed
algorithm still would not have made fully homomorphic encryption practical.
Investigating the modular operation in detail highlighted the challenges of
making fully homomorphic encryption practical with current schemes, thus
leading from Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 2.
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B
A Simple Fully Homomorphic
Encryption Algorithm
Limited improvements were realised by looking into already highly optimised
large number operations, as detailed in Appendix A when trying to answer Hy-
pothesis 1; therefore, the fully homomorphic encryption algorithms themselves
need to be made more lightweight in order to achieve practical performance
(Hypothesis 2). We started with a simple equation using waves, in an at-
tempt to see what is required to make it work and to make it at least secure
against brute-force attacks. This work should not be considered unique but
an exploratory process into Hypothesis 2.
B.1 General Concept
To support addition and multiplication, continuous waves were used to encrypt
data; such as the cosine wave. Given m = a cos(fx) + b, a is the amplitude, f
is the frequency, b is the displacement of the wave, while m (y) is the message
(in reality m = a cos(fx) + b ≡ m = ax + b). For addition, we can keep a,
f and x private, and b as the cipher text. An example is shown below where
x = 3, f = 2 and a = 10.
E(5)→ 5 = 10 cos(2× 3) + b
b = 5− 10 cos(6)
= −4.6017
E(6)→ 6 = 10 cos(2× 3) + b
b = 6− 10 cos(6)
= −3.6017
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w0
w1
w2
Figure B.1: Visual representation of adding two waves together (w0 + w1 = w2)
A problem can be seen from this example, where the difference between the
two m’s and b’s are both 1. To add randomness, the value a can be selected
at random; however, it needs to be combined with b to form the cipher-text
value.
E(8)→ 8 = 19 cos(4× 5) + b
b = 0.24644
∴ E(8) = 19, 0.24644
E(11)→ 11 = 27 cos(4× 5) + b
b = −0.018216
∴ E(11) = 27,−0.018216
Adding the values together gives 46, and 0.228224, which can be decrypted to
19 → y = 46cos(4 × 5) + 0.228224; where a visual representation is given in
Figure B.1. The waves themselves would only be important if x was random;
however, these would need to be tracked or if the data was stored in a physical
form such as light waves being added together during transit.1
Multiplication is more difficult because a new value is introduction; for ex-
ample, (a0x + b0)(a1x + b1) now contains x2. In the example using cos, the
growth needs to be controlled such that cos2 is represented as cos; cos2(4 ×
5) ≡ cos(20) − 0.24155109. A more precisely chosen frequency would yield
cos2(fx) ≡ cos(fx) + i where i ∈ Z. Therefore, during multiplication instead
of adding cos2, the values cos(20)− 0.24155109 would be added, as shown be-
low. An issue that starts to arise is precision, but this can be left as an open
problem for now as using a different equation (not waves) would help solve
this.
1The idea of computation in a physical form was the original reason for using waves.
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(27 cos(fx)− 0.018216)(19 cos(fx) + 0.24644)
513 cos2(fx)− 0.346104 cos(fx) + 6.65388 cos(fx)− 0.0044891504
513 cos2(fx) + 6.307776 cos(fx)− 0.0044891504
513(cos(fx)− 0.24155109) + 6.307776 cos(fx)− 0.0044891504
519.307776 cos(fx)− 123.92019817
The value −0.24155109 now needs to be protected, which can be done in the
same manner where −0.24155109 = a cos(20) + b; setting a = 15 results in
b = −6.362782017.
513(15 cos(fx)− 6.362782017) + 6.307776 cos(fx)− 0.0044891504
8214.307776 cos(fx)− 3264.111664
The value a can also be protected, using a different fx. In fact, all this achieves
is changing the unknown part from cos(fx) to cos(fx0)/ cos(fx1). For exam-
ple, if fx0 = 5 and fx1 = 2, then below is an example encryption for 10 and
12. Repeating this step would then be cos(fx0)/ cos(fx1)/ cos(fx2) and can
be done indefinitely. It does not change the fact that to break the values, only
one part (λ) needs to be guessed (m = a(λ)+ b where a and b are known), but
it does increase the number of possibilities. The value used for multiplication
to stop new values being added now becomes cos2(fx0)/ cos2(fx1), where in
the example below cos2(5)/ cos2(2) = 0.4646. This value is protected again
where 0.4646− 14 cos(5) = −3.5066 and 14 cos(2) = −5.826 (note that 14 was
chosen at random).
E(10)→10− 25 cos(5) = 2.908445
25 cos(2) = −10.40367
∴ E(10) = −10.40367, 2.908445
E(12)→12− 31 cos(5) = 3.206
31 cos(2) = −12.90055
∴ E(12) = −12.90055, 3.206
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E(10) + E(12) = −23.304, 6.114445
D() = −23.304/ cos(2)× cos(5) + 6.114445
= 22
E(10)× E(12) = (−10.40367x+ 2.908445)(−12.90055x+ 3.206)
= 134.2130650185x2 − 70.8747061648x+ 9.32447467
= 134.2130650185(−5.826x− 3.5066)− 70.8747061648x
+ 9.32447467
= −781.9253167978x− 470.6315337939− 70.8747061648x
+ 9.32447467
= −852.8000229626x− 461.3070591239
D(E(10)× E(12)) = −852.8000229626(cos(5)/cos(2))− 461.3070591239
= 120
B.2 Outcome
If two equal values are combined and solved using simultaneous equations,
then the plain-text value is revealed; therefore, it can be easy to brute force
no matter the complexity of the equation or how big the numbers are. This is
the main issue with many simple examples of fully homomorphic encryption,
and like these many examples of fully homomorphic encryption, error can be
added into the equations. However, this error needs to be managed; for the
current method of waves, where precision errors are already problematic, it
would be difficult to control the error. Like lattice based schemes, the point
could be shifted off the wave, where the closest point to the wave is the value.
Ultimately, using waves did not give an advantage over a simple linear equation,
because supporting both addition and multiplication limited their usefulness;
however, this work did help lead onto the main research presented in this
thesis, in particular Chapter 4.
224
B.2 Outcome
Even though this would be a symmetric scheme, for cloud processing this
would be acceptable; however, the other limitations were too great to continue
along this path. The primary outcome from this work was the ability to
add search for encrypted characters, which have not had any homomorphic
processing over them. To accomplish this, characters can be encrypted such
that a predefined selection of inputs have a range of a values. For example,
encrypting a set of characters m,n,o with a between 1, 000 − 10, 000, would
mean the cipher values are similar to each other. The set p,q,r could have a
range a value between 100, 000 − 110, 000, which would be differentiate them
from m,n,o. This idea of searching based on cipher ranges was explored in
Chapter 4.
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Screenshots
This appendix contains larger versions of screenshots for the following figures:
Chapter 3: Extending to Survey System
• Figure 3.3 (page 49) to Figure C.1 (page 228): Generating the public and
private key for a new survey
• Figure 3.4 (page 49) to Figure C.2 (page 229): Interface for creating a
survey
• Figure 3.5 (page 51) to Figure C.3 (page 230): Example of a user taking
a survey, with the encryption occurring in the background
• Figure 3.6 (page 52) to Figure C.4 (page 231): Example of a user review-
ing the results of their survey
• Figure 3.7 (page 52) to Figure C.5 (page 232): Example of how the cipher
and plain-text results for a survey are presented to the user
• Figure 3.8 (page 53) to Figure C.6 (page 233): Example of the perfor-
mance for decrypting each answer of a survey
Chapter 7: Proof-of-Concept Search Implementation
• Figure 7.7 (page 165) to Figures C.7 and C.8 (pages 234 and 235): A
proof-of-concept screenshot of searching for tagged wallet ID
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D
Source Code
The source code for proof-of-concept implementations given in this thesis can
be found at the following locations:
• https://github.com/maw41/FRIBs_Voting
• https://github.com/maw41/FRIBs_Search
Access to the following repository can be requested, for the web implementa-
tion of Mau Surveys.
• https://github.com/maw41/SecureSurveys
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E
Data Privacy Law Examples
This appendix provides a few examples of country laws and cloud service po-
lices in regards to data privacy.
E.1 Country Law
Part 2 of the New Zealand Privacy Act 1993, Principle 5 details storage and
security of personal information for an agency to meet and is given below.
Ultimately this part is vague in the sense that reasonable could range from
out-of-the-box security, to access policies and full data encryption.
An agency that holds personal information shall ensure—
(a) that the information is protected, by such security safeguards
as it is reasonable in the circumstances to take, against—
(i) loss; and
(ii) access, use, modification, or disclosure, except with the au-
thority of the agency that holds the information; and
(iii) other misuse; and
(b) that if it is necessary for the information to be given to a person
in connection with the provision of a service to the agency,
everything reasonably within the power of the agency is done
to prevent unauthorised use or unauthorised disclosure of the
information.
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In terms of lawfully requesting data, in Principle 11 Part 2, (e) on non-
compliance disclosure is important as it shows that law enforcement agencies
can request or get court orders for information. Section (f) mentions public
health and safety, which includes risks such as terrorism, but could also be
misused. The same is described in the United Kingdom Data Protection Act
1998; Sections 28 and 29 allow an organisation (cloud service) to disclose data
if they are persuaded in the interests of national security or criminal inves-
tigations; therefore, they can choose to withhold information, unless ordered
by the court. This is problematic, as the vagueness of the law does lead to
concerns and potential loopholes. For majority of cloud users, both personal
and enterprise, the probability of their data being requested is low. With
FRIBs distributing data–potentially across different jurisdictions–then sepa-
rate judges and other law personal need to approve the data request, thus
distributing data privacy in terms of law as well.
E.2 Cloud Service Terms and Conditions
The three main cloud service providers include in their polices to abide by
the law for data requests; however, it depends in which jurisdiction the data
resides.
Google Drive Privacy Policy [183]
We will share personal information with companies, organizations or
individuals outside of Google if we have a good-faith belief that ac-
cess, use, preservation or disclosure of the information is reasonably
necessary to:
• meet any applicable law, regulation, legal process or enforceable
governmental request.
• enforce applicable Terms of Service, including investigation of
potential violations.
• detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security or technical
issues.
• protect against harm to the rights, property or safety of Google,
our users or the public as required or permitted by law.
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Amazon AWS Data Privacy [184]
We are vigilant about our customers’ privacy. We do not disclose
customer content unless we’re required to do so to comply with the
law or a valid and binding order of a governmental or regulatory
body. Governmental and regulatory bodies need to follow the ap-
plicable legal process to obtain valid and binding orders, and we
review all orders and object to overbroad or otherwise inappropri-
ate ones. Unless prohibited from doing so or there is clear indication
of illegal conduct in connection with the use of Amazon products
or services, Amazon notifies customers before disclosing customer
content so they can seek protection from disclosure. It’s also im-
portant to point out that our customers can encrypt their customer
content, and we provide customers with the option to manage their
own encryption keys.
Microsoft Online Services [185]
Microsoft will not disclose Customer Data to law enforcement unless
required by law. Should law enforcement contact Microsoft with
a demand for Customer Data, Microsoft will attempt to redirect
the law enforcement agency to request that data directly from you.
If compelled to disclose Customer Data to law enforcement, then
Microsoft will promptly notify you and provide you a copy of the
demand unless legally prohibited from doing so.
The above policies are for data requests from law enforcement; however, the
same companies also state they have rights to user data, which can be seen as
a breech of data privacy. FRIBs would prevent a cloud service from accessing
and using data uploaded to their service.
Google Drive [186]
When you upload, submit, store, send or receive content to or
through Google Drive, you give Google a worldwide license to use,
host, store, reproduce, modify, create derivative works (such as those
resulting from translations, adaptations or other changes we make
so that your content works better with our services), communicate,
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publish, publicly perform, publicly display and distribute such con-
tent. The rights you grant in this license are for the limited purpose
of operating, promoting, and improving our services, and to develop
new ones. This license continues even if you stop using our services
unless you delete your content. Make sure you have the necessary
rights to grant us this license for any content that you submit to
Google Drive.
Dropbox [187]
We collect and use the personal data described above in order to
provide you with the Services in a reliable and secure manner. We
also collect and use personal data for our legitimate business needs.
To the extent we process your personal data for other purposes, we
ask for your consent in advance or require that our partners obtain
such consent.
Dropbox uses certain trusted third parties (for example, providers of
customer support and IT services) to help us provide, improve, pro-
tect, and promote our Services. These third parties will access your
information only to perform tasks on our behalf in compliance with
this Privacy Policy, and we’ll remain responsible for their handling
of your information per our instructions.
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